DEMOCRATIC CAMPAIGNING IN VENEZUELA

CALDERA'S VICTORY

by: david j. myers

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

Distribución exclusiva: EDITORIAL NATURA, S. R. L.
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DEMOCRATIC CAMPAIGNING IN VENEZUELA
CALDERA'S VICTORY

Impreso en Venezuela por Editorial Sucre

DAVID J. MYERS

Democratic Campaigning in Venezuela

Caldera's Victory

Monografía Nº 17

FUNDACION LA SALLE DE CIENCIAS NATURALES
INSTITUTO CARIBE DE ANTROPOLOGIA Y SOCIOLOGIA
Caracas, 1973

To my parents

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Venezuelan party leaders gave freely of their time by responding to questions in the middle of a heated election campaign and by arranging transportation that allowed the author to accompany candidates as they traveled throughout Venezuela. Special thanks are due to the four major presidential candidates —Rafael Caldera, Gonzalo Barrios, Miguel Angel Burelli Rivas and Luis Beltrán Prieto Figueroa— and to their staffs. Field research for this study was funded by the Latin American Center of the University of California, Los Angeles, and by the *Instituto Caribe de Antropología y Sociología* of Caracas, Venezuela. Matching grants from the La Salle Foundation and the *Centro Latino Americano de Venezuela* made possible its publication.

Recognition is also due to Professors John R. Sisson of the University of California — Los Angeles, Lee D. Olvey of the United States Military Academy and John D. Martz of the University of North Carolina. Their helpful comments on portions of the manuscript undoubtedly contributed to its improvement. In the final analysis, however, I willingly accept responsibility for my own writing.

D. J. M.

FOREWORD

The La Salle Foundation is best known for its research and development projects among indians and coastal fishermen. These are but two manifestations of our larger commitment to social science research and its application to Venezuela's most pressing problems. Since independence the problem of political succession has brought incalculable death and suffering. In very few instances has power been passed constittutionally from one individual to another. Following the revolution of 1958 Venezuela's return to democracy allowed our people to choose their government in free elections. Elections are preceded by political campaigns in which competition for votes brings into the open important societal rivalries, alliances and disputes. Campaigning also orients protagonists and allies toward electoral competition, and participation implies some commitment to respect voting returns. Selecting one's rulers by popular vote is perhaps the most successful procedure yet developed to resolve the problem of political succession. Understanding political campaigning, therefore, should be of highest priority to political leaders, social scientists and the citizenry.

Professor Myers, whose association with the La Salle Foundation began in 1966, has written a perceptive portrait of Venezuela's 1968 election campaign. One of the most important in our history, this campaign culminated in Rafael Caldera's election as chief executive. His acceptance of the presidential sash of office from Raul Leoni marked the first time in Venezuelan history that the government surrendered power to its opposition in accord with constitutional precepts. This was a benchmark in the consolidation of democracy and the institutionalization of procedures facilitating orderly political succession. Professor Myers' placing of the 1968 campaign in a theoretical and historial setting gives his work a dimension that will recommend it to scholars and policy makers for many years to come. For the former it offers theoretically useful new concepts and data about political campaigning. The latter will discover insights that can

increase the efficiency with which government policy can be implemented during electoral infighting. Finally, party strategists will find the study useful in organizing more efficient election campaigns.

A special word is in order concerning the "Epilogue", for it adds a new dimension. While not strictly part of the *Democratic Campaigning* analysis, it is the first published research into the formation and evolution of our party system using computer generated data. Findings confirm a variety of hypotheses often repeated by Venezuelan and foreign social scientists. However, they also reveal some unexpected relationships, such as the tendency of important elements of the urban middle class to vote for *Acción Democrática* and the strong affinity of illiterates for the Social Christians. Most startling, the computer analysis raises the possibility that events surrounding the 1968 election campaign weakened the electorate's faith in the multiparty system at the same time that Rafael Caldera's innauguration strengthened allegiance to democratic "rules of the game" among party leaders. This possibility and its implications should be examined carefully as Venezuelans plan our future. The La Salle Foundation believes that scientific political analysis will contribute to more rational and efficient choices. Hence the occasion for this book.

February 20, 1973.

HERMANO GINÉS
President

INTRODUCTION

Richard Rose, the noted British scholar, drew attention in his *Influencing Voters* to the need for middle range theories of election campaigning.[1] John D. Martz formally articulated a framework for analyzing election campaigns and expressed optimism that it might open the way for pre-theories of campaigning in "Democratic Political Campaigning in Latin America: A Typological Approach to Cross-Cultural Research".[2] Martz's approach was basically classificatory and constituted an important step forward. The framework developed in this "Introduction" also classifies, but in addition it emphasizes interaction.[3] Subsequent chapters describe the Venezuelan election campaign of 1968 using the interactive framework. Finally, the conclusion sets forth generalizations, based on application of the framework to Venezuela, that point toward middle range theories of election campaigns.

The conceptual perspective to be developed, referred to as the strategic game framework, assumes that election campaigns can be compared most profitably with a strategic game, and that such comparison is the best path to operational and classificatory theory. A strategic game framework, according to Professor Richard Snyder:

> employs as its basic model the game of strategy as distinct from games of chance. This is so because the pattern of rational behavior in a game of strategy is the same as that manifest in social situations that call for rational behavior — the achievement of aims at the minimum cost under certain conditions or the maximization of aims at fixed cost. The game and the conflict are on all fours

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1 Middle range theories take the route of systematic empirical analysis. RICHARD ROSECRANCE, *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (Boston: Little Brown, 1963), p. 5, defines this approach as endeavoring "to combine in a measure the systematic features of general explanatory concepts with the empirical content of detained empirical analysis".

2 RICHARD ROSE, *Influencing Voters: A Study of Campaign Rationality* (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), p. 23.

3 JOHN D. MARTZ, *"Democratic Political Campaigning in Latin America:* A Typological Approach to Cross-Cultural Research", Vol. 33, No. 2, *Journal of Politics* (May, 1971), pp. 370-398.

> insofar as they both require and reflect rational behavior. Not all conflict situations can be treated as strategic games. Use of this model simply assumes far reaching similarities between standardized games and some recurrent social conditions.[4]

In subsequent discussion of the strategic game outlook, Snyder develops perspectives and raises questions he believes must be addressed if game theory is to become a useful analytical tool. Drawing from Snyder's work, this study hypothesizes that the most important questions in developing a strategic game framework for election campaign analysis concern the institutional setting, rules of the game, nature of participating units, strategies, tactics, stakes and information.[5] Selection of the "important questions" is arbitrary, and whether or not the choice proves fortunate will not be apparent until the framework has been applied to at least one election campaign.

Venezuela, scene of the election campaign to be analyzed, fronts along the northeastern coast of South America. Its neighbors include Colombia, to the west, Brazil, to the south, and Guayana to the east. With more than 350,000 square miles, Venezuela is approximately the size of Texas and Oklahoma combined.[6] Venezuela, as indicated

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4 In his "Foreword" to *Action and Reaction In World Politics*, CARL FRIEDRICH identifies three kinds of theory —typological, operational and genetic— useful in discussing international relations. This three-fold division could also be used for theorizing about election campaigning. Operational theory would conceptualize campaigns and systems and describe how various campaign systems operated. Typological or taxomatic theorizing would focus on classifying types of campaign systems. Finally, genetic theory would inquire into how campaign systems came into being and why they pass away.

The framework which follows will not be concerned with genetic theorizing, although it may provide insights that would be useful to genetic theorists. The emphasis, rather, will be upon expanding concepts that have direct relevance to classifying election campaigns and explaining how they operate. The author believes that electoral campaigns must be classified and discussed in tems of their operational characteristics before it will be possible to analyze how campaign systems arise and decay. Operational and typological theorizing, therefore, should be given priority in contemporary research into election campaigning.

5 Quoted from RICHARD C. SNYDER, "Game Theory and the Analysis of Political Behavior", JAMES N. ROSENAU, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961), p. 383. Referred to hereafter as SNYDER.

6 For a discussion of game theory's major concepts, as they apply to political science, see *ibid.*, pp. 384-385. Professor Snyder's concept of pay-off can be equated with what this discussion labels "sakes of the game', and his idea of "coalitions" will be dealt with in the discussion of electoral strategies and tactics. Finally, "nature of the participating units" comes from Snyder's analysis of the decisions that led to United States involvement in the Korean Conflict, *ibid.*, p. 195. Decision making and game theory are closely linked, and Professor Snyder goes so far as to declare the former to be that application of the latter which is most useful to political scientists. Cf. the discussion of decision making in RICHARD C. SNYDER, H. W. BRUCK and BURTON SAPIN, *Decision-making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics* (Princeton: Foreign Policy Analysis Series No. 3, 1954), pp. 56-66.

by Illustration 1, is divided politically into twenty states, a Federal District, and two Federal Territories - Amacuro and Amazonas.

Impoverished, underdeveloped and rural, Venezuela entered the twentieth century unified nominally under a weak central government. Local *caudillos* jealously guarded their autonomy and opposed all attempts at centralizing political control. Caracas, the national capital and largest city, resembled more a provincial market center than a national seat of political, commercial and economic power. During the first half of the twentieth century, however, Venezuela and its capital underwent profound transformations. The catalyst for change was petroleum.[7] Beginning in the early 1920's, the Maracaibo Basin's vast petroleum reserves led international corporations to increase dramatically their Venezuelan investments. Agricultural exports lost their primacy to petroleum, which eventually accounted for ninety percent of Venezuela's earnings for foreign exchange. Tax revenue from petroleum related activities became the government's most important source of income. Table 1 indicates that government income and expenditures rose dramatically after 1944-45. Increases of this magni-

TABLE 1

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURES AT INTERVALS OF TEN YEARS 1904-05 — 1965 (MILLIONS OF BOLIVARES)

FISCAL PERIOD	INCOME	EXPENDITURES
1904-05	46.9	51.4
1914-15	50.6	44.8
1924-25	120.2	115.5
1934-35	203.0	178.0
1944-45	614.1	487.7
1954-55	2,826.3	2.797.5
1965	7,367.1	7,400.3

1 Bolívar = U.S. $ .23

Source: Dirección General de Estadística, Anuario Estadístico de Venezuela 1965 (Caracas: República de Venezuela, 1967).

7 See Table 3 under "Spatial Characteristics" in the *Statistical Abstract of Latin America 1968* (Los Angeles, California: UCLA Latin American Center, 1969), p. 52.

ILLUSTRATION 1

VENEZUELA: POLITICAL



tude would have been impossible had not petroleum production continued to expand and the larger profits of the international petroleum corporations been taxed at higher rates.[8]

The oil boom did more than provide a business activity capable of expanding in the face of growing taxation. It transformed Venezuela from a rural backwater into Latin America's most prosperous nation. Consequently, in 1965 Venezuela boasted a per capita Gross National Product of U.S. $ 797, below that of Israel but higher than in Japan or Argentina.[9] Venezuela, as will be discussed subsequently, also developed a competitive multi-party system. The insights of this study, therefore, will be most relevant for theory construction about democratic political campaigns. However, elections and election campaigning are common to a wide variety of political systems. This suggests that a truly comprehensive framework for campaign analysis must take into account campaigns which are semi-competitive or in which voters can also choose or reject a single slate of candidates.[10]

THE STRATEGIC GAME FRAMEWORK - AN OVERVIEW

The strategic game perspective conceives of election campaigns as systems in which political parties and coalitions employ strategies and tactics while playing for electoral stakes. Illustration 2 graphically portrays this perspective.

Parties or political coalitions may play exclusively for stakes sanctioned by pluralistic constitutions and competitive electoral laws.[11] This occurs when party leaders assume that the election in question offers an equitable opportunity to take control of government institutions and their intent is to exercise power in accordance with existing regime rules.[12] Election campaigns in the United States, at least from the standpoint of the two major parties, historically have been

8 For a detailed discussion regarding *Acción Democrática's* policy of increasing taxes on the international petroleum companies see Rómulo Betancourt, *Política y Petróleo* (México: Fundo de Cultura y Economía, 1956).

9 National Industries Conference Board, *Economic Almanac 1967-1968* (New York: the MacMillan Company, 1968), p. 490.

10 For a breakdown of the possible classes of political systems about whose election campaigns it would be useful to have information see GABRIEL ALMOND and G. BINGHAM POWELL, *Comparative Politics* (Boston: Little Brown & Company, 1966), p. 265.

11 Cf. SNYDER, BRUCK and SAPIN, pp. 60-64.

12 Regime is used in the sense that DAVID EASTON employs it in *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965), pp. 190-193.

ILLUSTRATION 2

THE STRATEGIC GAME FRAMEWORK AND OVERVIEW



for stakes of this ilk. However, the ideology of a political party, its history, or its relative size may influence politicians to play for other stakes.

The authoritarian orientations of Germany's National Socialist and Communist parties, and the contrasting pluralistic commitments of their opponents, for example, made stakes in the 1931 and 1932 election campaigns quite different for the two kinds of parties.[13] Victory to either of the former raised a strong possibility that the latter would be forcibly liquidated. On the other hand, Germany's pluralistic parties were ideologically committed to inter-party competition, even though such competition entailed a risk that forces dedicated to ending pluralism might prevail. Comparison of Germany's election campaigns of the early 1930's with recent campaigns in the United States, or with ones in the German Federal Republic after World

13 ALAN BULLOCK, *Hitler, A Study of Tyranny* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), pp. 187-250.

War II,[14] points to a potentially important focus for researching electoral stakes and election campaigning. It concerns feedback and how the kinds of electoral stakes played for in an election campaign influence the strategies and tactics employed by competing organizational units.

The strategic game framework hypothesizes that competing parties react to inputs from the campaign environment into the campaign system. Two immediate sources of inputs are envisioned; those dependent upon the level of legitimacy consolidation and those related to societal backing. Legitimacy consolidation focuses on the intensity and breadth of feeling within a polity that the procedures and mechanisms for electing political leaders are desirable and ought to be retained. Alternative levels of legitimacy consolidation are hypothesized to generate dissimilar inputs for the campaign system. Along the same lines, alternative societal backing profiles also may be expected to yield different inputs. Societal backing centers on which social, economic, ideological and regional groups are formally allied with competing parties or party coalitions. The idea is simple but basic. Competing organizational units are perceived as responding to the interests of their traditional clientele and as seeking to attract groups which will add to electoral strength without being offensive to long-term dependable backers. Therefore, the comparative analysis of alternative societal backing profiles constitutes an important starting point for understanding interaction within the campaign system.

Rules, an element of the campaign system not yet mentioned, stipulate how political parties may become legal competitors and the procedures by which the citizenry selects those who will exercise power during the next constitutional period. Finally, messages that are communicated between various elements in the campaign system comprise campaign information. The content of such information is diverse, but its single most important focus concerns campaign issues. Campaign issues are points over which politicians tell an electorate that it must decide in favor of one party or another. Issues also may arise

14 Cf. *ibid.*, and KARL W. DEUTSCH and ERIC NORDLINGER, "The German Federal Republic", in ROY C. MACRIDIS and ROBERT E. WARD, eds., *Modern Political Systems: Europe* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 407-434.

spontaneously because of some underlying social, economic or political condition which voters believe qualifies or disqualifies a party or leader from holding power. Campaign issues are perceived as directly affecting political parties, the stakes for which they play, and the strategies and tactics they employ. Also, campaign information, as indicated by the broken box in Illustration 2, circulates throughout the campaign system.

CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENTS

Legitimacy and societal backing, as discussed above, are sources of inputs from the campaign environment. Legitimacy consolidation focuses on recent political history and the intensity with which citizens support or are alienated from the electoral process.[15] A political system's recent history may be characterized as "stable" or "turbulent", while the intensity of support during an election campaign lies on a continuum between "high" and "low". Combining these perspectives, four theoretical types of legitimacy consolidation emerge: stable-high, turbulent-high, stable-low and turbulent-low.

1) *Stable-High.* When legitimacy consolidation is stable-high the regime rules have changed little during previous decades, and they are supported by most citizens. The likelihood is small that election campaigning will place enough stress on the political system to seriously threaten these rules. Thus, there is little concern about undermining regime rules when electoral strategies and tactics are selected. The most obvious example of a campaign environment with stable-high legitimacy consolidation is Great Britain.[16] The only Latin American country in which legitimacy consolidation clearly provides a stable-high backdrop for election campaigning is Costa Rica.[17]

2) *Turbulent-High.* Turbulent-high legitimacy consolidation characterizes political systems that have undergone frequent changes in the immediate past, but in which the new regime has made great

15 Cf., the discussion of "Competence, Participating and Political Allegiance" in GABRIEL ALMOND and SYDNEY VERBA, *Civic Culture* (Boston: Little Brown & Company, 1965), pp. 186-207.

16 SAMUEL FINER, "Great Britain" in Macridis and Ward, pp. 38-58.

17 JAMES BUSEY, "Costa Rica", in MARTIN NEEDLER, ed., *Political Systems of Latin America* (New York: Van Nostrand-Reinhold Company, 1970), pp. 133-149.

strides in generating support for their "rules of the game". Charismatic leadership and appeals are important in generating such support. Equally significant, new regimes may liquidate opponents, send them into exile or terrorize them into silence. Legitimacy consolidation levels also can be raised by persuading a wide range of groups that the new game rules provide adequate channels for expressing their interests and that those who gain power on the basis of such rules will respond to reasonable demands.

Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, upon taking control of the government, can be expected to mix the above techniques while consolidating power. An informative example is the skillful blend of terrorism, charismatic leadership and institution building that has enabled Fidel Castro to make impressive strides in creating a turbulent-high level of legitimacy consolidation for Cuba.[18] However, liquidation of opponents is antithetical to rules of the game which pluralistic regimes seek to institutionalize, for such rules stress the importance of a loyal opposition.[19] Democratic consolidation practices, therefore, may prolong the time necessary to raise levels of legitimacy consolidation. Until loyalty to the new regime has solidified, extra-constitutional attempts to seize power are likely, and democracy hangs by a slender thread. This situation existed in Venezuela during the early 1960's, when democratic leaders defended their regime from attempted coups by rightist elements and from the guerrilla warfare of radical leftists.[20]

3) *Stable-Low.* When legitimacy consolidation is stable-low, the regime rules of a political system have continued relatively unchanged during recent decades, but they are beginning to lose support. This type of legitimacy consolidation carries a high risk that the pressures of election campaigning will create unstable conditions that could lead to an abrupt change in regime rules. Danger is compounded when groups seeking to alter the existing order appear strong enough to

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18 Fidel Castro's efforts to transform Cuba and consolidate the legitimacy of his regime, have been analyzed at great length. For an excellent selected bibliography see RICHARD FAGEN and WAYNE CORNELIUS JR., *Political Power In Latin America* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), pp. 381-382.

19 For a brief discussion of political oppositions see the "Preface" in ROBERT DAHL, ed., Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

20 A detailed discussion of this period appears in ROBERT J. ALEXANDER, *The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964).

achieve their goals by taking advantage of the rules they wish to change. Faced with this prospect, those who benefited from the existing rules often prefer to abandon the present regime for one that assures their continued dominance. During such a scenario, the existing rules of the game cease to be viable and opposing groups seek to impose regimes of their own choosing by force. The situation in Greece, prior to the emergence of the present military regime, evolved along the above lines. Also, recent events in Chile indicate that legitimacy consolidation may have moved from stable-high to stable-low during the first years of the Allende administration.[21]

4) *Turbulent-Low.* This is the most volatile level of legitimacy consolidation. Rules of the game have been imposed recently, and those who hold power have not yet consolidated support for the new regime. Election campaigns in such settings place great strain on the regime, and opponents must always calculate whether or not they will be able to assume power, even should they triumph electorally. Since the overthrow of President Juan D. Perón, in 1955, legitimacy consolidation in Argentina has been turbulent-low.[22] In contrast, Venezuela's democratic leaders have made progress in converting the turbulent-low level of legitimacy consolidation that prevailed when they came to power, in 1959, into one that is turbulent-high.

Societal backing, the second inmediate source of inputs into the campaign system, involves the socio-economic, ideological and regional clientele of competing parties. As indicated in the overview, this framework hypothesizes that campaigning political parties act to further what are perceived as the common interests of their supporters and, especially in the cases of minority parties, maneuver to attract additional backing. From the socio-economic perspective, a party's backing may be concentrated within the lower class, middle class, upper class or some combination of any two or three. When a political party commands multi-class support, analysis must be concerned with which segment of each class habitually votes for the party, and whether non-class

21 For example, see "Chile: Back to the Polls?", *Latin America,* Vol. V., No. 38 (September 17, 1971), pp. 301-302.

22 Argentina's military annulled the 1962 congressional elections after the Peronists captured the governorships of several important provinces. The military's fear that Peronists might repeat this feat led to the ouster of President Arturo Illia during July, 1966, several months before scheduled congressional and gubernatorial elections.

variables explains the cross-class appeal.[23] A political party's socio-economic power base can be analyzed further by looking at the origins of its voters or members, and by contrasting origins with their present class and status.

Ideology facilitates the classification of political parties according to their action oriented belief systems. Five ideological families — the authoritarian left, the democratic left, the democratic right, the authoritarian right, and Christian Democracy — appear most common in Latin America. Parties of the authoritarian left concern themselves primarily with making a country's social, political and economic systems conform to preconceived egalitarian models, and authoritarian leftists are willing to use a wide variety of constitutional and extra-constitutional means to facilitate desired change.[24] When parties of the authoritarian left win democratic elections they can be expected to alter regime rules in a manner favoring their indefinite perpetuation in power.

Democratic left parties, while also interested in a more equitable distribution of wealth, insist on implementing their programs by competitive and constitutional means.[25] Parties of the democratic right share the democratic left's concern with rules of the game, but lack the egalitarian commitment. The democratic right's highest priority is the preservation and adaptation of existing socio-economic institutions.[26] Parties of the authoritarian right also demonstrate great concern over the fate of an existing social order. However, authoritarian rightists often appear less interested in adapting institutions than in preserving class structure.[27] Parties of the authoritarian right are prepared to

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23 Cf. the discussion of why workers vote for Britain's Conservative Party by ROBERT T. MCKENZIE and ALLAN SILVER, "The Delicate Experiment: Industrialism, Conservatism and Working-Class Tories in England", in Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 115-127.

24 Communists, Trotskyites and the Justicialist Party of Argentina can be considered parties of the authoritarian left.

25 Most Socialist Parties, nationalistic parties like *Acción Democrática* of Venezuela and APRA of Perú and the Democrat Party in the United States belong to the democratic left.

26 The democratic right includes a broad spectrum of political parties. They range from the Republican Party in the United States to the neo-Nazi New Democratic Party of West Germany. The former encompasses some positions taken by Christian Democrats in other countries and the latter straddles the line between the democratic and authoritarian right.

27 Germany's National Socialists, Italy's Fascists, Spain's Falangists and many personalist parties in Latin America belong to the authoritarian right. Such parties may further be divided into those of the "totalitarian" right and the "authoritarian" right, along lines suggested in GABRIEL ALMOND and G. BINGHAM POWELL, pp. 217, 256. In this discussion, however, we will not distinguish between "authoritarian" and "totalitarian" right.

employ force against all who threaten the *status quo.* Finally, Christian Democratic parties straddle the democratic left and the democratic right. They stress that man is a being of spirit and matter, and is by nature social as well as spiritual. He must be encouraged to participate actively in a society that values both liberty and social justice.[28]

ILLUSTRATION 3

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF VOTERS IN THE 1968 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION



28 ALEXANDER EDELMAN, *Latin American Government and Politics,* (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1969), pp. 369-373.

Geographically, the societal backing of a political party can be regional or national. The strength of regional parties centers disproportionately in one or more of a country's regions. Regional parties historically participate in coalitions when holding national power.[29] National parties, with more evenly distributed geographical support, have greater opportunities of unilaterally controlling the executive or legislative branches of government. However, the strength of a national party also may vary from region to region, and this is taken into account when choosing campaign strategies and tactics.

The following study divides Venezuela into five geo-political regions: the Andes, the West, the Plains, the Core and the East.[30] Each region groups several states and encompasses areas of Venezuela having common geographical, historical, social and economic characteristics. Spectacular scenery, culminating in snow clad peaks of up to 16,000 feet, characterizes the Venezuelan Andes. The region includes states having 12.5 percent of the national population — Táchira, Trujillo, and Mérida. While farming is the region's most significant economic activity, it boasts three cities of importance, Valera, San Cristóbal and Mérida. In the 1968 elections, Andeans cast 11.4 percent of the total presidential vote, slightly less than would have been expected based on their share of the national population.

While twice the population of the Andes, the West proved a decisive battleground in the 1968 elections. Comprised of the states of Zulia, Falcón, Lara and Yaracuy, the West contributed 24.6 percent of the total presidential vote. The region includes productive agricultural areas, but is dominated by the oil-rich Lake Maracaibo basin and the cities of Maracaibo, Cabimas, Barquisimeto and Coro. The Plains region, in contrast, is relatively rural and underpopulated. Consisting of the states of Apure, Barinas, Portuguesa, Cojedes and Guárico, the Plains yielded only 10.1 percent of the total presidential vote in the 1968 election.

The Core region lies north of the Plains, borders on the Caribbean Sea, and encompasses the states of Carabobo, Aragua, Miranda and the Federal District. Small in area, the Core is Venezuela's most

29 Australia's Country Party is a typical regional party. See GWENDOLEN M. CARTER, "The Commonwealth Overseas: Variations on the British Theme — Australia and New Zealand", in SIGMUND NEUMANN ed., *Modern Political Parties* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 94-96.

30 For an alternative classification of Venezuela's geopolitical regions see JOHN D. MARTZ, *The Venezuelan Elections of December 1963 — Part I* (Washington: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1964), pp. 1-3.

populous region. In 1968 its 1.33 million voters cast 35.7 percent of the total presidential vote. The site of thriving cities like Valencia and Maracay, the urbanized Center also includes Caracas, the national capital and seat of economic power.

The East, Venezuela's final geopolitical region, takes in the states of Nueva Esparta, Anzoátegui, Sucre, Monagas and Bolívar, and the federal territories of Delta Amacuro and Amazonas. The Orinoco River bisects the Eastern Region. South of the Orinoco lies the vast Guayana Highlands, sparsely populated but rich in resources. The seaport cities of Barcelona and Cumaná are located to the north, on the Caribbean shore. In 1968 the East contributed 18.1 percent of the total presidential vote.

Illustration 3 profiles Venezuela's geopolitical regions and the regional distribution of voters for the 1968 election.

RULES OF THE GAME

Rules, the limiting conditions under which the game takes place,[31] are perceived as democratic or authoritarian, presidential or parliamentary, party dominant or candidate dominant and staggered or fused. The dichotomy between democratic and authoritarian rules centers upon whether or not opposition parties are permitted to run candidates against those of the government. Only when a wide range of opposition candidates seeks votes without fear of reprisal can campaign rules be considered democratic. Presidential campaign rules indicate that a chief executive, who functions as head of government and sometimes also as chief of state, is to be elected.[32] In contrast, parliamentary campaign rules signify that the head of government will come from the party or coalition winning a majority of seats in the national legislature.

Some political systems, such as the French Fifth Republic, use campaign rules that are both presidential and parliamentary. The third dichotomy, between party dominant and candidate dominant rules, refers to whether citizens can vote directly for the candidate or whether

31 SNYDER, p. 385.

32 For example, even though Germany's president exercises influence, as well as certain minor powers, Germany's Chancellor controls the executive branch of goverment. Rules of the game in Germany, therefore, are parliamentary.

they cast their ballot for a party list.[33] Finally, staggered rules indicate that all electoral positions are not at stake in the election toward which campaigning is directed. When campaign rules are fused, in contrast, the election decides all regional, local and national offices.

NATURE OF PARTICIPATING UNITS

The nature of participating organizational units — parties and electoral coalitions — will be discussed in terms of 1) size, 2) structure and 3) financing.

Concerning size, organizational units will be described as major, minor and marginal. Participating political parties or coalitions which previously attracted, or seem likely to attract, support from more than twenty percent of the electorate will be defined as major. Those reasonably anticipating from five to nineteen percent of the total vote are minor, and smaller ones will be considered marginal.[34]

Five dichotomies — centralized or decentralized, consolidated or feudal,[35] permanent or intermittent, class oriented or administratively oriented, and personalized or institutionalized[36] describe the structuring of campaign participants. The first grouping, centralized or decentralized, focuses on how control is exercised over the campaign apparatus.

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33 For additional discussion of the effect of electoral systems see HARRY ECKSTEIN, "The Impact of Electoral Systems on Representative Government", in HARRY ECKSTEIN and DAVID APTER eds., *Comparative Politics* (Glencoe: the Free Press, 1963), pp. 247-253.

34 The cut-off points of five and nineteen percent seemed the most useful way of distinguishing between major, minor and marginal political parties in Venezuela. Subsequent applications of the framework might indicate that other cut-off points are of greater value.

35 Professor JOHN D. MARTZ, "Political Activism and Political Campaigning in Venezuela", a paper delivered at the American Political Science Association Convention on September 2, 1969, uses a centralized-decentralized dichotomy. The feudal-consolidated designation adds a new dimension. The designation of centralized or decentralized is concerned with how higher level campaign organizations control lower ones, or vertical control. From this perspective the Republican Party's campaign organization in 1968 was less centralized than that of Great Britain's Labor Party in 1970. However, if George Wallace's American Independent Party had allied with the Republicans, in support of Richard Nixon's bid for re-election in 1972, and there were no institutions with power to make binding decisions for the alliance's local, state and national campaign organizations, the president's campaign organization would have been both decentralized and feudal. The feudal-consolidated dichotomy, therefore, is concerned with horizontal control, as opposed to the vertical control emphasis of the centralized-descentralized dichotomy, and best relates to campaign organizations in which more than one party participates.

36 Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

The campaign apparatus is groupings of structures at the national, regional or local levels, and the scope of national apparatus dominance over regional or local organizations indicates the degree of centralization or decentralization in a campaign organization. There is an inverse relation between the number of areas in which regional and local campaign organizations have autonomy and the degree of centralization in the over-all national campaign organization.

The dichotomy between consolidated and feudal concerns the degree of hierarchy at each level (national, regional and local) of a campaign organization. If each has its own clear chain of command the campaign organization can be considered consolidated, but where such a chain is lacking the organization is feudal. Feudal campaign organizations most often are associated with multi-party electoral coalitions that unite behind a single candidate in anticipation of capturing electoral offices that would have been beyond the reach of any single member. Privileges and powers associated with the electoral office, should it be gained, are to be shared among coalition partners.

The dichotomy of permanence and intermittency concerns the persistence through time of campaign structures. A structure that functions between and during election campaigns can be classified as permanent, but one that becomes operational only during an election campaign is intermittent. There are two kinds of intermittent campaign structures, special and regular. A regular intermittent structure, carried on paper between elections, is "fleshed out" as campaigning intensifies. This may be either by design or due to a party's inability to maintain it permanently. Special intermittent structures, created for a specific election campaign, are dismantled subsequently by party leaders. The "Citizens' Committee" which American presidential aspirants form to attract independents or wavering members of the opposition can be considered special intermittent structures.[37]

Third, campaign structures can be organized in conformity with existing political-administrative boundaries, or can reflect an elector-

37 Students of political parties in the developing world, particularly Latin America, have commented that party organizations often are dissolved after elections and reappear only at the beginning of the next election campaign. See the discussion by RUSSELL FITZGIBBON, "The Political Potpourri in Latin America", *Western Political Quarterly*, X (March, 1957), pp. 3-22.

ate's socio-economic characteristics, or some combination of both.[38] When campaign structures parallel political and administrative subdivisions, party organizers will aspire to create duplicate campaign organizations within each subdivision. In contrast, when campaign organizations reflect the electorate's socio-economic characteristics they will be tailored to attract target groups such as the urban middle class, peasants, regionals, workers and professionals. In the latter case, various societally oriented electoral organizations may operate within the same political-administrative unit, or a single such organization may function within several political-administrative areas. The controlling factor in determining the territorial jurisdiction of socio-economic oriented campaign organizations is the spatial distribution of whichever socio-economic group is to be courted.

Campaign organizations also may be classified as personalized or institutionalized.[39] Personalized campaign organizations are built around the personality of the individual running for office. On the other hand, institutional campaign organizations rely on a party's existing apparatus to direct election campaigning. If a presidential candidate has not been active in his party, or if he is a coalition candidate, usually he will rely on an independent personal staff. However, if the presidential candidate has long been an important party figure, he may lean heavily on established electoral organizations. Parliamentary election campaigns should be characterized by the latter type of organization, for the Prime Minister usually is a creature of the party apparatus. A presidential candidate, on the other hand, has often been selected because of his charisma and may never before have been active in politics. Such was the case with Dwight D. Eisenhower when the Republicans nominated him as their standard bearer in 1952. Nevertheless, the candidate's own preference and campaign strategy also are crucial in determining whether a campaign organization is primarily personalized or institutionalized.

Finally, considerations must be given to the financial underpinnings of campaigning. Money sources, crucial in any election campaign,

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38 One could hypothesize that a lack of sophistication about modern methods of election campaigning is evidenced by campaign organizations that are tied exclusively to political-administrative boundaries. For a discussion of how socio-economic criteria were used to supplement those of political-administrative boundaries, in regard to the formulation of election campaign organizations, see the account of party organization in Caracas, Venezuela, by the author in Chapter 1 of *The Political Process of Urban Development* (UCLA: Unpublished dissertation, 1969).

39 See the discussion in Martz, "Political Activism and Political Campaigning in Venezuela", pp. 7-9.

remain an area about which information is scarce. Campaign financing is perceived as membership based, interest group based or government based.[40] While most democratic party leaders aspire to finance electoral activity from member contributions, the high cost of campaigning, especially given the growing importance of television, places the party which is unable to supplement internally generated funds at a serious disadvantage. The most common sources of external financing for democratic election campaigns are business, labor, professionals and rural organizations. Party leaders will aspire to assemble a combination of these groups calculated to facilitate electoral successes. In addition, government sometimes finances election campaigns, especially in systems with a single mass-based party where politicians believe their legitimacy is related to a formal expression of popular approval, even if there is no realistic possibility that approval will be withheld. Democratic regimes also may assume campaign expenses, or, as in Great Britain,[41] deprive the wealthier party of its advantage by limiting expenditures and the campaign's length. A third situation occurs in most competitive democracies, including Venezuela. Here the party in power uses the personnel, institutions and resources of the bureaucracy to enhance its image and chances for reelection. Since propaganda emanating from bureaucracies can be duplicated by other parties only at great expense, the government itself becomes an important source of campaign financing.

STRATEGIES AND TACTICS

Electoral strategies and tactics channel interaction within the campaign system. Strategies are perceived as concerned with the selection of viable voting bloc combinations and efforts to prevent opponents from assembling a winning coalition.[42] Four kinds of elec-

40 Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 10. Martz classifies financing as either membership based or privately based. The government, a third source of financing election campaigns, while an area of extreme sensitivity, is also one of great importance. The national bureaucracies propaganda organs, by advertising what they have accomplished under the incumbent government, give important publicity advantages to the party in power.

41 For a discussion of election campaign financing in Great Britain see SIDNEY BAILY, *British Parliamentary Democracy* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1962), pp. 119-121.

42 This paper conceives of strategy as a skillful or adroit plan, and differs from the formal game theory definition of "a complete plan — so complete that it cannot

toral strategies appear theoretically possible: recruitment, attraction, division and paralysis. Reinforcement strategies seek the retention of groups already inclined favorably toward a political party and its candidates. Strategies of attraction, on the other hand, appeal to voters who initially are indifferent or even hostile. Strategies of division attempt to weaken the opposition by fomenting disunity. Finally, paralysis strategies look for an opening through which to stun the opposition. The intent is to reduce a competitor's capability to maneuver and campaign. Election campaign participants often use all four strategies in an overarching campaign strategy mix. The strategy mix chosen depends on the capabilities of those employing it, the nature of the opposition and the kinds of groups and individuals which reasonably can be expected to be swayed by election campaigning.

Election tactics are plans for implementing strategies.[43] Seven tactics were observed during Venezuela's 1968 election campaign, and *a priori* seem common to most competitive campaigning. Five-positive inducements, negative inducements, association with legitimating symbols, disassociation with illegitimating symbols and negative symbolic projection — are associated with strategies of reinforcement, attraction and paralysis. The remaining two, leadership multiplication and issue divisiveness, are linked with the strategy of division.

Positive inducements promise rewards to those who are courted. Rewards may be material, money and jobs, or policy oriented, as with promises of agrarian reform or the nationalization of an important industry. Threatened sanctions range from income loss to violence against one's person or that of his family. The tactic of association with legitimating symbols attempts to identify a particular party or candidacy with objects and values of which the electorate approves. In the United States this tactic appears when Republicans

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be upset by an opponent or by nature". (Quoted from Snyder, p. 384). Game theory assumes that competing individuals or groups will act in a "rational" way and always seek the optional strategy, one that maximizes gains and minimizes losses. In practice, however, contestants sometimes pursue "irrational" courses of action, for election campaign plans may be incomplete. It is possible that party leaders will attempt to develop a "complete plan" for each election campaign, but for a variety of reasons, especially that of incomplete information, they may be unsuccessful. Until additional data on election campaign strategies is assembled, therefore, strategies must be conceived of as an "adroit plan", rather than a "complete plan".

43 While this definition is arbitrary, it is in accord with the widely-held assumption that tactics are less over-arching than strategies, and that the former are maneuvers for implementing the latter.

identify themselves with fiscal responsibility or Abraham Lincoln, and when Democrats refer to themselves as the party of Jefferson, Jackson and Franklin Roosevelt. Disassociation with illegitimating symbols, in contrast, seeks to separate a candidate or party from unpopular values or objects with which they may have become identified. During the 1968 presidential campaign and the Democratic Primaries of 1972, for example, Hubert Humphrey attempted to disassociate his candidacy from Lyndon Johnson's unpopular Vietnam War policy. The former vice-president implied that between 1964 and 1968 he had an obligation to support the president's decisions, just as he would expect his own vice-president to do. Humphrey argued that his administration could be expected to pursue its own course in relation to a wide range of issues, including the Vietnam War.

Finally, negative symbolic projection identifies opponents with positions or norms that a significant segment of the electorate, usually undecided voters, finds offensive. Tacticians seek to estrange uncommitted voters from the opposition, thus increasing the probability that they will support the desired candidate. French Gaullists successfully used negative symbolic projection against leftists during the election campaign of June, 1968. Throughout the previous month groups traditionally identified with the left rioted and demostrated against President DeGaulle's government. The Gaullists were able to portray leftists parties, especially the Socialists and Communists, as radical and dangerous, thus convincing a majority of Frenchmen that their best hope for tranquility lay in returning a heavy Gaullist majority to the National Assembly.[44]

The tactics of leadership multiplication and issue divisiveness, as indicated earlier, implement strategies of division. Leadership multiplication encourages multiple candidacies, appealing to a competitor's clientele, for a contested office. The intent is to fragment opposition strength so that supporters of the party employing the tactic will achieve a plurality within the contested election district. In the United States, if Republican strategists covertly encouraged George Wallace's presidential candidacy, with the intent of giving populist voters an alternative to the regular Democratic nominee, they would

44 Prior to the June, 1968, elections the Gaullist, while the largest single party in the National Assembly, lacked a majority. Subsequently, the Gaullists held 300 of 485 seats.

be pursing leadership multiplication. On the other hand, the issue divisiveness tactic raises and stresses an issue over which the opposition is divided. The goal is to create dissension and division within the enemy camp, thus making it difficult for him to fight an effective election campaign. In Italy, when Christian Democrats force Socialists to discuss what role the Communist Party should play in national political life, they are using an issue divisiveness tactic.

STAKES

Five kinds of takes most often appear in election campaigns: legitimation through validation, victory or vanquishment, system dominance, subsystem dominance and influence. Legitimation through validation stakes characterize election campaigns in single party, totalitarian regimes which claim popular mandates as the basis of their legitimacy.[45] Opposition candidates are not permitted on the election ballot and citizens only can approve or disapprove official candidates. Totalitarian democrats cite the overwhelmingly favorable vote that official candidates typically receive as proof that their regime and government are popular. Legitimation through validation describes election campaign stakes in fascist or communist political systems.

When an election threatens to transfer power to a group committed to changing the rules of the game so they deny the defeated a subsequent opportunity for success, the stakes become victory or vanquishment. However, victory or vanquishment stakes describe election campaigns only from the perspective of parties that perceive themselves as subject to repression following a defeat. If the party desiring to change the rules loses to a democratic opponent, the defeated party is not confronted with vanquishment. For example, had Argentina's democratic parties won the election of 1945 there is little evidence that regime rules would have been altered to preclude future Peronist triumphs at the polls. Peronists, themselves committed to changing regime rules, were not involved in an electoral campaign for victory or vanquishment stakes. However, Peronist opponents were, and their defeat was followed by repressive measures which

45 These are the "totalitarian democracies" which J. L. TALMAN discusses in *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracies* (New York: Beacon Press, 1952). See especially pp. 1-11, which also appears in Eckstein and Apter, pp. 459-471.

made it impossible for them to regain power through the electoral process.[46]

The normal stakes of democratic election campaigns are system and subsystem dominance. System dominance concerns control over national political systems, and usually is an issue in presidential, congressional and parliamentary elections. Subsystem dominance stakes characterize campaigning for local and regional offices. When system and subsystem dominance are the only stakes, parties are unconcerned that defeat may lead to an unfavorable or illegal altering of regime rules. Election campaigns in the United States and Great Britain traditionally involve only stakes for system and subsystem dominance.

While all election campaign competitors seek influence, it becomes the only stake available to those with little chance of winning major electoral office.[47] Participants playing largely for influence often emphasize indoctrination and education. In the long run, however, competitors engaged primarily in education and indoctrination strive to capture electoral offices. A party that fails to elect its candidates can exert only minimal influence on successful competitors, and players who neither win elections nor influence those who do have failed. The Socialist Workers Party of the United States is an example of such failure.

INFORMATION

Information, messages circulating throughout the campaign system, can be discussed in terms of flow, sources and content.[48] Information flows in all election campaigns appear along a continuum, one pole of which will be labeled "controlled" and the other "free'.

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46 For a detailed discussion of political life in Argentina after the democratic parties were defeated see GEORGE I. BLANKSTEN, *Perón's Argentina* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).

47 If a party's growth is slow it may focus indefinitely on education and indoctrination. On the other hand, as a party's potential to win elections increases its leaders will be tempted to abandon doctrines which might interfere with electoral successes, even though these doctrines were central to the party's formation and early growth. For an interesting discussion of this problem in relation to West Germany's Social Democrats see OTTO KIRCHEIMER, "Germany, the Vanishing Opposition", in Dahl, pp. 244-259.

48 The concept of information used in this study is that which KARL DEUTSCH defines in *Nerves of Government* (New York: The Free Press, 1963), p. 84. Deutsch here states that "information consists of a transmitted pattern that is received and evaluated against the background of a statistical ensemble of related paterns". Also see Deutsch's discussion in pp. 82-85.

Information flows falling on the third of the continuum closest to the "controlled" pole are defined as "controlled". Those on the third nearest the "free" pole are "free", and those in the middle third are "restricted". "Controlled" information flows characterize election campaigns in single party states, like Franco's Spain and Castro's Cuba. "Restricted" information flows typify countries where government permits the opposition organizational freedom, but restricts its access to the mass media. The France of Charles DeGaulle tolerated a "restricted" flow of campaign information.[49] Contrastingly, in political systems with "free" flowing campaign information, Venezuela and the United States, few restrictions are placed on political parties or coalitions' use of the mass media. The availability of financing, as well as prudence, become major determinants of the frequency with which a campaign competitor uses radio, television and the press.

The most important sources of political information in election campaigns are: (1) informal face to face contacts which spring up more or less independently of other societal structures, like discussions among friends; (2) traditional social structures, such as family, kinship or religious affiliations; (3) political output structures, such as legislatures and bureaucracies; (4) political input structures, including trade unions, peasant leagues and similar groups, and political parties; and (5) the mass media. Sources can be analyzed in terms of the volume of information they generate and the clarity and intensity with which they set forth candidate positions and issues. Data about information sources facilitates analysis of the relative strength of each candidate's communications network and of relationship between networks and campaign strategies.

Examining the clarity and intensity of campaign information involves analysis of election appeals and issues. Earlier discussion of the former, in the context of strategies and tactics, leaves only the problem of election campaign issues. There are four basic types of campaign issues: those of personality, ideology, efficiency and stability. Personality, of course, focuses on the candidates' abilities and leadership styles. Ideological issues relate to a competitor's action oriented belief system and how it may effect government policy.[50]

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49 ALFRED GROSSER, "France: Nothing But Opposition", in Dahl, p. 285.

50 An action oriented belief system provides the following for its adherents 1) a self definition; 2) a description of the current situation, its background, and

Issues of efficiency center about the administrative abilities of those who have been governing, in relation to those who seek to govern. Issues of stability emanate from perceptions of contenders' relative ability to guarantee tranquility and regime stability. In assessing the impact of issues on campaigning and outcomes, attention should be given to whether their content and manner of presentation places a candidate or political party on the defensive or in a position to attack.

CONCLUSIONS

Discussion to this point has outlined a framework for the cross-national comparison, description and analysis of election campaigning. Table 2 summarizes framework elements and subcategories.

While the intent of subsequent analysis is framework application to Venezuela's 1968 election campaign, a long range goal remains the examination of election campaigning in a variety of settings.[51] Given additional studies, framework strengths and weaknesses can be pinpointed and revisions made. The similar kinds of information derived from framework application to a number of cases also would facilitate classifying election systems and generalizing about how they operate. Anticipated benefits from cross national application of the framework, therefore, would enable political scientists to undertake significant "middle range" theorizing about election campaigns.

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whatever may be likely to follow; and 3) various imperatives that are deduced from the following. Cf. the discussion by MARY MAUSSASIAN, "Ideologies of Delayed Industrialization: Some Tensions and Ambiguities", in JOHN H. KAUTSKY ed., *Political Change in the Underdeveloped Countries* (New York: John Wiley & Son), p. 253.

51 Cf. ALMOND and POWELL, p. 256 and EDWARD SHILS, *Political Development in the New States* (The Hague: Mouton & Company, 1965), pp. 47-51, for possible classes of political systems which could be used.

TABLE 2

ELEMENTS AND SUB-CATEGORIES OF THE STRATEGIC GAME FRAMEWORK

I. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING

A. *Legitimacy Consolidation*
1) Stable-high
2) Turbulent-high
3) Stable-low
4) Turbulent-low

B. *Societal Backing*
1) Regional or national
2) Class
3) Ideological

II. RULES OF THE GAME

A. *Democratic or authoritarian*
B. *Presidential or parliamentary*
C. *Party dominant or candidate dominant*
D. *Staggered or fused*

III. NATURE OF PARTICIPATING UNITS

A. *Size*
1) Major
2) Minor
3) Marginal

B. *Structure*
1) Centralized or decentra--ized
2) Consolidated or feudal
3) Permanent or intermittent
4) Administrative or class-oriented
5) Personalized or institutionalized

C. *Financing*
1) Membership based
2) Interest group based
3) Government based

IV. STRATEGIES AND TACTICS

A. *Strategies*
1) Reinforcement
2) Attraction
3) Division
4) Paralysis

B. *Tactics*
1) Positive inducements
2) Negative inducements
3) Associated with legitimating symbols
4) Disassociation with illegitimating symbols
5) Negative symbolic projection
6) Leadership multiplication
7) Issue divisiveness

V. STAKES

A. *Legitimation through validation*
B. *Victory or Vanquishment*
C. *System dominance*
D. *Sub-system dominance*
E. *Influence*

VI. INFORMATION

A. *Flow*
1) Free
2) Restricted
3) Controlled

B. *Sources*
1) Informal contacts
2) Traditional social structures
3) Output structures
4) Input structures
5) Mass media

C. *Content*
1) Issues of effectiveness
2) Issues of stability
3) Issues of ideology
4) Issues of personality

CHAPTER I

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND PARTY SYSTEM ON THE EVE OF THE 1968 CAMPAIGN

Unusually complex issues and events surrounded Venezuela's 1968 election campaign, and unraveling them demands initially some understanding of the evolution and structure of the national executive. In relation to the 1968 election, as in most else, the importance of the Venezuelan national executive stems from its dominance over other government institutions. Historically, the national executive has been in the hands of authoritarian military *caudillos.*[1] More recently, in 1948 and from 1959 to the present, democratically elected presidents have exercised executive power. Venezuela's democratic constitution makes the president chief of state and head of government. It also specifies a division of powers among the executive, legislative and judicial branches.

Despite constitutional limitations, the powers of contemporary Venezuela's democratically elected chief executive remain impressive.[2] The president has complete authority within the national executive, which receives an upper hand in dealings with congress, the judiciary and state and local governments. Among the president's most important prerogatives are suspension of constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties in time of emergency, command of the military, control over the national bureaucracy and appointment of state governors. In ad-

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1 For an excellent discussion of Venezuelan political history between 1830 and 1899, see GUILLERMO MORÓN, *A History of Venezuela,* tr. by John Street (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD., 1964), pp. 140-202. Twentieth century Venezuelan political history is recounted in RÓMULO BETANCOURT. *Venezuela: Política y Petróleo* (Caracas: Editorial Senderos, 1967) and DOMINGO ALBERTO RANGEL, *Los Andinos En El Poder* (Caracas: n.p., 1964).

2 The constitution in force in Venezuela is that of 1961. For a detailed discussion of the executive powers under the Constitution of 1961 see LEO B. LOTT, "Venezuela" in MARTIN C. NEEDLER ed., *Political Systems of Latin America* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1970), pp. 198-274.

dition, the president traditionally leads the nation's most powerful political party or party coalition. Parties and party coalitions were primary actors in the 1968 election campaign, and comprise a second important background factor.

THE VENEZUELAN NATIONAL EXECUTIVE

Since 1935, as implied above, control over Venezuela's national executive has oscillated between those who believed that presidential power should be absolute and others who sought to impose constitutional limitations.[3] The former group, dominated by the landed oligarchy and military leaders, opposed change and fought to maintain traditional institutions and the existing social hierarchy.[4] The latter group, for ideological and pragmatic reasons, favored democracy, universal suffrage and socio-economic change. Ideologically, the democrats looked on themselves as intellectual descendants of Rousseau, Jefferson and Marx. More practically, the processes associated with socio-economic change and democratization were seen as vehicles for ending the dominance of landed oligarchs and Andean generals. Not surprisingly, therefore, the most fervent champions of Venezuela constitutional democracy in recent decades have been those who would greatly benefit from the entrenched elite's replacement, lower middle class professionals, workers and peasants. The authoritarian polity of General Juan Vicente Gómez, Venezuelan dictator between 1908 and 1935, denied status, wealth and power to these groups. Venezuelan politics since 1935 appears largely as a struggle between those who favored an absolutist presidency which could maintain the Gómez social and economic order and others who demanded a constitutional and popularly elected chief executive. Democratic reformers reasoned that if the president owed his election to the masses he would likely implement policies beneficial to "have-nots" regardless of their impact on the traditional elite .

The contemporary Venezuelan presidency became increasingly institutionalized after the passing of Gómez, when constitutional democrats were recovering their courage and openly questioning the con-

3 *Ibid.*, pp. 272-276.

4 Rangel refers to his traditional elite as *Andinos*. However, during the final years of *Andino* rule, the governments of Medina Angarita and Pérez Jiménez, the *Andinos* shared positions of power with the Caracas upper class.

cept of an all-powerful president. In addition to being authoritarian, Gómez's political style was paternalistic. He governed the country as if it were his private estate. Even on his deathbed the old dictator retained the power and will to name a successor. He chose General Eleazar López Contreras, the Army Chief of Staff. López Contreras believed that modern government demanded institutionalization and laid the foundation for an office of president apart from the personality who occupied it. Like his predecesor, however, López Contreras continued the tradition of executive dominance. The Venezuelan congress remained a rubber stamp while López Contraras and his Andean advisors held unrestricted power.

After several years in office, the new chief executive perceived that liberalizing trends set in motion at the death of Juan Vicente Gómez were gaining momentum. He feared that continuing liberalization jeopardized the security of his government. Consequently, while avoiding the excesses of his predecessor, López Contreras used the police to silence opponents and limit dissent. He also forced on congress, the institution then constitutionally empowered to select the chief executive, his choice for president-General Isaías Medina Angarita. However, by obeying the constitution in relinguishing the presidency when his term expired, López Contreras strengthened the idea that "rules of the game" were more important than personality.[5]

Although Medina Angarita came from the Andean military tradition he encouraged the liberalization supressed by his predecessor. Medina Angarita hoped this would increase his popularity and give him the leverage necessary to replace government officials whose first allegiance remained with López Contreras. In the long run, Medina Angarita anticipated isolating his predecessor on the right fringe of a leftward evolving polity. López Contreras's isolation would leave Medina Angarita and his supporters free to assemble a moderate coalition with which they expected to dominate national politics. President Medina Angarita's strategy, however, divided conservatives and failed to attract anticipated moderate support. The president himself became isolated, especially after selecting Angel Biaggini as his successor. Many conservatives found Biaggini suspiciously progressive, and democrats, both moderates and leftists, considered him an unyielding spokesman for the traditional elite. Biaggini's widespread unpopular-

5 Morón, pp. 204-207.

ity opened the way for an alliance of junior military officers and *Acción Democrática,* the most important opposition party, to stage the brief but bloody revolt of October 18, 1945.[6] President Medina was deposed and a "Revolutionary Junta", presided over by *Acción Democratica's* Rómulo Betancourt, seized power. Betancourt governed until January, 1948, when Rómulo Gallegos, *Acción Democrática's* candidate, assumed the presidency as Venezuela's first popularly elected chief executive.

President Gallegos and *Acción Democrática* interpreted their victory as a mandate to remake Venezuela in accordance with widely publicized socialist prescriptions. Their control of the national executive was complimented by overwhelming majorities in congress, the only institution with constitutional authority to delay or veto reforms advocated by the president. Those who feared and opposed *Acción Democrática* programs, consequently, began looking for extra-constitutional means of blocking them. The military, historically the court of last resort in social, political and economic conflict, responded to urgings from the government's conservative opponents during December, 1948. In a surprisingly easy coup, President Gallegos and the leaders of *Acción Democrática* were deposed and exiled. A decade was to pass before either could return to Venezuela as other than fighters in the underground.

Carlos Delgado Chalbaund, Marcos Pérez Jiménez and Felipe Llovera Páez shared power in the *junta* which ruled following the ouster of President Gallegos. Delgado Chalbaund moved toward restoration of constitutional democracy, minus participation by *Acción Democrática,* but assassins struck him down in 1950. During the next two years, although Dr. Germán Suárez Flamerich formally served as president, Col. Pérez Jiménez held the power.

Following fraudulent elections on December 3, 1952,[7] Pérez Jiménez became president in name as well as in fact. He attempted to rule in the authoritarian tradition of Juan Vicente Gómez, but the 1945 revolution and subsequent democratic interlude had altered political attitudes and expectations. The country grew increasingly restive. Expanding urban violence finally forced the dictator and his advisors,

6 *Acción Democrática's* early development is discussed in JOHN D. MARTZ, *Acción Democrática* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 1-89.

7 LEO B. LOTT, "The 1952 Venezuelan Elections: A Lesson for 1957", *Western Political Quarterly* (September, 1957), pp. 451-558.

on the evening of January 23, 1958, to flee the country.[8] The political pendulum was swinging toward a democratic and constitutional regime.

Following Pérez Jiménez's flight a civilian and military *junta,* presided over by Admiral Wolfgang Larrazábal, assumed control. The *junta* set in motion electoral machinery, but when Admiral Larrazábal announced he would seek the presidency many doubted that the promised -elections would be truly free. However, Rómulo Betancourt, the candidate of a resurrected *Acción Democrática,* defeated Larrazábal and the military accepted the former's victory. President Betancourt was inaugurated in January, 1959, and served his full constitutional term. Five years later Betancourt passed the sash of office to his friend and political ally, Raúl Leoni.[9] Dr. Leoni became the first popularly-elected Venezuelan president to take power from a predecessor who had also been chosen by direct, universal suffrage.[10]

Between the death of Gómez and the beginning of the 1968 election campaign, as Table 3 reveals, ten men served as Venezuela's chief executive.

TABLE 3

VENEZUELAN CHIEF EXECUTIVES 1935 - 1969

YEARS OCCUPYING THE OFFICE	CHIEF EXECUTIVE	MANNER IN WHICH THE OFFICER WAS RELINQUISHED
1935 - 1941	General López Contreras	term ended
1941 - 1945	General Isaías Medina Angarita	overthrown
1945 - 1948	Rómulo Betancourt	successor elected
1948	Rómulo Gallegos	overthrown
1950 - 1952	Dr. Germán Suárez Flamerich	removed
1952 - 1958	General Marcos Pérez Jiménez	overthrown
1958	Admiral Wolfgang Larrazábal	successor elected
1959 - 1964	Rómulo Betancourt	successor elected
1964 - 1969	Raúl Leoni	successor elected

8 PHILIP B. TAYLOR, JR., *The Venezuelan Golpe de Estado of 1958: The Fall of Marcos Pérez Jiménez* (Washington: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1968). See especially pages 41-62.

9 See ROBERT J. ALEXANDER, *The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution: A Profile of the Regime of Rómulo Betancourt* (New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1964).

10 MARTZ, JOHN D., *The Venezuelan Elections of December 1, 1963* (Washington: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1964).

During the decade of the Betancourt and Leoni administrations, *Acción Democrática* joined with other political parties as the senior partner in various government coalitions. Table 4 illustrates the party composition of these coalitions.

TABLE 4

GOVERNMENT COALITIONS IN VENEZUELA, 1959 - 1969

DATES	MAJOR COALITION PARTNER	MINOR COALITION PARTNER
January, 1959 - November, 1960	*Acción Democrática*	Social Christians Democratic Republican Union
November, 1960- March, 1964	*Acción Democrática*	Social Christians
March, 1964 - November, 1964	*Acción Democrática*	
November, 1964- April, 1966	*Acción Democrática*	Democratic Republican Union National Democratic Front
April, 1966 - May, 1968	*Acción Democrática*	Democratic Republican Union
May, 1968 - March, 1969	*Acción Democrática*	

Three factors favored the formation of coalition governments in Venezuela throughout the 1960's. The first stemmed from a judgment by democratic leaders that democracy's hold on the country was precarious and could be broken by relatively minor provocation. Dictatorial government had been the rule since independence, and democratic politicians beleived that either they must demonstrate solidarity or run a high risk of being overwhelmed by their authoritarian enemies.[11] This perception was exceptionally strong between 1959 and

11 Cf., the discussion in Martz, *Acción Democrática*, pp. 331-337.

1961, the initial years during which pluralistic democracy was becoming operational.

Acción Democrática also entered into coalitions with rival political parties in order to secure working majorities in the legislative branch of national government. The 1961 constitution stipulated that the two houses of the Venezuelan congress, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, must pass favorably on a bill before the president could sign it into law. Following the 1958 elections, *Acción Democrática* dominated both houses of congress. However, in 1962 the struggle to nominate a presidential candidate split *Acción Democrática,* and subsequently no party has held a majority in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Forming a coalition capable of dominating congress, either on an *ad hoc* or long term basis, became necessary if the president's program was to be enacted.[12] Junior coalition partners, in contrast, entered the government to obtain jobs for their militants and to gain a base from which to strengthen and expand party organization. Also, civil servants with patronage positions were expected to turn over part of their salary, and such contributions constituted an important source of political party income.

CONTEMPORARY VENEZUELA'S POLITICAL PARTIES

At the onset of election campaigning in 1968, Venezuela exhibited an increasingly fragmented multi-party system. Nine political parties — *Acción Democrática* (A.D.), the Social Christians (COPEI). The People's Electoral Movement (M.E.P.), the National Civic Crusade (C.C.N.), the Democratic Republican Union (U.R.D.), the Communist Party of Venezuela (P.C.V.), the National Democratic Front (F.N.D.), the Popular Democratic Force (F.D.P.), and the Revolutionary Party of National Integration (PRIN) — appeared capable of capturing at least five percent of the total vote. Analysis of the nine begins with a simple scheme for classifying attitudes toward interparty relations and socio-political change.[13]

The concept of "maneuverability" divides parties in terms of their likelihood to ally with another party of parties. It describes the

12 RONALD H. MCDONALD, *Party Systems and Elections in Latin America* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 48-51.

13 This classification is modified from one developed by PETER RANIS, "A Two-Dimensional Typology of Latin American Political Parties", *Journal of Politics,* Vol. 30, No. 3 (August, 1968), pp. 796-832.

operational style party leaders adopt in their attempts to attain power and influence. Parties with "low maneuverability" are relative outsiders in the political arena. They eschew the mediation required for inter-party agreements and dislike the features of political bargaining and compromise. Highly "maneuverable" parties, in contrast, are extremely flexible and adaptive. Their leaders strive to maximize the possibilities of inter-party cooperation. Preoccupation is with assemblying a coalition sufficiently encompassing to achieve a level of power which would have been impossible had they remained separate.

"Perception", the second classificatory concept, divides parties in terms of their orientation toward social change and democratic pluralism. Parties opposing social change, and willing to resort to authoritarian means to prevent change, will be labeled preservators. Authoritarian parties seeking to impose a desired new order can be termed rejectors, for they repudiate the *status quo* and efforts to remake it incrementally. Innovator parties occupy a middle ground between rejectors and preservators. Innovators favor pragmatic and gradualist approaches to socio-economic problems. Regardless of their ideologies, innovator parties are willing to experiment with varying political formulae and refrain from committing thenselves to any absolutistic view of society. They will bend the political exigencies of the moment in order to resolve political impasses or economic obstacles. Innovators also seek to accommodate the broadest possible spectrum of interest.

Illustration 4 locates Venezuelan political parties, in 1968, from the perspectives of "maneuverability" and "perception". Illustration 4 also reveals two parties, the National Civil Crusade and the Communists, near the "maneuverability" continuum's low pole. From the standpoint of "perception" the Communists appear as rejectors and the National Civic Crusade falls near the preservator-innovator boundary. Significant electoral support for low "maneuverability" preservators and rejectors traditionally threatens pluralistic democracy by denying to a party system the flexibility on which coalition making depends. This is also true, although to a lesser degree, for low "maneuverability" innovator parties. The Venezuelan Communist Party, a low "Maneuverability" rejector, has never polled ten percent of the vote, and in 1968 the National Civic Crusade, a low "maneuverability" preservator, possessed only the rudiments of a formal party organization. Neither was expected to play an important role in the upcoming

ILLUSTRATION 4

IMPORTANT VENEZUELAN POLITICAL PARTIES CLASSIFIED IN TERMS OF "MANEUVERABILITY" AND "PERCEPTION": 1968

"MANEUVERABILITY"	REJECTOR	INNOVATOR	PRESERVATOR
Low	P.C.V.		C.C.N.
High		COPEI F.D.P. A.D. PRIN. M.E.P. F.N.D. U.R.D.	

Total Social Change — "PERCEPTION" — *Status Quo Retention*

presidential election campaign. Also, Venezuela lacked a low "maneuverability" innovator. Electoral politics were dominated by innovator parties with high "maneuverability".

The "maneuverability" — "perception" classification places parties which, until 1968, secured 90 percent of the total vote in the high "maneuverability" innovator category. Having parties supported by such an overwhelming percent of the electorate raises the question of what, if anything, differentiates the many members of this category. Also, the low "maneuverability" preservator classification for the National Civic Crusade and the low "maneuverability" resistor classification for Communists only begin to distinguish them from their high "maneuverability" innovator rivals.

The concept of ideological family adds a needed dimension to the classification of Venezuelan political parties. Venezuelan innovator high "maneuverability" political parties can be divided into three ideological families, the democratic right, christian democracy and the democratic left. All three ideological families are comprised of parties committed to incremental change, but important inter-family differences exist over the desired rate of change and concerning which programs most effectively modernize. Party differences within an ideological family, in contrast, generally rest on personalistic rivalries. Regionalism also helps to explain individual party differences, but its relationship to ideological families is unclear. Political parties in Venezuela fall into five ideological families, the above mentioned three, the authoritarian left and the authoritarian right. The fivefold ideological family classification may be seen as a compliment to the "maneuverability" — "perception" typology.

THE DEMOCRATIC LEFT

When elections were honest and based on universal suffrage, most Venezuelans supported parties of the democratic left. The key to democratic left dominance has been the organizational skill of *Acción Democrática,* a democratic socialist party that once counted on support from eight in ten voters.[14] *Acción Democrática's* initial success

14 McDonald, p. 48.

rested on an alliance of peasants, workers and the provincial middle class. Opposed to this alliance was the governing elite which came to power in 1899 — Andean generals, Caracas based land owners and businessmen.[15] Party politics during the twentieth century's first six decades largely revolved about efforts to depose this ruling coalition, and after 1942 *Acción Democrática* spearheaded the movement for change.

Acción Democrática's efforts, as discussed earlier, bore fruit following the revolution of 1945 and the overthrow of General Pérez Jiménez, in 1958. Success, however, was followed by internal struggles that debilitated the party and eventually fragmented the democratic left. Once in power, many democratic left leaders became unwilling to resolve intra-party disagreement through compromise.[16] Those who controlled *Acción Democrática,* for example, refused to grant minority demands, and minority faction leaders chose to form splinter groups they could dominate. On the eve of the 1968 election, consequently, the democratic left, once largely within *Acción Democrática,* was represented by four additional parties — the Democratic Republican Union, the Popular Democratic Force, the People's Electoral Movement and the Revolutionary Party of National Integration.

Although not founded officially until 1942, *Acción Democrática's* roots go back to the struggle against Juan Vicente Gómez. The leading opponents of Gómez and his immediate successors included Rómulo Betancourt, Raúl Leoni, Gonzalo Barrios and Luis Beltrán Prieto Figueroa, all of whon eventually became presidential candidates. This opposition, along with Rómulo Gallegos, formed the original nucleus of *Acción Democrática.*[17] The governing alliance of 1899, the Caracas-Andean elite, intended to retain power indefinitely. Under the constitution, as discussed earlier, congress elected the president and the elite controlled congress. Throughout 1944 and 1945 *Acción Democrática* pressured Isaías Medina to name a successor who favored constitutional reform, especially the implementation of direct presidential election by universal suffrage. When Medina Angarita decided

15 For further discussion of the Gómez regime, see THOMAS ROURKE, *Gómez, Tyrant of the Andes* (Garden City: Halcyon House, 1936). Also, see Rangel.

16 José Rivas Rivas, *Las Tres Divisiones de Acción Democrática* (Caracas: Pensamiento Vivo, 1968).

17 For discussion of the formation of the party, see Martz, *Acción Democrática,* pp. 1-89 McDonald, p. 44.

against an individual of this ilk, *Acción Democrática* leaders dispaired of gaining power through constitutional means and opened conversations with junior military officers. The young officers, like *Acción Democrática's* leaders, chafed because many who came to prominance with the Andean generals in 1899 continued to monopolize important positions in government and the military. Common Interest led to alliance, and to the previously discussed revolt of October 18, 1945.

Having Rómulo Betancourt as president of the new ruling *junta* enabled *Acción Democrática* to organize peasants and workers with official assistance, rather than in the face of government opposition. Organizational efforts were highly successful. Rómulo Gallegos, the presidential candidate of *Acción Democrática* in the 1947 elections, received 74 percent of the total vote. *Acción Democrática* won in every state but two Andean ones, Táchira and Mérida.[18] At that time *Adecos* considered themselves radical socialists. They blamed capitalism, domestic and foreign, for the backwardness of Venezuela and the long rule of the Caracas-Andean elite. Believing the election to be an overwhelming mandate, they moved swiftly to reshape Venezuela. Reforms proposed by *Acción Democrática* frightened the traditional elite. They also went beyond anything imagined by the young officers who overthrew President Medina Angarita. On November 24, 1948, with full support from the Caracas-Andean elite, the military again siezed power. President Gallegos and Rómulo Betancourt along with other leaders of *Acción Democrática,* were exiled.

Following their ouster and exile, *Acción Democrática's* leaders began a decade of clandestine activity. Initially they hoped that elections, minus their participation, would pave the way for a return of democracy and eventual legalization. This strategy appeared to be working when government scheduled presidential balloting for late 1952 and encouraged participation by the Social Christians and the Democratic Republican Union, both critics of the incumbent administration. *Acción Democrática's* high command directed the party faithful to support Jóvito Villalba, the presidential candidate of the Democratic Republican Union. As election returns filtered into Caracas Villalba and his party appeared certain of victory. However, the government suddenly imposed censorship and the next day announced that its

18 For detailed election returns since 1946 see BORIS BUNIMOV-PARRA, *Introducción A La Sociología Electoral Venezolana* (Caracas: Editorial Arte, 1967).

candidate, Col. Pérez Jiménez, was the new president elect. Villalba and his lieutenants joined the leaders of *Acción Democrática* in exile.

When Pérez Jiménez assumed the presidency, *Acción Democrática's* leaders abandoned any hope of securing reintegration into national political life through peaceful means. Clandestine activities against the government escalated and alliances were formed with parties and groups from all ideological families except the authoritarian right. As the anti-government alliance gained support Pérez Jiménez's military backers wavered, and the slums of Caracas became centers for urban guerrilla warfare. Tension mounted during late 1957 and early 1958, and open rebellion flared on January 23, 1958. When cadets from the National Military Academy joined in, the game was played out. Pérez Jiménez fled.

The new government, a "revolutionary" *junta,* held free elections during December, 1958. As indicated earlier, Rómulo Betancourt captured the presidency and *Acción Democrática* won control of both houses of congress. In place of the lopsided popular majority of 1947, however, *Acción Democrática's* share fell to 49.5 percent. The party suffered its greatest losses in Caracas, where only 15 percent of the electorate preferred Betancourt and his allies.[19] *Acción Democrática's* younger leaders expected Betancourt would resume the rapid pace of social change that characterized the Gallegos administration. Betancourt had a different strategy. He believed that conservatives pressured for a military coup in 1948 because they felt themselves powerless to influence President Gallegos and *Acción Democrática.* Betancourt argued that his government should point Venezuela in a new direction, but with caution. Conservatives and the military were to be educated to work constitutional government. Once the democratic system was firmly established, *Acción Democrática,* by electoral mandate, could increase the pace of socio-economic change. To many youthful members of *Acción Democrática* these policies betrayed the revolution which overthrew Pérez Jiménez and led to elections from which Betancourt emerged victorious. The young dissidents, led by Domingo Alberto Rangel, Simón Sáez Mérida and Jorge Dáger, abandoned the party and formed the Movement of the Revolutionary Left. (M.I.R.)

As the time approached to select a presidential candidate for the 1963 elections, dissension within *Acción Democrática* again bubbled

19 *Ibid.,* Cuadro Anexo VII.

over. Middle generation leaders, those who remained in Venezuela while leading the underground against Pérez Jiménez, favored the candidacy of Raúl Ramos Giménez. They came within several votes of controlling the machinery which would select *Acción Democrática's* presidential candidate. Following a narrow loss to the "Old Guard", most middle-generation leaders, collectively known as the "ARS" faction, established their own party, *Acción Democrática Oposición.*[20] Raúl Leoni, the candidate of *Acción Democrática's* "Old Guard", won the presidency in 1963. However, the share of total popular votes going to *Acción Democrática* declined to 33 percent. Reduction in popular support, while disappointing to the "Old Guard" was mild in comparison to the bitter surprise awaiting Raul Ramos Giménez and his followers. *Acción Democrática Oposición* received less than five percent of the popular vote and elected only one senator and six members to the Chamber of Diputies. Shortly after the election, *Acción Democrática Oposición* was renamed the National Revolutionary Party.

During 1966 maneuvering began within *Acción Democrática* to select a presidential candidate for the 1968 elections. The three most important contenders were Luis Beltrán Prieto Figueroa, Gonzálo Barrios and Jesús Angel Paz Galarraga. The latter spoke for the middle-generation leaders who had not followed Raúl Ramos Giménez, while the former two were part of the dominant "Old Guard". When the 1966 convention of *Acción Democrática* replaced Paz Galarraga with Gonzalo Barrios as Secretary General of the party, it appeared that the "Old Guard" had decided upon the latter and was capable of hoisting its choice on the party.[21] Bitter over his removal as Secretary General, Paz Galarraga believed a major barrier to realizing his presidential ambition was the well known animosity between himself and former president Betancourt. Although out of the country in semi-retirement, Betancourt retained enormous influence within the "Old Guard". Paz Galarraga calculated that before he could gain his party's presidential nomination he would to crack the united front presented by the "Old Guard".

As a tactic for dividing the "Old Guard" Paz Galarraga offered his support to the presidential candidacy of Prieto Figueroa. Prieto Fi-

20 The label "ARS" was applied to this group by its critics who accused them of wanting to control everything within the party. "ARS" was a publicity agency in Venezuela whose motto was "Let us do your thinking for you".

21 Cr. ENRIQUE MEDINA, "La Verdad Sobre la División de A.D.", *Elite*, No. 2198 (November 11, 1967), pp. 36-39, 90.

gueroa, as indicated earlier, played a major role in the development and evolution of *Acción Democrática.*[22] He wanted to be president. However, already in his middle sixties, Prieto Figueroa feared 1973 would be too late for another try at the nomination. Consequently, he accepted Paz Galarraga's offer and set out to challenge Gonzalo Barrios and his comrades in the "Old Guard".

Prieto Figueroa and Gonzalo Barrios each commanded broad support within *Acción Democrática.* Prieto Figueroa could depend on middle-generation and middle-echelon party leaders allied with Paz Galarraga. He also had a powerful ally in González Navarro, president of the Venezuelan Confederation of Workers (C.T.V.),[23] the nation's largest labor organization. Second echelon leaders within C.T.V. component unions also favored Prieto Figueroa. However, the presidents of many component unions supported Gonzalo Barrios. Barrios also could count on President Leoni's cabinet and high level bureaucrats in their late thirties and early forties. These latter individuals owed their positions to the "Old Guard", which had promoted them over many of Paz Galarraga's generation. Resulting resentment was a major generator of friction between the "Old Guard" and the middle-generation.

The "Old Guard's" dominant faction, after successfully replacing Paz Galarraga with Gonzalo Barrios, believed their control over the party to be unassailable. Consequently, they challenged Prieto Figueroa to test his strength in a primary election, the first ever held within *Acción Democrática.* While the turnout was light preliminary returns indicated a smashing victory for Prieto Figueroa.[24] Sporadic violence marked the primaries, however, and voting in the Cumaná Section of Sucre state was postponed. When the primaries took place in Cumaná, each side charged the other with fraud and intimidation. Followers of Gonzalo Barrios subsequently stated that the entire

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22 Most members of the "Old Guard" were in their early or middle sixties. In contrast, the generation of Paz Galarraga was in its early or middle fifties. The highest ranking, youthful bureaucrats, like Leopoldo Sucre Figarella, Lorenzo Azpúrua and Carlos Andrés Pérez, were in their late thirties and middle forties. Insufficient evidence exists at present, however, to totally explain the conflict on the basis of generational rivalry.

23 C.T.V. stands for Confederación de Trabajadores Venezolanos. For a more complete discussion of the C.T.V. in politics see Martz, *Acción Democrática.* pp. 255-286.

24 A detailed discussion of the controversy surrounding the primary elections appeared in the Caracas press between September 25 and 29, 1967. *El Nacional* and *El Universal* provided especially complete coverage. Cf. the final third of Rivas Rivas.

primary election had become questionable, and that its results did not bind elected delegates to either of the declared candidates.[25]

The primary elections were for party delegates at the municipal level.[26] Elected delegates subsequently assembled in conventions to select district delegates. In turn, district delegates gathered in state conventions known as sections, where they chose section delegations to *Acción Democrática's* national convention. The national convention, given supreme authority by party statues, could alter the National Directive Council and the National Executive Committee. These two bodies controlled *Acción Democrática* when the national convention was not in session, and at the time of the primaries they were dominated by partisans of Gonzalo Barrios.[27]

In spite of Barrios' control over the National Directive Council and the National Executive Committee, Prieto Figueroa possessed important support in both. By virtue of his office as president of *Acción Democrática,* Prieto Figueroa was himself a member of the Council and the Committee. This also was true of Gonzalo Barrios, who held the office of Secretary General. Following the primary, on the basis of his authority as president of *Acción Democrática,* Prieto Figueroa ordered elected municipal delegates to choose district delegates, thus opening the way for calling state and national conventions into session. He believed that the national convention, once it met, would place a majority loyal to him on the National Executive Committee and the National Directive Council. Gonzalo Barrios and his allies undertook counter-measures. Repeating charges that the primaries had taken place under questionable circumstances, and that results were unrepresentative, they ordered the elected municipal delegates to postpone the selection of district representatives.[28] Prieto Figueroa reissued his earlier directive to proceed inmediately with the selection. The National Directive Council, still dominated by Barrios, suspended Prieto Figueroa as president of the party. In a final gesture at reconciliation

25 *El Nacional,* October 16, 1967.

26 In Venezuela, states are divided into districts *(distritos),* and these are broken un into municipalities *(municipios).* The delegates to the national convention of *Acción Democrática* represent a section, which is comprised of districts. Most sections have the same boundaries as a state. In some instances, however, a state may be broken into sections. For example, *Acción Democrática,* divides the state of Sucre into two sections, those of Cumaná and Carúpano. In contrast, the Carabobo section of *Acción Democrática* includes all the districts of the state of Carabobo.

27 See the Caracas dialies *El Nacional* and *El Universal.* October 1-21, 1967, for a more complete discussion. Cf. Rivas Rivas, 74-82.

28 *El Nacional,* October 17, 1967.

the Council called upon both Prieto Figueroa and Gonzalo Barrios to renounce their candidacies. When Prieto Figueroa refused, he and his followers were expelled.[29] They then organized as the People's Electoral Movement.

The Revolutionary Party of National Integration, also a democratic left party in 1968, included most leaders who separated from *Acción Democrática* in the divisions of 1960 and 1962. As indicated earlier, the latter division was more significant and revolved around the presidential candidacy of Raúl Ramos Giménez. Partisans of Ramos Giménez founded *Acción Democrática Oposición.*[30] Following the 1963 elections, *Acción Democrática Oposición* changed its name to the National Revolutionary Party (P.R.N.). Three years later, the followers of Domingo Alberto Rangel joined the National Revolutionary Party. Rangel, as noted earlier, was a leader of the youth who split from *Acción Democrática* in 1960 and founded the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (M.I.R.). Alienated from the regime, the M.I.R. waged guerrilla warfare during the early and middle 1960's. Their efforts failed, and Rangel and his followers served time in prison. After release they chose electoral politics as the only possible arena in which to battle *Acción Democrática.* Rangel merged his following with the National Revolutionary Party in 1966, and the new organization was called the Revolutionary Party of National Integration (PRIN).

The Popular Democratic Force (F.D.P.) also emerged from the split in *Acción Democrática* which preceded formation of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left. Jorge Dáger, along with Rangel and Sáez Mérida, a leader of the dissidents, disagreed with the thesis that armed struggle was necessary to transform Venezuela. Dáger argued that the time was not propitious for guerrilla warfare, and that while Betancourt allowed free elections violence was unjustified. Consequently, Dáger broke with Rangel and Sáez Mérida when they initiated terrorism against the government. With a small group of followers Dáger formed the Popular Democratic Force.

In the election of 1958 Admiral Larrazábal ran as the presidential candidate of the Democratic Republican Union (U.R.D.) and the Communist Party of Venezuela (P.C.V.). While losing, he did well in the cities and won an overwhelming victory in Caracas. Democratic Republican Union leaders, however, opposed a second Larrazábal pre-

29 Rivas Rivas, pp. 88-99.
30 In Yaracuy, *Acción Democrática Oposición* received 13 percent of the total vote.

sidential candidacy. Instead, they nominated the party's founder, Jóvito Villalba. The Communists, by then allied with the guerrillas, had been declared illegal. As the 1963 elections approached Larrazábal remained a popular figure, but without a political party. Jorge Dáger, on the other hand, was searching for a charismatic figure to run as the presidential candidate of F.D.P. Dáger convinced Larrazábal to accept the nomination of his party, and electoral results underscored the wisdom of Dáger's choice. With little organization, and almost no money, the Popular Democratic Force won 10 percent of the total popular vote. Larrazábal again did well in the slums of Caracas and Maracaibo. Consequently, the Popular Democratic Force elected 4 senators and 16 members of the Chamber of Deputies.[31]

The Democratic Republican Union, the final party if the Democratic left, is almost as old as *Acción Democrática.* The same rural and small town intellectual who founded *Acción Democrática* also established the Democratic Republican Union. However, the latter's early cadres looked to Jóvito Villalba instead of Rómulo Betancourt. Villalba and Betancourt were rivals since their students days at the Central University, where each hoped to become the leading spokesman for opponents of the Caracas-Andean elite. Villalba lacked Betancourt's organizational talent. In the 1947 election the Democratic Republican Union polled only 4.5 percent of the total congressional vote and failed to run a presidential candidate. The military considered the party ineffective, and permitted it to function following the expulsion of President Gallegos and *Acción Democrática.* Consequently, Villalba became Pérez Jiménez's most important opponent in the 1952 elections. The Colonel, confident of victory, considered electoral fraud unnecessary. Villalba, as discussed earlier, reached an agreement with *Acción Democrática. Acción Democrática* support and his own efforts yielded a victory that Pérez Jiménez refused to accept. Villalba and his most important lieutenants were herded onto an airplane and flown into exile.

In 1958, after returning to reorganize the Democratic Republican Union, Villalba moved to the left of *Acción Democrática.* Unsure of his party's strength, Villalba offered Admiral Larrazábal the Democratic Republican Union's presidential nomination. Larrazábal consented, and as discussed earlier, ran extremely well cities while making a

31 Bunimov Parra, pp. 279-290.

respectable showing in the countryside. The Democratic Republican Union polled 26.8 percent of the total congressional vote and became Venezuela's second strongest political party.[32] Hoping to stabilize fledgling democratic system, Democratic Republican Union leaders entered the government in partnership with *Acción Democrática* and the Social Christian Party. During November, 1960, however, differences within the coalition deepened. Disagreement over whether Cuba should be suspended from the O.A.S. resulted in the Democratic Republican Union passing into opposition.

Between 1959 and 1962 Villalba struggled to retain control over his party. While successful, he alienated many young and talented leaders. The Democratic Republican Union became more and more Villalba's personalistic vehicle, especially after he was nominated as its presidential candidate in 1963. Villalba proved attractive in rural areas, but was rejected overwhelmingly in the cities. The Democratic Republican Union's vote fell to 17.6 percent of legislative total,[33] dropping the party to third place in the National Congress. During November, 1964, the Democratic Republican Union, as discussed earlier, entered the government as a coalition partner of President Raúl Leoni. Participation continued until May 15, 1968. Villalba removed his party from government following unsuccessful negotiations with *Acción Democrática* over formation of an electoral alliance for the upcoming elections. The Democratic Republican Union subsequently joined the Popular Democratic Force and the National Democratic Front in supporting a "unity" candidate for president.

THE AUTHORITARIAN LEFT

The authoritarian left in Venezuela has never spoken for more than a small minority. A major reason for impotence is that the family's only important electoral representative, the Venezuelan Communist Party (P.C.V.), rejected a nationalist political style and responded almost mechanically to the zigs and zags of Moscow's Latin American policies.[34] Subserviance to Russian communism placed the Venezuelan Communist Party at a great disadvantage in its compe-

32 *Ibid.*, pp. 263-273.
33 *Ibid.*, Cuadro Anexos X and XI.
34 For a detailed discussion of the Venezuelan Communist Party see ROBERT J. ALEXANDER, *The Communist Party of Venezuela* (Palo Alto, California: The Hoover Institution Press, 1969).

tition with *Acción Democrática,* especially when the latter stressed its exclusively national character. Venezuelan Communists, consequently, did poorly in competition to attract leadership capable of developing a mass based political organization.

Founded in 1931, the Communists are Venezuela's oldest existing political party. Most prominant among its early leaders were Gustavo Machado, Eduardo Machado and Juan Bautista Fuenmayor. Gustavo Machado ran as the Communist candidate for president in the 1947 election, but received only 3.2 percent of the vote. Between 1948 and 1958, the decade of military rule, the Communist Party divided between those favoring collaboration with Pérez Jiménez and others who fought in the underground with *Acción Democrática* and other democratic political parties. The faction collaborating with Pérez Jiménez received the dictator's blessing for an attempt to break *Acción Democrática's* hold over organized labor. However, the former ruling party maintained clandestine dominance over most unions.[35]

At the beginning of Betancourt's second administration, in 1959, the Venezuelan Communist Party declared its intention to operate within the democratic system. Several years later, however, party leaders joined with the guerrillas of Rangel and Sáez Mérida. This caused the government to withdraw legal recognition, thus denying the Communists an opportunity to run candidates in the 1963 elections. By early 1966 the Communist Party, along with most of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, agreed that guerrilla warfare had failed. Again changing tactics, the Venezuelan Communist Party sought legalization to participate in the 1968 elections. The Supreme Electoral Council recognized the Communist Party, which for the election took the name Union for Advancement (U.P.A.).

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY

Founded soon after the coup which ousted General Medina Angarita the Social Christian Party (COPEI)[36] looked for ideological guidance to the thought of Jacques Maritain and the papal encyclicals of the 1930's. The Venezuelan Social Christian Party swiftly emerged as the

35 MARTZ, *Acción Democrática,* pp. 260-261.

36 The initials COPEI stand for *Comité de Organización Pro-Elecciones Independientes.* The Social Christians chose this title because they hoped to attract a wide variety of independents who were not a part of the dominant *Acción Democrática* party.

major vehicle of opposition to the socialism and anti-clericalism of *Acción Democrática.* In 1947 Rafael Caldera, the presidential choice of COPEI, provided the only significant opposition to Rómulo Gallegos, *Acción Democrática's* victorious candidate. Caldera, as indicated earlier, carried the Andean states of Táchira and Mérida.[37]

Between 1948 and 1958, of all major parties, the Social Christians fared the best. Not until the final years of Pérez Jiménez's regime was the party actively persecuted. On January 23, 1958, however, the Social Christians were fighting in the underground with *Acción Democrática* and the Democratic Republican Union. In the elections of December, 1958, the Social Christians again nominated Rafael Caldera for the presidency. However, Caldera was overshadowed by the contest between front-runners Wolfgang Larrazábal and Rómulo Betancourt. The Social Christians nominee ran a weak third, receiving only 16 percent of the total presidential vote. Support again came disproportionately from Andean states.[38] Social Christians, in conjunction with the Democratic Republican Union, joined the Betancourt coalition. When the latter party broke with *Acción Democrática* the Social Christians choose to remain. President Betancourt received support from Rafael Caldera and his followers throughout the 1959-1964 constitutional period. The Social Christians anticipated cooperation would continue into the 1963 election. Running stronger than in 1958, the Social Christians became Venezuela's second party.

While Social Christians led opposition to the government during Raúl Leoni's administration, many party professionals remained in the bureaucracy. Social Christian influence and prestige grew. As the 1968 elections approached an increasingly confident Social Christian Party nominated Rafael Caldera for the fourth time as its presidential standard bearer. With what had been *Acción Democrática* divided between partisans of Gonzalo Barrios and Luis Beltrán Prieto Figueroa, the elections of 1968 gave the Social Christians their best opportunity to capture the presidency.

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37 For a more complete discussion of the Social Christians, see FRANKLIN TUGWELL, "The Christian Democrats of Venezuela", *Journal of Inter-American Studies,* VII, 2 (Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami), pp. 245-267.

38 Consejo Supremo Electoral, *Resultados de la Votación de 1958.*

THE DEMOCRATIC RIGHT

The democratic right in Venezuela never has attracted broad electoral support. Several factors explain this lack of appeal. First, carriers of both conservative and pluralistic ideals, upper and upper middle class groups influenced by democratic thinking were a small minority.[39] They could not win elections without making alliances with workers, peasants or the urban poor. Middle class conservative democrats, because of their dependence upon the wealthy, hesitated to search out electoral alliances without upper class approval. Most upper class conservative democrats, in turn, found political competition with lower middle class leaders from the democratic left distasteful. Consequently, a majority of upper class Venezuelans historically accepted political solutions which disenfranchised the masses.

If a conservative found dictatorships distasteful, or doubted their viability, his most likely preference was the Social Christian Party. Venezuelan Christian Democracy, despite its revolutionary rhetoric, developed in opposition to the socialism of *Acción Democrática.* From its earliest days the party received backing from individuals of wealth and position. Social Christians, therefore, were heirs to a long tradition of association with the upper class. In addition, the Social Christian Party grew between 1958 and 1968. It offered the opportunity of electing a president whom conservatives believed they could influence, while electoral success seemed beyond the grasp of any party in the democratic right. Assuming that it was desirable to replace *Acción Democrática's* government of the left with any more conservative one, potential sympathizers of the democratic right inclined toward the Social Christians. This was especially true after the National Democratic Front, the only significant party of the democratic right, joined President Raul Leoni's coalition government in 1964.[40]

The National Democratic Front (F.N.D.) grew out of the Venezuelan Association of Independents, a group of politically dissatisfied businessmen and professionals. In 1963 they rallied behind the presidential candidacy of Arturo Uslar Pietri, a prominent Caracas intellectual. The Venezuelan Association of Independents counted among its supporters the country's most important financial and commercial

39 Cf. BUNIMOV-PARRA, pp. 327-333.

40 The National Democratic Front explained its participation in the Leoni government in a party pamphlet entitled, *El F.N.D. y El Gobierno de Colaboración* (Caracas: n.p., 1966).

interests. Consequently, the backers of Uslar Pietri were able to mount an intensive television campaign.[41] Results proved surprising and confirmed the floating and mecurial character of the Caracas vote. Uslar Pietri ran stronger in the capital than any other candidate, capturing 33 percent of the vote. Nationally, the independent association supporting Uslar Pietri received 13 percent of the legislative vote and elected 3 senators and 20 members of the Chamber of Deputies. Following the elections Uslar Pietri organized the Association of Independents into a political party, the National Democratic Front. During November, 1964, as indicated earlier, the National Democratic Front entered the government coalition in partnership with *Acción Democrática* and the Democratic Republican Union. After 16 months, however, the National Democratic Front passed to the opposition. In keeping with their conservative ideology, leaders of the National Democratic Front broke with *Acción Democrática* and the Democratic Republican Union over proposals to increase personal and corporate income taxes.

Many democratic conservatives never forgave Uslar Pietri and the National Democratic Front their flirtation with the Leoni administration. National Democratic Front strategists, consequently, believed recovery of their conservative clientele depended on offering a reasonable opportunity for victory in the 1968 election. Only as part an inclusive "Anti-*Acción Democrática*" alliance could the National Democratic Front hope to capture the presidency. Consequently, during April, 1968, Uslar Pietri concluded an election pact with the Democratic Republican Union and the Popular Democratic Force that committed each to the candidacy Miguel Angel Burelli Rivas, a respected but unknown diplomat.

Two parties also belonging to the democratic right, the National Action Movement (M.A.N.) and the Venezuelan Socialist Party (P.S.D.) were minuscule. The former served as a personalist vehicle for Germán Borregales while industrialist Alejandro Hernández controlled the latter. Borregales and Hernández were to run as their respective parties presidential candidates in the 1968 election, but neither proved an important contender. The National Action Movement and the Venezuelan Socialist Party also presented candidates for congress, state legislatures and the municipal councils.

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41 MARTZ, *The Venezuelan Elections of December 1, 1963*, Part I, pp. 32-33.

THE AUTHORITARIAN RIGHT

The prestigeous study by Laureano Vallenilla Lanz, *Cesarismo Democrático,* presents a carefully reasoned argument for right authoritarianism in Venezuela.[42] Its best known chapter, "The Necessary Policeman", asserts that given Venezuela's violent past and geography only a strong ruler can prevent the nation from slipping into anarchy. Vallenilla Lanz's arguments were used by Colonel Pérez Jiménez, the most recent authoritarian rightist to govern, in justifying his refusal to permit opposition.

Following his inauguration President John F. Kennedy acceded to the request of President Rómulo Betancourt and began proceedings that extradited Pérez Jiménez from his exile in Miami, Florida, to Venezuela. The ousted dictator's return, even though he was arrested at the Caracas airport, kindled hope among authoritarian rightists that their former champion might again become an important political leader. Friends of Pérez Jiménez formed the National Civic Crusade (C.C.N.) for the purpose of securing his release from prison. The National Civic Crusade evolved into a political party, and much to their delight authoritarian rightists discovered an undercurrent of support for the imprisoned Colonel. As this undercurrent became clear, the government abandoned plans to prosecute vigorously the former dictator. In mid-1968, after a trial in which Pérez Jiménez was convicted of stealing from the national treasury, the government exiled him to Spain.[43] The National Civic Crusade's leaders, however, became more confident and boldly presented the exiled dictator as senatorial candidate from the Federal District. The authoritarian right was no longer dispirited and intimidated as it had been a decade earlier, when Rómulo Betancourt took the presidential oath of office.

Table 5 closes the discussion of Venezuelan political parties on the eve of the 1968 election campaign. It summarizes findings concerning ideological family, ideology and regional difference in party support.

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42 LAUREANO VALLENILLA LANZ, *Cesarismo Democrático,* 4th ed. (Caracas: Tipografía Garrido, 1960).

43 *El Nacional,* August 1 1968.

TABLE 5

IMPORTANT VENEZUELAN POLITICAL PARTIES
ON THE EVE OF THE 1968 ELECTION CAMPAIGN

IDEOLOGICAL FAMILY	PARTY REPRESENTATIVE	INITIALS USED IN VENEZUELA	IDEOLOGY	REGION OF GREATEST STRENGTH
DEMOCRATIC LEFT	Acción Democrática	A.D.	Social Democrat	Rural areas, except Andes
	Electoral Movement of the People	M.E.P.	Radical Socialist	Unknown
	Revolutionary Party of National Integration	P.R.I.N.	Radical Socialist	Yaracuy
	Popular Democratic Force	F.D.P.	Personalistic Radical Socialist	Maracaibo & Caracas
	Democratic Republican Union	U.R.D.	Personalistic Social Democrat	Rural areas, especially East
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY	Social Christian Party	COPEI	Christian Socialist	Andes
DEMOCRATIC RIGHT	National Democratic Front	F.N.D.	Personalistic National Conservative	Caracas
AUTHORITARIAN LEFT	Communist Party of Venezuela	P.C.V.	Traditional Communism	Maracaibo & Caracas
AUTHORITARIAN RIGHT	National Civic Crusade	C.C.N.	Personalistic Authoritarian Conservative	Unknown

CHAPTER II

STAKES AND RULES OF THE GAME

THE STAKES

From the perspective of participating parties and coalitions stakes in the 1968 election were "system dominance", "subsystem dominance", and "influence". Conflict for "system dominance" centered about control of the presidency.[1] Municipal councils, the focus of struggle for subsystem dominance, were the only Venezuelan governmental institutions with significant autonomy from national decision makers. However, municipal councils were second order electoral prizes. They enjoyed restricted powers and, with few exceptions, controlled minuscule budgets.[2] Also, given recent fragmentación within the Venezuelan party system municipal councils, like the national congress, increasingly were controlled by party coalitions rather than by a single party.[3] Influence within a controlling coalition rather than total dominance, therefore, became the common stake in municipal elections.

Acción Democrática entered the 1968 election campaign having just emerged from the most destructive intra-party struggle in its turbulent history. Nevertheless, after an only slightly less debilitating clash in 1962 the party recovered and elected Raúl Leoni president. *Acción Democrática* leaders regrouped following the shock of division in 1967 and concluded they had a fighting chance of electing Barrios.

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1 The powers and duties of Venezuela's president are enumerated in Article 190 of the Constitution of 1961. Also, see Articles 128, 131 and 228.

2 In 1965, for example, the combined income of all Venezuelan municipalities was Bs. 650.528.363 or approximately U.S. $ 151.1 million. Of the total, more than one half was received by the Municipal Council of the Federal District. Only two other municipal councils had incomes of more than Bs. 25.000.000 for the same period. In contrast, the income of the national government for 1965 was Bs. 7.367.117.000. Source: *Anuario Estadístico de Venezuela 1965* (Caracas: Dirección General de Estadística y Censos Nacionales, 1967).

3 Cf. the discussion of party system fragmentation in Chapter I.

They also believed that his election could prove a major turning point in Venezuelan politics. If an opposition candidate could not defeat Barrios following the fratricidal strife of 1967, it would be strong evidence that *Acción Democrática's* hold on the presidency was unlikely to be broken in the near future.[4] A wide range of historically hostile interests, especially in the business community, might be persuaded to seek accommodation with the government party. To a surprising degree, as will be analyzed subsequently, this occurred during 1967 and 1968. Victory in the 1968 election, therefore, carried the possibility for *Acción Democrática* that its position in Venezuela might be consolidated into something approaching the dominance enjoyed by the Revolutionary Institutional Party (P.R.I.) in México.

The People's Electoral Movement (M.E.P.), at least during the first months of the election campaign, also believed themselves capable of capturing the presidency. As Gonzalo Barrios and *Acción Democrática* gathered strength, however, confidence among leaders of the People's Electoral Movement ebbed. The impact of Prieto Figueroa's primary victory declined. He was hard pressed to maintain his standing as the legitimate heir to *Acción Democrática's* historic majority position. A heavy barrage of *Acción Democrática* propaganda placed him on the defensive. Prieto Figueroa, therefore, spent much of his time answering charges that his "defection" had opened the way to power for enemies of the workers and peasants. The major uncertainty for the People's Electoral Movement, instead of being whether it could capture the presidency, became whether or not it would survive as a significant electoral force.

The 1968 elections were the most important in the history of the Social Christian Party. Not only did the party have its best opportunity of electing a president, it was imperative that the opportunity be used successfully. The Social Christians had finished second to *Acción Democrática* in every election since 1946, when the modern party system emerged, except in the three-cornered contest of 1958.[5] Excited anticipation, tempered by two and a half decades of frustration, therefore, characterized Social Christian leaders and militants during the 1968 campaign. The party's vaunted campaign organization functioned

4 This opinion was widespread among Barrios' most important advisors and even was acknowledged implicitly, as will be discussed, by Social Christian strategists.

5 In 1958 Rafael Caldera, the Social Christian presidential candidate, received slightly more than 15 percent of the total vote, finishing behind Rómulo Betancourt (*Acción Democrática*) and Admiral Wolfgang Larrazábal (Democratic Republican Union and the Communist Party of Venezuela).

at its efficient best. Caldera had wrought a minor miracle by uniting community-property leftists and land-owning conservatives behind his candidacy. However, an undertone pervaded that this was the maximum effort, and if the party again failed to capture the presidency, no matter by how small a margin, important support would slip away irretrievably. Not only was system dominance at stake for the Social Christians in 1968, but also potentially their long-term viability as a political force capable of challenging for national power.

Most politicians backing Burelly Rivas privately doubted he could be elected president. However, they feared that unless their supporters believed capture of the presidency likely, they would desert to parties having a realistic possibility of achieving system dominance. The Democratic Republican Union, the Popular Democratic Force and the National Democratic Front, therefore, gambled that alliance would create the illusion of sufficient strength to increase their clientele. Practically, each anticipated at most retaining their existing level of influence. The Revolutionary Party of National Integration also struggled for influence, although its leaders had little hope that their support would exceed 5 percent of the total vote. Communist strategists indicated success would be recovering the strength and influence enjoyed following the 1958 election. Finally, the National Civic Crusade, lacking a presidential candidate in its initial venture into electoral politics, competed only for influence. Party leaders, however, wanted enough influence to sustain expected attacks from *Acción Democrática* and other democratic left parties, and to lay the groundwork for Pérez Jiménez's re-entry into Venezuelan politics as a major competitor.

RULES OF THE GAME

From the standpoint of the strategic game framework rules governing the 1968 election campaign were "democratic", "presidential", "fused", and "party dominant". Democracy, at least the pluralistic variant, presumes that the opposition has the right to organize and periodically run candidates for government offices in free elections. At a minimum, free elections are understood to mean ones in which voters express preferences without fear that the expression will become a cause for coercive action against them. The Venezuelan Constitution of 1961 envisions free elections and stipulates that the vote will be secret and universally mandatory for eligible citizens, male and female,

18 years of age ar older.[6] The Supreme Electoral Council has responsibility for safeguarding these constitutional guarantees.

Nine members, representatives of various political parties and independents, sit on the Supreme Electoral Council, the only National Election Board. Members are chosen by Congress every two years. No party receives "pre-eminent representation", and *Acción Democrática,* the Social Christians, the Democratic Republican Union, the National Democratic Front and the Popular Democratic Force had representatives during the 1964-1969 constitutional period. In addition, one Council member looks after interests of the minor parties. Important Council duties include overseeing the election campaign, directing the registration process and counting the vote. On the basis of official results the Council declares the new president. In the event of a tie or the incapacity of the Supreme Electoral Council to determine a winner, the Supreme Court arbitrates the election.

Just below the Supreme Electoral Council are the Principal Electoral Councils, one for each state, territory, and the Federal District. These Councils, consisting of seven members appointed by the Supreme Electoral Council, are responsible for registration and election procedures in the states and other federal entities. Principal Electoral Councils also have jurisdiction over district and municipal electoral boards. These boards are composed of appointees of the higher councils. At the base of the structure are polling places. Polling places are staffed by three member teams presided over by a chief appointee of the district boards, each member representing a different party, and by at least two approved poll witnesses also representing parties. In the 1968 elections there were 15,315 polling places throughout the country, each guarded by the military. In addition, soldiers patrolled the streets and countryside during the election weekend and until final announcement of the election results.

Election boards tabulate and officially approve returns, starting at the polling places. Results are not official until double-checked at the national level by the Supreme Electoral Council. The failure to vote if registered is identified as an abstention.

Members and witnesses of the boards and polling places retained the right to vote. Other citizens expressly permitted this guarantee included Indians, presidential candidates, and others not deprived of

6 Article 111 of the Constitution of 1961.

civil or political rights. Those expressly not permitted to vote were members of the armed forces while on active military duty, the insane, those deprived of civil and political rights, and citizens who came to the polls armed. No provision existed for absentee registration or voting. For example, ex-President Betancourt, who remained in Europe during the registration period, could not vote upon his return. Voting, in summation, was both a legal right and duty for all non-military and capacitated citizens of legal age, regardless of wealth, position, sex or literacy.

In 1968 the Supreme Electoral Council registered 4,068,491 eligible voters representing 42 percent of the estimated population.[7] Eight days after the registration period terminated, on September 28th, the electoral boards in each district posted the names of the registrants and their assigned places of voting. Citizens could challenge a registration before the board until ten day prior to the election, and appeals might be carried to the state election board, the *Consejo Principal Electoral del Estado.*[8] Only this body could annul registrations. In general, the registration process was a model of fairness, something to which Venezuelans could point with justifiable pride.

Examination of the positions at stake in elections on December 1, 1968, revealed that rules of the game were "presidential" and "fused". Balloting filled five categories of elected offices: (1) the Presidency of the Republic;[9] (2) the entire national Senate; (3) the entire national Chamber of Deputies; (4) all stake legislative Assamblies; (5) all Municipal Councils.[10] Simultaneous contests were conducted to determine the holders of 1,763 public offices.

The number of senators is constitutionally determined, two from each of the twenty states and the Federal District, resulting in a total of forty-two senate seats elected by direct vote. In addition, the workings of the national quotient system, which will be discussed subse-

7 DAVID E. BLANK, ed., *Venezuela Election Factbook: December 1, 1968* (Washington: ICOPS, 1966), p. 16.

8 Cf. the discussion in *Ibid.*, p. 41.

9 There is no Vice-President. If a vacancy occurs during a term of office, the Constitution provides for the election of a new President by joint session of Congress, which must be held within thirty days after the vacancy. In the interim the President of the Congress serves as President of the Republic.

10 Venezuelan states are divided into districts *(distritos)*, which are composed of municipalities *(municipios)*.

quently, provides for an unspecified number of senators to be elected indirectly. Also, former presidents are made non-elected, life-time senators. At the close of his constitutional period, therefore, President Leoni joined ex-Presidents López Contreras, Gallegos and Betancourt in this category.[11]

The number of national deputies allocated to a state varies, for the most part, with population. The constitution of 1961 allocates one deputy to represent each 50,000 inhabitants or fraction thereof — as long as the fractional portion contains 25,000 or more constituents. Furthermormore, both federal territories, Delta Amacuro and Amazonas, are permitted one deputy apiece, and each state, regardless of its population, is guaranted at least two deputies. The seventy-two island dependencies are legally represented by the Federal District. In 1968 all twenty states and the Federal District, on the basis of their populations, had a minimum of two deputies. This included the least populated state, Cojedes, with only 91,119 inhabitants. The Chamber of Deputies increased from 177 seats in the elections of 1963 to 213 seats in 1968.

Increases in the number of state legislators and municipal councilmen between 1963 and 1968 were directly proportional to the number of new government subdivisions, districts or municipalities, created within a given state.[12] Two representatives from each district [13] comprised the state legislative assemblies, and the municipal councils, with one exception, were composed of seven members.[14] The national and state constitutions provided for enlarging the number of state political subdivisions in accord with population needs and local considerations. The number of state legislators grew from 314 in 1963 to 328 in 1968; the number of municipal councilmen from 1,135 in 1963 to 1,186 in 1968.

Each Venezuelan voter expresses his preferences by selection of two cards representing the party or parties he favors. At the polling

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11 Article 148 of the Constitution of 1961.

12 At the time of the 1961 census there were 620 municipalities in the 20 Venezuelan states and 22 parishes in the Federal District (Federal District Parishes are territorial subdivisions roughly equivalent to municipalities in the states. However, the entire Federal District has a single "municipal" government).

13 Cf. Articles 19 and 20 of the Constitution of 1961.

14 The exception is the Municipal Council of the Federal District. For a more detailed discussion of government in Venezuela's Federal District, see the author's *The Political Process of Urban Development: Caracas Under Acción Democrática* (Ann arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, 1969), Chapter I.

places he receives the large and small cards of all competing parties.[15] Placing the chosen cards in an unmarked envelope and depositing it in a sealed ballot box constitutes casting of the vote. The unmarked envelope, to count as a valid presidential and legislative vote, must contain no more than one large card and one small card.[16] The large card is for the presidential choice. A single small card fills offices at the other four levels of government. The process by which small card slates are assembled, as will be discussed, guarantees that the electoral process remains "party dominant".

By law each party must be legally approved and registered with the Supreme Electoral Council to obtain ballot cards and participate in the election campaign. In order to receive the large card a party must formally endorse a presidential candidate.[17] The candidate receiving the most popular votes, comprised of the combined total of large card ballots cast for the endorsing party or parties, wins the election. Candidates tied to the small card, those for the national Senate, the national Chamber of Deputies, the state legislatures and the municipal councils, are elected if they stand high enough on their party lists so that their positions fall within the number of seats allotted to their parties through the proportional representation system. Each party submits a list of candidates for each legislative body. These lists include candidates for all positions available, as well as alternates. For example, if there are twenty seats to be filled in a given legislative assembly each party would present a list of forty names — twenty candidates and twenty alternates.

Position on a party list is crucial, for the assignment of seats is according to the order in which the names of candidates appear. Party leaders determine positioning. This represents a powerful control

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15 Each card is distinguished by the use of various colors and symbols representing the individual parties. The general pattern is to adorn the large and small cards, which are identical except for size, with the party color or colors, name or initials, and symbol. This is done specifically to provide an intelligible choice for illiterate voters. Two symbols not permitted are the yellow, blue and red of the Venezuelan flag and the likeness of Simón Bolívar, the National Liberator.
For the blind, the cards were shaped in distinctive geometric figures corresponding to the individual parties so that their voting could parallel the normal procedure. Some symbols used in the 1968 elections were a triangle, a star, the letter "v", a guitar, the number "8", a hand, a circle and a half moon. Before going to the polls, the blind voter could learn from the radio or from friends which parties the symbols represented.

16 The suggested instructions for voters appear in Consejo Supremo Electoral, *Instrucciones Para Las Mesas Electorales,* (Caracas, 1968), pp. 7-8.

17 In 1968, as discussed earlier, neither the National Civic Crusade nor the Venezuelan Communist Party officially endorsed a presidential candidate.

mechanism over middle and lower echelons in the party hierarchies and over legislative candidates. General primary elections in the American sense are uncommon, the contrast between Barrios and Prieto Figueroa in *Acción Democrática* being an important exception. Candidates initially are screened by party directorates at the municipal, state and national levels, and submitted for approval in state and national conventions of carefully selected delegates.[18] An important consequence of this system is that the local constituency has minimal influence over elected representatives. Anticipated party loyalty is central in deciding who receives nominations that carry a high, medium or low probability of election.

As long as discipline holds, party leaders' control over nominations bars the re-election of a maverick. For example, should a member of the national Chamber of Deputies displease his party's leadership, and if his party traditionally elects four deputies of a total of ten from his state, the dissident's name might be dropped to eighth place on the party list. Since the party has no chance to elect eight of ten deputies, the maverick has been eliminated. Of course, party leaders may choose to scratch his name from the list entirely. It would then be impossible for the displaced deputy to run for his seat without establishing a new political party.

Analysis of the election law reveals the mechanics associated with party dominant rules. Directly elected seats in the national Senate, the national Chamber of Deputies, the state legislatures and the municipal councils are distributed by the d'Hondt system of proportional representation.[19] To illustrate this system, assume a state has been allotted five seats in the Chamber of Deputies and the election resulted in the following distribution of vote totals by party:

Party A = 100,000 votes

Party B = 60,000 votes

Party C = 40,000 votes

18 JOHN D. MARTZ, *Acción Democrática* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 148-157.

19 The d'Hondt system of proportional representation employs the "highest average" rule and is also used in many Western European countries. It is named for its inventor Victor D'Hondt. For a concise discussion of systems of proportional representation, including the one invented by d'Hondt, see "Proportional Representation" *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 1971 ed., Vol. 18.

The assignment of seats proceeds by successive counting of the vote totals for each of the five seats in order. For each seat, the totals are counted and the highest total wins. After each count and assignment of a seat, the winning party's total is halved for the next count and assignment of a seat. Thus, in this example, Party A would receive the first seat of the five available and its total then would be halved to 50,000 for consideration in the next count, resulting in the following:

Party A = 50,000 votes
Party B = 60,000 votes
Party C = 40,000 votes

Party B would be assigned the second seat and its vote halved to 30,000 for the third counting. By this process, Party A would receive the third seat and Party C the fourth seat. In the fifth counting, the distribution would appear as:

Party A = 25,000 votes
Party B = 30,000 votes
Party C = 20,000 votes

On the basis of this count, Party B would get the remaining seat.

Parties A and B would, therefore, receive two seats and Party C one seat. The order of counting and receiving of seats carries no further significance in the operation of legislative bodies. The ordering is crucially important, as indicated earlier, in regard to the selection of candidates from the party lists. Seats are assigned to the top of the lists down. Thus, only the first and second candidates would gain office in Party A's electoral lists.

Note from this example that even though Party A would have received a total vote equivalent to the combined totals of Parties B and C (100,000 votes), it would receive only as many seats as Party B, or only 40%, rather than 50%, of the seats available. The d'Hondt system impairs the possibility of direct proportional representation. The likelihood of a tie in the voting totals and subsequent contings, which may be suggested by this overly simple example, is so minute in practice as to go without forther comment.

The other mechanism for distributing legislative positions, an electoral quotient, applies only to the selection of senators and deputies on the national level. The quotient becomes operative after directly elected legislative seats awarded through the d'Hondt system. Upon application of the electoral quotient, a party can receive "bonus" seats awarded on the basis of its total national vote. The electoral quotient is arrived at by considering the total national vote for all parties (the total of all small cards) and dividing this by the number of directly elected seats in the legislative body in question. Thus, there are two national quotients; one for the Senate which is the small card total divided by the number of directly elected Senate seats; the other for the Chamber of Deputies which is the small card total divided by the number of directly elected deputies.

The resulting quotient figure is applicable for all parties, but in fact works to the advantage of only the smaller parties. The small card totals of each party are then divided by this quotient figure to ascertain the number of seats each would theoretically receive if the d'Hondt system were not in operation, i.e., in a system of direct proportional representation rather than indirect. If the total number of seats a party has received under the d'Hondt system is less than the number it theoretically warrants under the quotient formula, it is assigned the difference in seats. The seats gained by the parties are then assigned by the Supreme Electoral Council to states in which the parties are most underrepresented. For example, election mechanics dictated assignment of six additional seats to minor parties in the populous state of Zulia in 1968. Three of these were Senate seats and three were seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Each went to a different party, only one of which had already gained representation through the workings of the d'Hondt system. There are maximum limits to the number of seats which can be awarded to a party by the national electoral quotient; six in the Chamber of Deputies and four in the Senate.[20]

In conclusion, some consequences of election rules in Venezuela have special significance for subsequent analysis. First, "presidential" and "fused" rules direct voter attention toward the presidential race and relegate contests for the national Senate, the national Chamber of Deputies, the state legislatures and the municipal councils to com-

20 See Appendix "B" for detailed voting returns in both small card and large card ballots.

parative insignificance. Presidential candidates historically have been leaders of major political parties. Their nomination indicated control over the party machinery, including the process by which small card slates were assembled. Consequently, the electorate tended to view a candidate on the small card ballots as part of a total legislative offering by the party and its presidential nominee. An important means of expressing support for one's presidential choice was to cast a small card ballot for his legislative slate. Thus, the large and small card vote for most parties in the elections of 1958 and 1963 were strikingly similar. This changed in 1968 when neither the Communist Party nor the National Civic Crusade offered presidential candidates. Differences between the large and small card vote of political parties, consequently, were sharper than at any time since the introduction of universal suffrage. At most, however, a voter's choices remained between presidential candidates and total legislative packages.

During the 1968 campaign a strong undercurrent of dissatisfaction emerged among professionals in Caracas and Maracaibo over their inability to choose among individual legislative candidates. Many stated that having a single card elect four levels of legislative candidates allowed party chieftains inordinate power and lowered the quality of party nominees. Protests against the alleged mediocrity of legislative candidates was one reason given for the surprisingly large vote received by the National Civic Crusade. Stories circulating among the middle class mocked the National Civic Crusade for having managed the difficult feat of outdistancing its rivals in assembling a small card slate of incompetents. According to this sarcastic humor voters chose incompetents of the first order, the small card slate of the National Civic Crusade.[21] Such humor did an injustice to many talented and able legislative candidates. However, it illustrated that "presidential", "fused", and "party dominant" election rules led to neglect and contempt for lesser contests.

Finally, the democratic cast of election rules instituted during the early 1960's, by encouraging periodic competition among political parties for a broad spectrum of government positions, offered an orderly means of succession. For the first time since independence,

21 For example, see the political cartoon by MUÑOZ, "Leña y Cariño", *La Verdad*, December 5, 1968., Cf. the discussion by major political leaders, especially Jorge Dáger, of the meaning of the large vote for Pérez Jiménez. *El Nacional*, December 3, 1968.

Venezuela had demostrably operational procedures for legitimating new governments and debating policy alternatives.[22] However, authoritarian opponents claimed that democratic rules permitted only insignificant choice. Consequently, they decided to render the rules inoperative by waging guerrilla warfare.

Whether because these rules were perceived as allowing for meaningful choice, or because they gave a procedure for peaceful succession to a people weary of violence, or because of apathy, few Venezuelans sided with the guerrillas. Given this lack of enthusiasm, even outside assistance from Cuba could not sustain irregular warfare against *Acción Democrática* governments. By 1967 most who once favored violence were abiding by established "rules of the game". During the 1968 election campaign, therefore, even virulently anti-*status quo* politicians and parties gave lip service to "democratic" procedures and rules.[23] It remained unclear, however, to what extent democratic norms had taken root in Venezuelan political culture.

22 For a perceptive analysis of Venezuela's inability to establish accepted rules of the game during the nineteenth century see ROBERT GILMORE, *Caudillism and Militarism* in Venezuela (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1964).

23 For example, see the interview with leaders of the Nation Civic Crusade "Hemos Escogido el Camino de la Democracia, *"El Universal"*, December 8, 1968.

CHAPTER III

CAMPAIGN COMPETITORS SIZE, STRUCTURE, FINANCING

Formation of the People's Electoral Movement ushered in a period of intensive election campaigning and guaranted at least three "mayor" contenders for the presidency. Rafael Caldera, the first to receive a formal nomination, carried the Social Christian banner. Gonzalo Barrios and Prieto Figueroa represented a faction of what had been *Acción Democrática.* Finally, after five months of intensive campaigning Miguel Angel Burelli Rivas emerged as a fourth "major" presidential aspirant. A little known career diplomat, Burelli Rivas owed his major contender status to backing from Venezuela's three most important "minor" parties — the Democratic Republican Union, the National Democratic Front and the Popular Democratic Force. The two remaining presidential nominees, Germán Borregales and Alejandro Hernández were "marginal". "Marginal" also describes other parties offering only slates for congress, state legislatures and municipal councils, except the National Civic Crusade. National Civic Crusade strength, an unknown, depended on the extent to which General Pérez Jiménez remained popular.

INITIAL MANEUVERING AND SIZE

As indicated in Chapter I, the anti-Prieto faction never lost its dominance over *Acción Democrática's* National Executive Committee and National Directive Council, the party organs of legal control. Because Gonzalo Barrios and his supporters held a majority on these organs they were empowered to expel the Prieto faction when the latter refused to abide by the former's directives.[1] Barrios' control over the National

1 For a detailed discussion of the National Executive Committee and National Directive Council see JOHN D. MARTZ, *Acción Democrática* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 148-161.

Executive Committee and National Directive Council also provided legal justification for the Supreme Electoral Council decision to deny the Prieto faction, despite its primary triumph, the government party's designation, color and symbols. By the time Barrios forces gathered in Caracas for their national convention during February, 1968, they were recognized legally as *Acción Democrática.*[2]

The selection of Barrios as *Acción Democrática's* presidential standard bearer came as no surprise. He was a party founder, had served in the cabinets of Presidents Betancourt and Leoni, and was discharging the office of Secretary General within *Acción Democrática.*[3] Barrios became the leader around whom Prieto Figueroa's opponents clustered, and even disaster in the primaries failed to dilute his standing among those remaining with the faction legally recognized as *Acción Democrática.* A serious challege could have been mounted to Barrios only if President Leoni or former-President Betancourt had withdrawn support, an unlikely possibility. Consequently, Luis Augusto Dubuc and Eligio Anzola Anzola, both aspirants for *Acción Democrática's* presidential nomination, found little enthusiasm for their candidacies. Anzola Anzola, angry over what he perceived as a cursory rejection, refrained from active participation in the Barrios campaign. Consequently, *Acción Democrática* performed below expectation in the important state of Lara, where Anzola Anzola had been the principal architect of earlier party victories.[4]

Acción Democrática entered the 1968 election campaign without many on whom the party historically depended. Most grass roots organizations in the heavily populated and urbanized states —Zulia, Miranda, Lara, Aragua and the Federal District— favored Prieto Figueroa. Barrios' greatest strength lay in the more rural and less affluent East, long the source of *Acción Democrática's* greatest electoral majorities. However, in Bolívar, the most developed Eastern state,[5] Prieto Figueroa split the party's organization and won the primary election. At the

2 *Accón Democrática's* national convention is covered in great detail in the Caracas Press of February 10-13, 1968. See especially *El Nacional* and *El Universal.*

3 For additional information about Gonzalo Barrios' past political career see MARTZ, pp. 32-34, 62-63, 340, 380 and 589.

4 Prior to *Acción Democrática's* national convention Eligio Anzola threw his support to the hopeless candidacy of Luis Augusto Dubuc. Consequently, Anzola Anzola withdrew from active participation in party affairs. Cf. *El Nacional,* January 4, February 10, 11 and 12, 1968 and *El Universal,* February 15, 1968.

5 The Caracas press of October and November, 1967, contains numerous discussions about which party organizations favored Barrios and Prieto Figueroa. For a useful summary see LUIS SERRANO REYES, "40 Días Finales En La Vida de *Acción Democrática*" *El Nacional,* October 29, 1967.

start of the 1968 election campaign, with very few exceptions, therefore, *Acción Democrática's* state and local party apparatus lay in shambles.

The societal organizations on which *Acción Democrática* depended were no less divided than the state and local party apparatus. The powerful *Buró Sindical* (Workers Affiliate) vacillated between Barrios and Prieto Figueroa, as did the equally important *Buró Agrario* (Agrarian Affiliate). On the other hand, the party's educational and professional organizations, especially the former, strongly favored Prieto Figueroa. Only within the *Buró Juvenil* (Youth Affiliate) did Gonzalo Barrios' candidacy command widespread support.[6]

Next to the Secretary General and President of the Party, the Secretary of Organization was the most important *Acción Democrática* official. He controlled and coordinated the state, district and municipal party apparatus, and kept party records. The National Organization Secretary, Carlos Canache Mata, remained loyal to Barrios.[7] In addition, Gonzalo Barrios received widespread support from President Leoni's cabinet, including an intense commitment from the chief executive himself. Without this support Barrios and his followers would have been unable to rebuild *Acción Democrática's* broken organization in time to be of use in the campaign. As opponents discovered, while the national executive supported a political party, even one seriously weakened by recent bloodletting, the party remained a major contender.[8]

Prieto Figueroa's supporters found the events of late 1967 disorienting and debilitating. Given their apparent primary victory they anticipated controlling *Acción Democrática* and dictating its presidential nominee. When Gonzalo Barrios and his partisans replied that the primaries had been fraudulent and subsequently expelled Prieto supporters, the latter felt betrayed. *Prietistas* were left with the alternative of accepting defeat or establishing a new party. Since no one around Prieto favored abandoning the field to those who had denied them

6 *Ibid.*

7 The national Secretary of Organization was Dr. Carlos Mata, a strong supporter of Gonzalo Barrios.

8 No member of President Leoni's Cabinet openly supported Prieto Figueroa's presidential candidacy. In contrast, some of Gonzalo Barrios' strongest supporters, such as Carlos Andrés Pérez and Reinaldo Leandro Mora, held important cabinet posts. During the election campaign there was a great deal of speculation that an important characteristic of Prieto supporters was that they were second echelon party leaders who had been passed over by Presidents Betancourt and Leoni.

what they considered to have been honorably won, the *Prietistas* created their own party, the People's Electoral Movement.[9]

Detailed information about which regional and local party leaders remained loyal to *Acción Democrática* and which joined with the People's Electoral Movement remains unavailable. However, 15 of the party's 25 regional organizations, including Caracas, Zulia and Aragua, backed Prieto Figueroa.[10] Also, in each state at least some seasoned politicians broke with *Acción Democrática.* This gave the People's Electoral Movement an advantage not usually enjoyed by new political parties. Nevertheless, a wide spectrum of *Acción Democrática* remained loyal to Gonzalo Barrios. The People's Electoral Movement inherited an incomplete electoral apparatus.

The People's Electoral Movement, as expected, gained its most important societal affiliates from elements within *Acción Democrática* that supported Prieto Figueroa.[11] Most leaders, as well as a majority of the rank and file, left *Acción Democrática's* Education Bureau to form its counterpart in the new party. More than half of *Acción Democrática's* agrarian and professional organizations also shifted to the People's Electoral Movement. Within the Youth Bureau, in contrast, mass defections never materialized. *Acción Democrática's* labor affiliate presented a confused picture. Factions supporting Prieto Figueroa and Gonzalo Barrios were approximately equal. Rival union leaders spent the campaign consolidating and expanding their strength within the labor movement. Consequently, it was doubtful whether organized labor substantially aided either the People's Electoral Movement or *Acción Democrática.*[12]

Prietistas, no less than the *Gonzalistas,* encountered serious problems stemming from divided loyalties. Many rank and file supporters of Prieto Figueroa retained emotional attachments to *Acción Democrática.* The People's Electoral Movement was never sure that latent loyalty to the government party might not cause those who voted for Prieto in the primary to support Barrios in the general election. Leaders in the People's Electoral Movement, consequently, concentrated both on

9 *El Nacional, El Universal,* December 10, 1967.

10 SERRANO REYES, "40 Días Finales En La Vida de Acción Democrática".

11 This was confirmed by interviews with major party leaders in both *Acción Democrática* and the People's Electoral Movement, and is noted in *Ibid.*

12 During July and August of 1967 a great deal of maneuvering occurred within the labor movement between supporters of Prieto Figueroa and Gonzalo Barrios. Prieto had the backing of José González Navarro, President of the Venezuelan Worker's Confederation and of many middle level leaders within component unions.

strengthening the loyalty of supporters and attracting the undecided. The strain of handling both problems, when added to difficulties associated with consolidating the apparatus inherited from *Acción Democrática* and running congressional and presidential election campaigns, placed an inordinate burden on the resources and manpower of the People's Electoral Movement.

While fratricidal struggle decimated *Acción Democrática,* the Social Christians united behind Rafael Caldera. Social Christian election-year unity, however, failed to obscure festering internal conflicts. The most serious raged between traditionalists and the *Astronautas,* a group of youthful leftists.[13] While the former asserted that divine law dictated a hierarchical society, the latter preached social equality and cited the practices of early Christianity as historical justification. However, impending electoral success caused traditionalists and *Astronautas* to seek a compromise that would keep the party together. As of early 1968 differences were papered over, at least until voters had decided on Venezuela's next chief executive.

Like other Venezuelan parties the Social Christians aspired to represent all classes and regions.[14] However, the party was strongest where the Catholic Church retained its greatest secular influence, in the Andes. Large land holders, a major part of the national bourgeoisie, and an important faction within the Army officer corps, also favored the Social Christians. Finally, the party could count upon the second largest group of organized university students, clerically-oriented professionals and a small but effective segment or organized labor.[15] Support from this combination, a group not usually associated with conservatives, did much to alter the Social Christians' earlier image, that of spokesman for the traditional upper class, the church and the right in general.

Despite an expanding clientele Social Christian supporters predominated only among proclericals and the landed elite. The party's university following comprised a minority of all students, and Social Christian workers were fewer than supporters of either faction of

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13 In addition, see information concerning *Opus Dei,* see J. L. ARANGUREN, "La Spiritualite y Opus Dei". *Esperit* (Paris, April, 1965). The role of Opus Dei in Venezuela is discussed in *El Nacional,* December 15, 1968.

14 For a more complete discussion of the early history of Rafael Caldera and the Social Christians, see FRANKLIN TUGWELL "The Christian Democrats of Venezuela", *Journal of Inter-American Studies,* VII (April, 1965), pp. 245-267.

15 Cf. "Copei y El Programa De La Violencia", *Semana* November 22-28, 1968.

Acción Democrática or the Democratic Republican Union. Also, the Social Christians' demonstrated capability for attracting the urban poor remained unimpressive and their appeal among non-Andean peasants was dubious. Among the middle class the Social Christians enjoyed increasing popularity, but even here rival parties — the National Democratic Front and *Acción Democrática*-commanded significant followings. While the Social Christians legitimately claimed multi-class support, therefore, less than one fifth of the electorate strongly inclined toward the party.[16]

Miguel Angel Burelli Rivas emerged as a major presidential contender when three "minor" parties united behind his candidacy.[17] Jóvito Villalba of the Democratic Republican Union, the most influential "minor" party, began serious discussions with the National Democratic Front and the Popular Democratic Force about a joint campaign during January, 1968. Negotiations continued into early March, with Villalba also exploring the possibility of an electoral alliance with *Acción Democrática.* The government party, however, like the Social Christians and the People's Electoral Movement, was commited to an "irreversible" presidential candidacy. Villalba refused to subordinate his presidential ambitions to those of another well-known party leader. Nevertheless, to assemble a multi-party electoral alliance Villalba was prepared to match the sacrifice of other established politicians' presidential hopes.[18] The only important parties whose leaders would negotiate on this basis were the National Democratic Front and the Popular Democratic Force.

Villalba's decision to ally with the Popular Democratic Force and National Democratic Front caused apprehension within his own party. Important leaders, especially Juan Domínguez Chacín, preferred a coalition with either *Acción Democrática* or the People's Electoral Movement.[19] Domínguez Chacín publicly argued that his party had little in common with the National Democratic Front's middle class clientele or with the Popular Democratic Force slum

16 Cf. the discussion by Professor BORIS BUNINOV-PARRA, "El Partido Social Cristiano COPEI", in *Introducción a La Sociología Electoral Venezoluna* (Caracas: Editorial Arte, 1968), pp. 303-326.

17 *El Nacional,* June 6, 1968. For a more complete biography of Burelli Rivas see Appendix A.

18 For a hostile discussion of Villalba's personalistic domination over tre party apparatus of the Democratic Republican Union see JUAN MANUEL DOMÍNGUEZ CHACÍN, *Carta Abierta a Jóvito Villalba* (Caracas: n.p. 1968).

19 *Ibid.*

dwellers. Instead, he asserted that the Democratic Republican Union most resembled *Acción Democrática,* and because the two parties were in coalition during President Leoni's administration they should fight the 1968 elections together. Villalba, however, controlled the Democratic Republican Union party apparatus. He dismissed Domínguez Chacín's arguments and eased his supporters out of policy-making positions.[20] While this dispute further weakened the party, the Democratic Republican Union remained a significant electoral force, especially among peasants in the East.

Between 1963 and 1968 the National Democratic Front made little progress in consolidating support. Part of this failure is explained by the party's inability to attract funds with which to organize the grass roots. Equally important, potential supporters and party militants became disillusioned when the National Democratic Front entered into coalition with *Acción Democrática* after campaigning as its most severe critic.[21] Uncertain of the their support, National Democratic Front leaders decided that only by entering into an alliance could they emerge from the 1968 election as an important political force. However, two conflicting ideas about which alliance the party should choose gained prominance. One, espoused by congressman Enrique Yéspica, argued for coalition with the Social Christians. Congresman Pedro Segnini La Cruz spoke on behalf of the second — an arrangement with the Democratic Republican Union and the Popular Democratic Force.[22] Sentiment in the party initially inclined toward the Yéspica position, but Rafael Caldera's "irreversible" candidacy brought negotiations between the National Democratic Front and Social Christians to an impasse. Subsequently, Uslar Pietri, the party's founder, and most other National Democratic Front leaders moved toward the position of Segnini La Cruz.

The third important party backing Burelli Rivas, the Popular Democratic Front, had remained in opposition since its founding in 1962. It had yet to obtain the patronage that participation in the national bureaucracy guaranted, and a leftist ideology precluded private sector support. In summary, the Popular Democratic Force lacked

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20 By the time the Democratic Republican Union officially accepted Burelli Rivas as its presidential candidate the supporters of Domínguez Chacín had ceased to be influential within the party.

21 See the earlier discussion in Chapter I.

22 Interview with Juan Guevara Benzo, a prominent professional allied with the Social Christians, on November 10, 1968. Confirmed in subsequent discussions with Segnini La Cruz.

the resources necessary for establishing a modern party. Success or failure turned on the popularity of Admiral Larrazábal, its presidential candidate in 1963. The Admiral's popularity, as discussed earlier, stemmed from his brief tenure as provisional president in 1958. Popular Democratic Force leaders understood the precariousness of depending on gratitud for favors rendered in an earlier decade.[23] Jorge Dáger, the Popular Democratic Force Secretary General, believed that decisive moves were necessary during early 1968. Otherwise his party would not figure significantly in the coming election campaign. Dáger favored an alliance with elements drawing on private sector support, like the National Democratic Front. Such an alliance would attract financing unavailable to the Popular Democratic Force by itself. Should the alliance capture the presidency, an eventuality Dáger doubted, his party would gain an added bonus.

It was possible that a coalition of the Democratic Republican Union, the National Democratic Front and the Popular Democratic Force might obtain a plurality in a four-cornered presidential contest. Should the support patterns of 1963 be repeated, Burelli Rivas could expect approximately 43 percent of the total vote.[24] The 43 percent included strong backing in all regions, expect the Andes, and from a wide range of socio-economic interests. Burelli Rivas, however, faced a formidable task in duplicating the 1963 showings of the Democratic Republican Union, Popular Democratic Force and National Democratic Front. In the first place, elements within each coalition party found the Victory Front ideologically unpalatable and loocked elsewhere.[25] Second, the most fervent supporters of the Popular Democratic Force and National Democratic Front, the urban poor and the urban middle classes, traditionally distruted each other. Each doubted that their interests could be attended properly in a coalition including the other. Third, as indicated earlier, the Democratic Republican Union and the National Democratic Front had been weakened by internal strife since last facing the electorate. Finally, each party supporting Burelli Rivas was highly personalistic. Past expe-

23 A more complete biography of Admiral Larrazábal appears in Appendix "A".

24 For a detailed breakdown of the 1963 election results for Victory Front parties see Apendix "B".

25 Dissatisfied factions included those in the National Democratic Front who supported Enrique Yéspica, followers of Juan Manuel Domínguez Chacín in the Democratic Republican Union, and scattered middle level leaders from the Popular Democratic Force.

rience argued that Uslar Pietri, Villalba and Larrazábal could not transfer their charisma, especially to a relative unknown. In assessing Burelli Rivas' strength, therefore, pointing to the combined vote in 1963 of the Democratic Republican Union, the Popular Democratic Force and the National Democratic Front was misleading.

Apart from declared allies of the four major presidential candidates only two parties — the Communists and the National Civic Crusade — fell in the "minor" category during the 1968 election campaign. The Venezuelan Communist Party, as indicated in Chapter I, went underground after its leaders opted for guerrilla warfare in 1962. When this course proved disastrous the party re-entered the legal spectrum. Castroite guerrillas believed that abandonment of the armed struggle unnecessarily strengthened an imperialist regime, and accused the Communist Party of selling out the "revolution". Nevertheless, the Communists participated in the 1968 elections as the Advancement Union. Based on previous perfomance, Communist leaders expected between 3 and 7 percent of the total vote. Their clientele, concentrated in Maracaibo, Caracas, Barquisimeto and several lesser cities, historically elected a small number of senators, congressman, state legislators and municipal councilmen.[26] Potentially more popular than the Venezuelan Communist Party, the National Civic Crusade campaigned sporadically. Its appeal, as indicated earlier, rested on the charisma of former President Pérez Jiménez.

A host of "marginal" political parties also participated in the 1968 election campaign, some created specifically for this purpose. While none realistically expected 5 percent of the vote two, the Socialist Party and the National Action Movement, presented their own presidential candidates. The former's Alejandro Hernández, developer of a profit-sharing plan for employees in his industrial empire, ran as an "englightened" entrepreneur. The latter's candidate, Germán Borregales, was a militant Social Christian during the party's formative years. However, Borregales maintained that Social Christian evolution toward the center-left betrayed its mission of preserving traditional institutions, a cause now taken up by the Movement of National Action. Finally, the Revolutionary Party of National Integration deserves special mention. As indicated in Chapter I, it consisted of former *Acción Democrática* leaders who separated from the

26 In 1947 the Communist presidential candidate, Gustavo Machado, received 3.9 percent of the total vote. In 1959 the Communists percentage of the total vote was 6.2 or 160,791 small card ballots.

party between 1959 and 1962. As the 1968 election campaign approached the Revolutionary Party of National Integration could point to no major organizational successes. Indeed, it was unclear that the party would re-elect its leaders to the national congress. Other "marginal" parties, however, anticipated less.[27]

STRUCTURE

Significant differences and similarities characterized the structure of campaign competitors. A continuum indicating the comparative advantage parties derived from their campaign organizations would place the Social Christians, with their highly trained and disciplined cadres, near the pole of "greatest advantage". The National Civic Crusade, because of its minuscule political infrastructure and dependence on Pérez Jiménez, would be closest to the "no advantage" pole. Other party campaign organizations were in between. Factors determining position on the "advantage" continuum included extent of centralization, consolidation, permanence, personalistic control and how parties organized locally.

Until 1967 *Acción Democrática* boasted an unequaled campaign apparatus which had enabled it to capture the presidency in all previous free elections. This apparatus sustained significant damage in the division of 1962, when opposing factions failed to agree on a presidential candidate.[28] After *Acción Democrática's* Raúl Leoni subsequently won the 1963 presidential elections, party leaders embarked on a vigorous program to rebuild the state and local infrastructure. They believed the cities of Maracaibo and Caracas, as well as the states of Carabobo and Aragua, merited special attention. With the exception of Carabobo, efforts in these areas were directed by leaders who sided with Prieto Figueroa. His expulsion, consequently, erased four years of rebuilding where erosion had been most prenounced. Confrontation between Prieto and Barrios also decimated local organizations in the West, Plains and East, regions from which *Acción Democrática* historically drew its greatest support. State party organizations in Zulia, Lara and Anzoátegui were his especially hard. Only in Monagas, Táchira and Carabobo was the government party spared massive defections.

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27 For a complete listing of all parties participating in the 1968 election see Appendix B.

28 A detailed discussion of the conflict between "ARS" and the "Old Guard" appears in MARTZ, *Acción Democrática*, pp. 183-192.

Acción Democrática depended upon its Organization Secretariat to maintain and strengthen the party apparatus between elections. Following the party's national convention in 1966 a partisan of Gonzalo Barrios replaced a Prieto Figueroa ally as *Acción Democrática's* National Organization Secretary. Primary elections in 1967, however, demonstrated that despite a new power alignment at the national level Prieto dominated most state and local organizations. When state and local leaders shifted to the People's Electoral Movement, decisions about who would fill the vacant positions were made in Caracas. Those chosen often found themselves working in unfamiliar areas or dealing with problems that had developed since they last resided in the locality.[29] Also, Prieto partisans removed records. This further increased dependence on Caracas, where Barrios, supporters retained control over party archives.

Following Gonzalo Barrios' nomination *Acción Democrática* established an Electoral Commission to plan and direct the campaign. Octavio Lepage, an ally of former President Rómulo Betancourt, became its chairman. The Electoral Commission also included the party's National Organization Secretary and other prominant leaders. Because of damage inflicted on local organizations the Electoral Commission depended heavily upon special intermittent organizations like "Independents for Gonzalo", "Naturalized Venezuelans for Gonzalo", and "Women for Gonzalo". The burden of creating numerous intermittent organizations, when coupled with that of restoring the regular party organization, placed greater than anticipated strains on what remained of the party's infrastructure. It was not until August, 1968, three months before the election, that *Acción Democrática* could use these organizations for effective campaigning. Until then only control of the national executive allowed *Acción Democrática* to make widespread electoral appeals and remain a major contender.

The government party's restored permanent campaign organization paralleled administrative subdivisions — states, districts and municipalities. State party organizations reproduced national ones on a smaller scale, and structural duplication often extended down to the districts and municipalities. At the former level two variants were common. In the first (Class I of Illustration 5) each component municipality

29 For example, Miguel Bellorín, a long-time party official from Lake Maracaibo's "East Bank", guided Barrios' campaign in the crucial state of Zulia. When called upon to assume this task bellorín had been in Bolívar state for more than a year, as an employee of the Sanitation Ministry.

possessed a miniature of the district organization to which it was subordinate. However, only the district remained an organic campaign organization in the second variant (Class II of Illustration 5). Here the district campaign organization was flexible, often ignoring municipal boundaries and creating institutions which appealed to specific interests throughout the district.

ILLUSTRATION 5

ACCION DEMOCRATICA'S CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION - 1968



Arrows indicate directions of influence and control. Some organizations are shown as both regular intermittent and permanent. This is because of the split in 1967. Organizations shown as hybrids were permanent, but following the departure of Prieto Figueroa lost key personnel and records. Since they were being reconstituted in the short time before the election, they were operationally "regular intermittent".

— = permanent structures
= = special intermittent structures
--- = regular intermittent structures

Finally, Barrios' campaign organization was institutionalized, rather than personalized.[30] Barrios balked at imposing his will on others. Rather than commanding the anti-Prieto faction he emerged as the single personality around whom it could coalesce. His leadership style, not surprisingly, relied heavily upon party institutions and bureaucracies, especially the Electoral Commission. One explanation for Barrios' reluctance to create a personalized election campaign organization was that those he trusted most, his comrades in political battles over a quarter century, dominated the remaining party apparatus. Barrios was the choice of that apparatus. Initially his appeal, apart from the institutional loyalty *Acción Democrática* commanded, was limited.

Differences between elements favoring the People's Electoral Movement and those coalescing around Gonzalo Barrios influenced the emergence of a more decentralized apparatus in the former.[31] The People's Electoral Movement, as discussed earlier, attracted a majority of *Acción Democrática* state, district and municipal leaders. On the other hand, the government party's national organization remained under the control of Barrios. Where *Acción Democrática* grass roots organization defected, the more common occurrence, national leaders of the People's Electoral Movement gave their state and local subordinates great latitude.[32] By allowing autonomy among subordinates Prieto Figueroa's campaign managers freed themselves to establish an apparatus in areas where Barrios supporters held the grass roots for *Acción Democrática.* In such areas leaders around Prieto Figueroa, in imitation of *Acción Democrática,* maintained tight control over the newly established state and local organizations.

Consolidation, as well as centralization, characterized the People's Electoral Movement's emerging campaign organization. Within each political subdivision a party designee made over-all campaign decisions. However, an arrangement between the People's Electoral Movement and the Revolutionary Party of National Integration, had the latter proved more important, would have transformed the structure of Prieto's campaign from "consolidated" to "feudal".

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30 Cf. the discussion in JOHN D. MARTZ *Party Activism and Political Campaigning in Venezuela* (Paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Convention, New York City, September 2, 1969), p. 19.

31 For detailed discussions of which positions were held by Prieto's supporters Cf. *El Nacional* and *El Universal,* October 20, 1967, October 26, 1967 and October 30, 1967.

32 JOSÉ RIVAS RIVAS, ed., *Las Tres Divisiones de Acción Democrática* (Caracas: Pensamiento Vivo, 1968), p. 73 reproduces Prieto's version of the primary outcome. While results must be viewed skeptically they indicate the magnitude of Prieto's domination over *Acción Democrática's* grass roots organization.

The Revolutionary Party of National Integration pressed the People's Electoral Movement for an alliance based on equality. The *Prietistas,* however, calculated they would poll four times the vote of their solicitous ally. With differences in perceptions of relative strength deadlocking negotiations Raúl Ramos Giménez, Secretary General of the Revolutionary Party of National Integration, changed course. He declared that given the intransigence of the People's Electoral Movement his party could gain more legislative positions by remaining unattached. Soon afterward the People's Electoral Movement decided the presidential race was so close that even a small bloc of votes could mean the difference between defeat and victory. The Revolutionary Party of National Integration, on the other hand, concluded that its minuscule legislative representation was in jeopardy unless the party found a charismatic presidential candidate whose coattails would attract votes to its small card slate. Consequently, Ramos Giménez and Prieto Figueroa agreed that the latter would seek the presidency on behalf of both the Revolutionary Party of National Integration and the People's Electoral Movement.[33] The Revolutionary Party of National Integration, however, proved more feeble than anticipated, adding only marginally to Prieto Figueroa's strength.

Within the permanent campaign apparatus of the People's Electoral Movement the Organization Secretariat, directed by Adelso González, proved most important.[34] González and his staff identified which local *Acción Democrática* organizations *Prietistas* controlled and which supported Barrios. In the latter they assembled a campaign apparatus around available Prieto supporters, of which there were usually some. However, not until mid-July was there a People's Electoral Movement campaign organization in every Venezuelan district and in most municipalities. The party also established a National Electoral Commission presided over by Luis Lander,[35] the architect of *Acción Democrática's* successful presidential campaigns in 1958 and 1963. Lander's Electoral

33 Prieto's advisors initially were undecided on whether or not their nominee also should run as the Revolutionary Party of National Integration's presidential candidate. Some feared such a move, by providing an alternative ballot with to support Prieto, would reduce his vote on the large cards of the People's Electoral Movement. This, in turn, might carry over to the small card vote, thus costing the party congressional, state legislature and municipal council seats. Eventually it was decided that the danger was not serious enough to cancel out the potential additional votes Prieto could receive from the Revolutionary Party of National Integration.

34 Professor González, a close associate of Paz Galarraga, served as *Acción Democrática's* National Education Secretary before joining the People's Electoral Movement.

35 For a brief discussion of Lander's role in *Acción Democrática's* 1963 campaign see MARTZ, *Acción Democrática,* pp. 347-348.

Commission coordinated over-all campaign strategy and established committees that appealed to a wide variety of special interests.

Illustration 6 portrays Luis Beltrán Prieto Figueroa's campaign organization.

ILLUSTRATION 6

PRIETO FIGUEROA'S CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION - 1968



Arrows indicate directions of influence and control. Some organizations are shown as both regular intermittent and permanent. This is because of the split in 1967. Organizations shown as hybrids were permanent in *Acción Democrática* prior to the split. Important personnel and records from the *Acción Democrática* organizations shifted to the People's Electoral Movement. Since these were incomplete and had to be strengthened in the short time before the election, they were operationally "regular intermittent".

— = Permanent structures

= = special intermittent structures

--- = regular intermittent structures

Finally, Prieto Figueroa favored an institutionalized over a personalized campaign organization. His preference partially can be explained by a lack of time and a shortage of qualified personnel, both crucial in assembling the autonomous staff necessary for a personalized campaign organization. Equally important, however, Prieto chose an institutionalized campaign organization because those he trusted most were within the People's Electoral Movement. Even more than Barrios, Prieto Figueroa maintained few close associations beyond *Acción Democrática.* His image was that of a totally dedicated party member. Prieto Figueroa, therefore, neither possesed nor sought contacts which might have inclined him to use political counsel outside of his immediate circle.

The Social Christians relied on an Organizations Secretariat to maintain and increase party membership through the 1963 election campaign. Special intermittent structures planned and coordinated campaign strategy and tactics.[36] While the 1963 elections brought significant Social Christian gains they also confirmed that *Acción Democrática* remained Venezuela's strongest political party. Consequently, Caldera and his advisors decided to break new ground in organizing for the 1968 election. They adopted a campaign apparatus, highly centralized and consolidated, that focused on the electorate's social and economic characteristics. This contrasted with the more traditional emphasis on political-administrative subdivision — states, districts and municipalities.

The revised campaign organization placed four Sub-Secretary Generals — one each for Electoral Organizations, Operational Organizations, Official Contacts and Functional Organizations — under the control of the party's Secretary General.[37] While the Official Contacts and Formal Organization Sub-Secretary Generals focused on relationships with government and interest groups, the first priority of the Electoral Organization Sub-Secretariat and the Operational Organization Sub-Secretariat was campaigning and turning out Social Christian voters.

Most of what before reorganization was the Social Christian Organization Secretariat, subsequently the Operational Organization Sub-Secretariat, continued to parallel political and administrative subdivisions. While final control over state and local operational organizations rested with the national sub-Secretariat, state, district and municipal first secretaries were elected by the party rank and file. Possession

36 Cf. the earlier discussion of *Acción Democrática's* campaign organizations.
37 Interview with Dr. José Curiel, June 30, 1967.

of their own electoral constituencies, despite centralizing party regulation,[38] gave state and local first secretaries considerable leverage in dealing with the national apparatus. In the 1963 campaign, when the Organization Secretariat retained responsibility both for providing activities to involve the faithful and for increasing membership, the party's electoral fortune in a given area depended largely upon the skill of state and local first secretaries.[39] Pressure from Caracas to remove an ineffective but popular first secretary could sow dissension between the national and local apparatus. Consequently, national party leaders perceived themselves on the horns of a dilemma. If they did nothing to replace an incompetent state or local first secretary, electoral prospects within the effected area could be impaired. However, removal of an ineffective first secretary might alienate his supporters, even driving them out of the party. It was in hope of escaping from this dilemma that the Social Christians established the Sub-Secretariat for Electoral Organization.

To develop the new Electoral Organization Sub-Secretariat Rafael Caldera chose a young engineer, José Curiel, who had studied organization techniques in the United States. Drawing upon the expertise and experience of selected technicians and leaders from the defunct Organization Secretariat Curiel created an apparatus for campaigning that was more centralized, consolidated, and class oriented than its predecesor. Elements of the Electoral Organization Sub-Secretariat included Zone Organization Committees (C.O.Z.), Regional Committees and Locality Committees.

"Zones", "Regions", and "Localities" did not necessarily correspond to Venezuela's states, districts and municipalities. The Zone Organization Committee's (C.O.Z.) geographical jurisdiction depended on what party leaders perceived as the most efficient social, economic and sub-regional unit within which to make electoral appeals.[40] For example, the southern third of Zulia State, a region long tied to the Andes, fell under the jurisdiction of an Andean Zone Organization Committee rather than under the one responsible for the remainder of Zulia. On the other hand, a single Zone Organization Committee operated in metropolitan Caracas, an area encompassing the Federal District and Miranda State's Sucre District. Separate organizations, one coordinat-

38 *Ibid.*
39 *Ibid.* Confirmed in an additional interview with Alvaro Páez Pumar, the coordinator of the Caracas Zone Organization Committee.
40 *Ibid.*

ing activity in each District, directed semi-autonomous campaigns within metropolitan Caracas prior to 1966. The new Caracas Zone Organization Committee, itself unique among Zone Organization Committees, was subdivided into three units. One attended slum dwellers, one the middle class and a third trained recently recruited militants.

Curiel, in a further departure from established practices, appointed the chairman, of each Zone Organization Committee. The chairman, in turn, controlled all electorally related party activities within his zone. Also, Operational Party Organizations were to defer to the Chairman's judgment in matters of campaign strategy and tactics. The 1968 campaign, however, was the first in which the Electoral and Operational hierarchies interacted under stress. Party leaders hesitated initially over how best the two could be meshed. The situation clarified quickly as control gravitated to the National Sub-Secretariat for Electoral Organization. The Operational Organization came to function largely as a channel through which party activists could participate in the campaign.[41]

Alliance with several autonomous groups diluted over-all centralization and consolidation within the Social Christian campaign organization. The first such group, the *Desarrollistas,* was an amalgam of professionals and businessmen interested in finding an electable non-Marxist presidential contender.[42] Social Christian campaign strategists cited *Desarrollista* support as evidence that Caldera's appeal transcended party boundaries. Most *Desarrollistas* openly campaigned for the Social Christians, but some also participated in their own political group, the *Democratic Independent Movement.* While the Democratic Independent Movement supported Caldera for president, it ran candidates for congress, the state legislatures and the municipal councils. A third semi-autonomous group, the minuscule Liberal Party, integrated its large and small card lists with the Social Christians. The Liberal Party lacked a popular base and was little more than the personalist following of its founder, Jorge Olavarría.[43]

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41 *Ibid.*

42 For a more detailed account of the National Committee for Independents, see the following discussion of Miguel Angel Burelli Rivas' presidential campaign.

43 Jorge Olavarría originally was a follower of Arturo Uslar Pietri, but refused to join with Uslar Pietri in forming the National Democratic Front. Olavarría's support added to Caldera's appeal among upper and middle class voters suspicions of clerical influence in the social Christian Party.

ILLUSTRATION 7

RAFAEL CALDERA'S CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION - 1968



Solid arrows indicate directions of control. Broken arrows indicate directions of influence.

= = Permanent Electoral Structures

— = Special Intermittent Structures

Institutionalization overshadowed personalism in Caldera's campaign apparatus, but to a lesser extent than with Barrios.[44] While Barrios spent most of his political career as a lieutenant of Rómulo Betancourt, Rafael Caldera created the Social Christian Party and presided over its emergence as a major electoral force. Caldera kept close watch over the Electoral Organization Sub-Secretariat's development, and throughout the campaign depended upon it to schedule his appearances and to plan strategy and tactics. In addition, Caldera looked to his personal staff as an alternative source of advice and information. Eduardo Fernández, a former leader of the Social Christian Youth,[45] coordinated the personal staff.

The Democratic Republican Union, Popular Democratic Force and National Democratic Front, after allying behind Burelli Rivas, aseembled a "High Policy Committe" to coordinate their efforts.[46] Because the "Victory Front" alliance congealed midway in the campaign, the apparatus with which its sponsoring parties supported Burelli Rivas proved inferior to that of their major rivals. In terms of the introductory framework,[47] Burelli Rivas, campaign was the most decentralized, the most feudal, the most intermittent and the most personalized. Also, in both the presidential and legislative campaign the organizational structure of Victory Front parties paralleled political-administrative subdivisions.[48]

The Victory Front's presidential campaign organization began as little more than a national headquarters where the "High Policy Committe" gathered to coordinate strategy and tactics. Coordination often demanded decisions that sacrificed the specific interest of an

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44 Cf. the discussion by JOHN D. MARTZ in "Party Activism and Political Campaigning in Venezuela", pp. 20-21.

45 Fernández led the *Juventud Revolucionaria Copeyana* (J.R.C.), the functional organization on which the Social Christians depended to spread their message among Venezuelan Youth. Following President Caldera's inauguration Fernández was appointed Sub-Secretary General to the Presidency.

46 The "High Policy Committee" was composed of Segnini La Cruz (National Democratic Front) Enrique Betancourt y Galíndez (Democratic Republican Union), Angel Zambrano (Popular Democratic Force) and Carlos G. Rangel (National Movement of Independents).

47 Cf. the section entitled "Nature of Participating Units".

48 Like *Acción Democrática* and the People's Electoral Movement, Victory Front parties aspired to assemble individual campaign organization in every state, district and municipality. This desire to parallel national political administrative subdivisions caused the Democratic Republican Union, Popular Democratic Force and National Democratic Front to overlook opportunities where they effectively could combine their campaign apparatus within the subdivisions. Consequently, "Victory Front" parties weakened their effectiveness by failing to use efficiently even the minimal campaign apparatus they possessed.

individual member for the overall good of the Front. Such sacrifices seldom proved agreeable to the adversely affected. Consequently, the "High Policy Committee" found itself deadlocked. When deadlock within the "Committee" continued into mid-July, Burelli Rivas' personal advisors siezed the initiative and developed his campaign along lines of their own choosing.[49] Subsequently, while the fiction of coordination received lip service each of the Front,'s parties, as well as the Burelli Rivas staff, ran semi-autonomous election campaigns.

Major parties supporting Burelli exercised centralized control over their individual state, district and local campaign organizations. Among the three only the Democratic Republican Union boasted a truly national political infrastructure. Its grass roots organizations, however, were smaller and weaker than those of *Acción Democrática* or the Social Christian Party.[50] Democratic Republican Union infrastructure proved strongest in small towns of the East, the Plains and among petroleum workers in the West. The latter two areas of Democratic Republican Union weakness were ones in which the Popular Democratic Force and National Democratic Front achieved great success in 1963. While tightly controlled from Caracas, the local campaign organizations of the Popular Democratic Force and National Democratic Front often consisted of several paid employees and a rented headquarters from which candidates and party leaders toured a region. In the more rural municipalities and districts they lacked even this skeletal structure.

A fourth group allied with Burelli Rivas, the National Electoral Movement of Independents, also participated in the Front's "High Policy Committee". Many of Venezuela's most prominent entrepreneurs belonged to the National Electoral Movement of Independents, and because Burelli Rivas depended on private sector financing he avoided any attempt to dictate how allied businessmen should campaign. Another minor supporter of the Victory Front, the Popular Nationalist Vanguard (V.P.N.), also campaigned autonomously.

Not only could the Victory Front's High Policy Committee not control the national campaigns of member parties, but coordination

49 For example, the "High Policy Committee" hired the OPPA Advertising Agency to handle Burelli Rivas' publicity. For more than a month after signing the contract the "High Committee" argued over what image of Burelli Rivas would appeal to their diverse clientele. Finally, Raúl Acosta Rubio, the President of OPPA, and Burelli Rivas exercised their own judgment in making television and radio commercials.

50 Cf. the discussion in MARTZ, *Acción Democrática*, pp. 366-390.

sometimes proved impossible within a given state or district. For example, in the Heres District of the state of Bolívar[51] the Democratic Republican Union, Popular Democratic Force and the National Democratic Front plotted against each other as much as against their mutual opponents. Party leaders seldom appeared together in public, except during visits by Burelli Rivas. While the Front's eleventh hour coalescence accounted for some problems of coordination, jealousy and differing perceptions of likely electoral strength proved even greater obstacles. Consequently, merging individual party legislative lists into an over-arching Victory Front list became impossible. Each ally demanded an unacceptable number of positions on any such joint offering.[52] Only in states where Victory Front parties stood little chance of electing significant legislative delegations by themselves, such as Portuguesa and Táchira, was it possible to agree on common legislative lists. In summary, Burelli Rivas obtained support from his backers' permanent and regular intermittent campaign organizations. He also depended heavily on "special intermittent" structures. These included his personal staff, the "High Policy Committee', various special committees and the National Electoral Movement of Independents (MENI).

Analysis of the National Civic Crusade and Communist Party's campaign organizations, both, "minor", should be approached with caution. Each attempted to conceal information, the former because of organizational weakness and the latter because it feared the authorities. The National Civic Crusade never completed the metamorphosis from pressure group, concerned with obtaining freedom for General Pérez Jiménez, to political party, seeking the election of congressmen, state legislators and municipal councilmen. To the extent that the National Civic Crusade possessed a campaign organization it was "centralized", "consolidated", "regular - intermittent", oriented to political

51 This district contains Ciudad Bolívar and the surrounding area.

52 For example, the National Democratic Front maintained that it would receive as many votes in 1968 as it had in 1963. On this basis the party demanded approximately equal representation with its major allies on any unified small card ballot. The Democratic Republican Union and the Popular Democratic Force, correctly as it turned out, realized that the National Democratic Front had lost its popular appeal and would be lucky to survive the election as even a "minor" electoral force. Consequently, they offered the National Democratic Front few valuable positions. The National Democratic Front, unwilling to admit to such a deterioration, refused to participate in the small card unity lists. Similar disagreements between the Democratic Republican Union and the Popular Democratic Force also blocked agreement on joint small card lists in many key states. For a detailed discussion of the mechanics of the small card ballot see Chapter II.

ILLUSTRATION 8

VICTORY FRONT CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION - 1968



Solid arrows indicate directions of control. Broken arrows indicate directions of influence.

— = Permanent Electoral Structures

= = Special Intermittent Structures

--- = Regular Intermittent Structures

administrative boundaries and personalized. The campaign apparatus of the Communists, on the other hand, was "centralized", "consolidated", "permanent", keyed to the electorate's socio-economic characteristics and institutionalized. While the Communists openly campaigned in the large cities, clandestine organizations carried much of this burden in the countryside. Despite cohesive and integrated direction, the Communists generated little popular enthusiasm as they appealed to voters for the first time in almost a decade.

FINANCING

Party members, private interest groups, government and foreigners were the most important sources of campaign financing. The flow of money to party and candidate campaign funds, however, remains clouded. Generally, Gonzalo Barrios and Rafael Caldera ran affluent campaigns, while Burelli Rivas and Prieto Figueroa operated on smaller budgets. It is significant that the former candidates ran a close race for the presidency while the latter finished in third and fourth place.

Many bank accounts in which *Acción Democrática* placed funds for the 1968 campaign were controlled by *Prietistas* and eventually financed the People's Electoral Movement.[53] *Acción Democrática,* however, had assembled diverse assets during its decade of power, and Gonzalo Barrios mounted a well-financed campaign. Equally important, the *Gonzalistas* dominated the national executive.[54] The national executive commanded the bureaucracy and bureaucrats, many appointees of *Acción Democrática,* served as professional campaign workers. Consequently, the government party avoided many expenditures associated with the full time employment of trained personnel. Government presses also remained available to print *Acción Democrática* campaign literature and official government publications stressed President Leoni's accomplishments. Regardless of ritualistic affirmations concerning the bureaucrcy's impartiality, *Acción Demo-*

53 Secrecy surrounded the movement of funds from *Acción Democrática* to the People's Electoral Movement. It remains impossible to discover the exact amount transferred, but estimates among party leaders not directly involved ran from U.S. $9 million to $12 million.

54 President Raul Leoni pledged the government's neutrality in the 1968 election campaign. However, President Leoni's cabinet overwhelmingly favored Gonzalo Barrios, who by the end of the campaign had the support of most upper and middle level bureaucrats.

crática's incumbency gave free access to costly goods and services, some of them unavailable to the opposition at any price.

Acción Democrática required its members to pay monthly dues, and only the unemployed routinely received exemption from this obligation.[55] While party statutes stipulated no set amount official policy encouraged a contribution of one *bolívar* monthly. Party leaders asserted that the principal purpose of the financial act was less that of collecting funds than of encouraging a feeling of participation. However, if claims of between 900,000 and 1,000,000 members for *Acción Democrática* were accurate, monthly dues of 1 *bolívar* per member would have yielded a substantial income.[56] Unfortunately, information concerning what percent of claimed membership actually paid dues is unavailable.

Financing from private groups, although shrouded in secrecy, played an important role in *Acción Democrática's* 1968 election campaign. Anti-clerical businessmen and entrepreneurs not allied with the landed elite felt that among candidates with a realistic chance of winning Gonzalo Barrios represented the best possibility for stability and continued cooperation between the public and private sectors. This was an important change from election campaigns in 1958 and 1963, when *Acción Democrática's* socialist rhetoric frightened away most business support. Organized labor traditionally contributed personnel and financing to *Acción Democrática* campaigns, but the struggle between Barrios and Prieto divided the unions and diminished their capability to assist either. Peasants, initially confused by conflicting *Prietistas* and *Gonzalistas* claims that each represented *Acción Democrática,* gravitated toward the latter. However, poverty precluded peasants from contributing significantly to campaign financing. Finally, while support for *Acción Democrática* existed within most professional associations, government, party professionals also lacked economic muscle.[57]

The Barrios campaign received some funding from foreigners. Important decisions about the future of international petroleum com-

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55 MARTZ, *Acción Democrática,* pp. 215-216.

56 The estimate of 900,000 - 1,000,000, prior to the decision of December, 1967, came from *Acción Democrática's* Organization Secretariat and was accepted by José Curiel, the Social Christian Sub-Secretary General for Electoral Organization.

57 Venezuela's most prestiguous professional organization is the College of Engineers. The Social Christians traditionally command the largest organized faction within the College, with *Acción Democrática* running a distant second.

panies in Venezuela were to be taken during the 1969-1974 constitutional period, and Barrios' party had never lost an open presidential election. Consequently, petroleum executives believed that prudence demanded financial contributions to *Acción Democrática.* The United States government, at least according to the rhetoric of leftists and Social Christians, acted as a second foreign source of campaign funds for Gonzalo Barrios. They charged that *Acción Democrática's* record revealed subservience to imperialism and that Washington wanted its lackey to win.[58] However, there was no evidence of tangible United States support for Barrios, and his most significant sources of funds clearly were domestic.

The People's Electoral Movement, while less affluent than the Social Christians and *Acción Democrática,* was not without resources. During the struggle with Barrios, Prieto's faction controlled between U.S. $ 3.5 million and $ 7.0 million, which became the People's Electoral Movement's financial cushion.[59] The party used these funds for campaigning and to consolidate its state, national and local party organizations. Among the other sources of financing available to *Prietistas* government was most significant within a limited area — the state of Zulia. Throughout Zulia, especially in the city of Maracaibo, the People's Electoral Movement commanded the allegiance of most elected officials who ran in 1963 as *Acción Democrática* candidates. Consequently, Prieto Figueroa's supporters dominated the municipal Council of Maracaibo, as well as councils in many lesser Zulian municipalities. Goods and services dispensed by the "dominated" municipal councils could be converted into electoral assets.[60] However, state and national government institutions in Zulia were controlled by the national executive over which *Acción Democrática's* Raul Leoni presided. In Zulia, as throughout the country, state and national governments dispensed significantly more goods and services than the

58 See the changes made by Dr. Hilarión Cardozo of the Social Christians in *El Nacional,* November 16, 1967.

59 Cf. the estimations made in *Bohemia* (Caracas, January 14, 1968), p. 34, with the statement made by Paz Galarraga in *El Nacional,* April 1, 1968.

60 The Municipal Council of the Maracaibo District governs the city of Maracaibo. In 1965 the Maracaibo District Council had an income of Bs. 27, 919,331, making it Venezuela's third wealthiest municipal government. Dirección General de Estadística y Censo Nacional, *Anuario Estadístico de Venezuela, 1965* (Caracas, 1967), p. 315.

municipalities.[61] Even in areas where his supporters dominated the grass roots, therefore, Prieto Figueroa was opposed by the most important political bureaucracies. Throughout the rest of the country, where the People's Electoral Movement held a minority of municipal council seats, the party encountered opposition from local officials to complement the hostility of those at the state and national level.

The People's Electoral Movement could not look to private sources for even token financing. Prieto's championing of secular public education alienated the traditional elite, and his militant socialism precluded the support of those whose recent affluence stemmed from business success. While some professionals favored the People's Electoral Movement they were a small minority and an unimportant source of financing. Among private groups only unions possessed an ideological affinity for Prieto Figueroa's programs and a potential to add financial muscle to his presidential bid. However, as discussed earlier, control of organized labor was at stake throughout the campaign, and Prieto's supporters within the Venezuelan Confederation of Workers needed all of their resources for that struggle.[62] Finally, the People's Electoral Movement neither anticipated nor received support from foreigners. The United States government, international business and the Communists felt equally uncomfortable when confronted by Prieto Figueroa's highly nationalistic socialism.

The Social Christians, although controlling few government institutions, ran a well financed campaign. Caldera's relative affluence stemmed from support given by large landowner's, the private sector and a tightly disciplined party membership. Many professionals also volunteered skills that reduced Social Christian expenses. Finally, Social Christian ideology was international, and many socially conscious Roman Catholics in Western Europe, the United States and Latin America identified with Caldera and his party. The Social Christians, like *Acción Democrática,* anticipated financial support from party members. Regulations empowered national and regional

61 All Venezuelan states receive their income as a constitutionally fixed percent of total national spending. The national government in 1965 had an income of Bs. 7,400,341 million bolívares and Zulia's income was Bs. 105,687,564. *Ibid,* pp. 290, 295. Public resources available to the People's Electoral Movement, therefore, were immeasurably inferior to those commanded by *Acción Democrática.*

62 *Acción Democrática* traditionally dominated between seventy and eighty percent of organized labor in Venezuela. So bitter did the struggle become between union supporters of Gonzalo Barrios and Prieto Figueroa that many union elections had to be postponed until after the general election.

organs to fix membership dues, and the more wealthy were tapped for special contributions.[63] Being Venezuela's second largest political party, with between 700,000 and 800,000 members, the Social Christians could expect a significant income if each member paid only a small amount monthly. As with *Acción Democrática,* however, the Social Christians released no statistics indicating what percent of their claimed membership fulfilled its financial obligations.

Government proved of marginal significance to the Social Christians as a source of campaign financing. The party, on the basis of its 1963 vote, elected the second largest number of congressmen, state legislators and municipal councilmen, and each Social Christian office holder, like all elected officials in Venezuela, was expected to return a portion of his salary to his party.[64] Compared with control over major government institutions, however, salary percentages paled as sources of campaign financing. Only in the Andes did the Social Christians dominate a significant number of municipal councils, and the total municipal income for the three Andean states came to 70 percent of municipal income in the state of Zulia.[65] As indicated earlier, the People's Electoral Movement dominated the most important Zulian municipal councils, and even given this domination controled only a small percent of total government spending in the state. The Social Christians found themselves in the same position throughout the Andes.

Private interests were the Social Christians' most important sources of campaign financing. Large landowners and their business allies anticipated that Caldera, if elected, would slow the large increases in public expenditures that marked the administrations of Raul Leoni and Rómulo Betancourt.[66] While the increasingly anti-capitalist tone of the Social Chiristian youth worried the landed and business elites, most felt they would receive a more favorable hearing from militant Social Christian youth than from their Socialist counterparts in the

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63 Partido Social Cristiano COPEI, *Estatutos* (Caracas, 1964), 40-41.

64 *Ibid.*

65 In 1965 total income of Venezuela's three Andean states' was Bs. 37,205,441. It was divided as follows; Trujillo 6,751,513, Mérida 11,091,142 and Táchira 19,362,786. The combined income of Zulia's municipalities, in contrast, was Bs. 53,372,811. *Anuario Estadístico* 1965, 306,312,313 and 314.

66 In 1957, the final fiscal year of the Pérez Jiménez regime, government expenditures totaled Bs. 4.38 billion. By 1965, the seventh year of government by *Acción Democrática,* expenditures had risen to Bs. 7.4 billion. *Compendio Estadístico de Venezuela* (Caracas: Dirección General de Estadística, 1968), p. 395.

People's Electoral Movement, the Popular Democratic Force and the Democratic Republican Union. Following the departure of Prieto Figueroa from *Acción Democrática* the government party likely contained fewer dogmatic anti-capitalists than the Social Christians. However, historical antagonism between large land holders, clerically-oriented businessmen and *Acción Democrática* made in unlikely that Gonzalo Barrios would attract Social Christian financial backers.

Theree other major interests — the church, peasants and organized labor — made little if any contribution toward financing the Social Christian campaign. The Roman Catholic hierarchy, while remaining officially neutral, privately favored Caldera. There is no evidence, however, that the church gave financial support to Social Christian candidates. Peasant Leagues historically favored *Acción Democrática.* Only in the Andes did Peasant Leagues dominated by Social Christians outnumber ones allied with the government party. However, during the administration of Rómulo Betancourt Social Christian participation in the governing coalition gave the party responsibility for the Ministry of Agriculture. Control of Agriculture enabled COPEI to build support among peasants and become a major competitor with *Acción Democrática* for the rural vote. As indicated earlier, however, the economic status of peasants restricted their importance as a source of campaign financing. Finally, while the Social Christians boasted a highly organized labor affiliate, it encompassed less than fifteen percent of all union members.[67] Labor, like the church and peasants, was unwilling or unable to play a major role in funding Caldera's campaign.

Foreigners, on the other hand, gave important financial backing to the Social Christians. Christian Democrats in Germany and Italy perceived their ideology as a successful alternative to Marxism in Europe and hoped it could be made viable throughout Latin America. Because Venezuela's Social Christians were in a good position to capture the presidency in 1968 European Christian Democrats focused on Caldera's campaign. Money and technical experts arrived from Germany and Italy, although the extent of assistance remained a closely guarded secret.[68] Additional foreign contributions came to

67 Confirmed in a forthcoming study of Venzuelan labor by Stuart Fagan of Columbia University.

68 Since before the 1963 elections Venezuelan Social Christians had been sent to Germany and Italy for training with Local Christian Democratic Party organizations. The Social Christians consequently, continually had to guard against allegations that they were foreign controlled. Such allegations were never proved, and there is no evidence of Italian or German control over Venezuelan and Social Christians.

the Social Christian Party from Venezuelan subsidiaries of the international petroleum corporations.[69] Creole, Shell and lesser foreign producers, as discussed earlier, anticipated that the next president would be Caldera or Barrios, and considered it prudent to have contributed to the incoming chief executive's campaign. In contrast, neither the United States government nor international communism believed that their interests would be dramatically advanced or adversely affected by Caldera's fate. Consequently, both maintained a respectful distance between themselves and the Social Christian campaign.

While ideologically a favorite of business, the Victory Front and Burelli Rivas obtained less financial support than Caldera or Barrios. Indeed, Burelli Rivas may have been constrained by a smaller budget than even Prieto Figueroa, the candidate entrepreneurs most distrusted. Burelli Rivas' presidential drive also received less support than anticipated from the Democratic Republican Union, the Popular Democratic Force and the National Democratic Front. In contrast, strategists for these parties spared no expense in campaigns for their congressional, state legislative and municipal council candidates. Four semi-autonomous centers of financial control emerged within the Victory Front in consequence: the National Executive Committees of the three important supporting parties and Burelli Rivas' personal staff.

While the Democratic Republican Union had greater access to public resources than other Victory Front parties, governments also provided financing for campaigns by the Popular Democratic Force and the National Democratic Front. The Democratic Republican Union remained in the government coalition until May, 1968, thus controlling national ministries, official corporations and state executives until well into the election campaign. In contrast to the Social Christians five years earlier, however, the Democratic Republican Union seemed unable to use the associated patronage and resources to broaden its appeal.[70]

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69 The most important of these were Shell, Creole (a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey) and Mene Grande (a joint operation of Shell, Standard Oil of New Jersey and Gulf).

70 The Social Christian small card vote rose from 15.2 percent to 20.8 percent between 1958 and 1963, the period of participation in President Betancourt's government. In contrast, the Democratic Republican Union's small card vote fell from 17.4 percent in 1963 to 9.2 percent in 1968. During the interregnum, the Democratic Republican Union was the junior partner in President Raul Leoni's government.

The Popular Democratic Force and National Democratic Front boasted fewer elected officials than their ally. The only government institution of consequence they controlled was the Federal District Municipal Council. In spite of the Council's national prestige most Federal District expenditures were decided by a governor appointed by the President.[71] Even the council's meager resources, however proved of some importance to the Popular Democratic Force. In contrast, the National Democratic Front received business support. If entrepreneurs could have been convinced that the National Democratic Front had a realistic chance of gaining the presidency of congress, they might have been persuaded to invest even more in the party's campaign. The Democratic Republican Union, claiming between 450,000 and 550,000 adherents, stressed membership-based financing.[72] While the 1968 elections were to reveal hard core support at well under 400,000, the party retained a grass roots organization capable of raising significant economic resources. The Popular Democratic Force and the National Democratic Front, however, lacked the institutions and militant cadres that would have facilitated membership based financing.

Burelli Rivas' private sector backers, as discussed earlier, supported the presidential candidacy of Arturo Uslar Pietri in 1963. Following a respectable electoral showing Uslar Pietri's popularity steadily declined. Nevertheless, important elements in the private sector viewed the other non-Marxist party, the Social Christians, with suspicion. They feared that Caldera was over-committed to his traditional upper class clientele[73] and distrusted the radical Social Christian youth. Consequently, Uslar Pietri hoped that if he assembled a viable alternative to the Social Christians he might again attract financing from industrialists associated with the Vollmer, Phelps and Zuloaga interests. Few entrepreneurs, however, believed that an alliance of three declining political forces could place a relative unknown in

71 CARL S. SHOUP, et. al. *The Fiscal System of the Federal District of Venezuela* (New York City: n.p., 1960), p. 1-17.

72 If small card vote is taken as an indication of "hard core" clientele, the party spoke for approximately 340,000 members in 1968.

73 Venezula's business community is divided into several powerful clusters. The Mendoza and Phelps groups inclined toward Dr. Caldera while the Zuloaga and Vollmer interests a Social Christian victory would give the former unacceptable influence. Consequently, the Zuloaga and Vollmer interests became the core of Burelli Rivas financing.

the presidency.[74] Nevertheless, they contributed enough to make Burelli Rivas a major contender. One often repeated explanation for private sector backing of the Victory Front noted that many businessmen had developed a working relationship with *Acción Democrática* and believed that Gonzalo Barrios' election would best serve their interests. They also calculated Burelli Rivas' candidacy, by dividing the anti-*Acción Democrática* vote, would reduce the probability of a Social Christian victory.[75]

Victory Front parties received less private sector support for individual legislative campaigns than for Burelli Rivas' presidential bid. The Democratic Republican Union obtained marginal funding from unions, but as indicated earlier, organized labor was divided largely between partisans of Barrios or Prieto. Slum dwellers, the mainstay of Popular Democratic Force support, managed only minor contributions. Some National Democratic Front private sector financiers refused to abandon the party. However, the National Democratic Front's legislative candidates generally were overlooked by businessmen whose primary concern was defeating Caldera and strengthening the appeal of Burelli Rivas.

Finally, neither the Communists nor the National Civic Crusade received large scale financial backing. The former apparently drew upon the international communist movement, but if the Venezuelan party's almost invisible campaign was a valid indicator, allocations were not generous. National Civic Crusade leaders initially anticipated that General Pérez Jiménez would support efforts on his behalf. The former president, however, proved reluctant to gamble much of his personal fortune on a political comeback. Consequently, the National Civic Crusade operated on a most austere of budgets.

SUMMATION AND CONCLUSIONS

Campaign competitors were examined from the perspectives of size, structure and financing. Size, structure and financing contrast

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74 As indicated previously, these developments included National Democratic Front participation in President Leoni's government and Villalba's continuing authoritarian rule over the Democratic Republican Union. Also, Admiral Larrazabal's two unsuccessful runs for the presidency had dimmed his charisma.

75 The Social Christians also believed that Burelli Rivas' candidacy would cost them more votes than it would *Acción Democrática.* Consequently, they attacked Burelli Rivas as a spoiler, a parasite and as the "third *Acción Democrática* candidate". The matter is discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV.

with strategies, tactics and information, the latter emphasizing *interaction* among parties, coalitions, interest groups and voters. While Chapter IV will discuss interaction, describing the "nature of participating units" provides the base for subsequently analyzing campaign dynamics.

In terms of size, as revealed by Table 6, three competitors fall in the "major" category, four are classified as "minor" and four as "marginal".

TABLE 6

PARTY AND COALITION SIZE CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO ELECTION RETURNS IN 1963 AND 1968

PARTY OR COALITION	SIZE 1963	1968
Social Christians	Major	Major
Acción Democrática	Major	Major
Victory Front	—	Major
Democratic Republican Union	Major	Minor
Popular Democratic Force	Minor	Minor
National Democratic Front	Minor	Marginal
People's Electoral Movement	—	Minor
National Civic Crusade	—	Minor
Union for Advancement (Communists)	—	Marginal
Revolutionary Party of National Integration	—	Marginal
Others	Marginal	Marginal

Two parties, the Democratic Republican Union and the National Democratic Front, appear in different categories depending on whether one classifies according to results from elections in 1963 and 1968. Based on the earlier election, the former party would have fallen on the "major" — "minor" boundary and the latter would have been categorized as "minor". I would argue that the chronological propinquity of a campaign and the election in which it culminates makes the culminating election the better indicator of strength or size during a campaign. Therefore, two parties, each claiming bet-

ween 700,000 and 900,000 numbers, were "major" during the 1968 election campaign.[76] Also, despite the weaker campaign organization of its members, the Victory Front falls in the "major" category. Parties classified as "marginal", in contrast, were unable to raise their total vote above 100,000. "Minor" parties, the intermediate category, received between 195,000 (Popular Democratic Force) and 476,000 (People's Electoral Movement) small card votes.

The concept of structure facilitated discussion of campaign competitors in terms of five characteristics: vertical control, horizontal control, organizational persistence, style and organizational focus for regional appeals. Table 7 summarizes the findings.

Venezuelan politicians, as expected, consider party financing privileged information. Their passion for privacy, when coupled with an absence of legislation requiring disclosure of the sources and amount of contributions, precludes detailed analysis. Indeed, available information about campaign financing in Venezuela is at best a synthesis of rumors, boasts and speculation. This synthesis is summarized in Table 8, which closes the discussion of size, structuring and financing.

76 The smaller parties refused to release membership statistics, so their small card vote is taken as the best available indicator of strength. However, it is doubtful that all who voted for them were party militants.

TABLE 7

STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION OF PARTIES AND ELECTORAL COALITIONS IN 1968

	Vertical Control		Horizontal Control		Organizational Persistence		Organizational Focus for Regional Appeals		Style	
	Centralized	Decentralized	Consolidated	Feudal	Permanent	Intermittent	Administrative	Societal	Institutionalized	Personalized
Social Christians	1		1		1			1	3	
Acción Democrática	2		2			3	3		1	
Victory Front		2		2		1	1			1
Democratic Republican Union	2		2			3	2		2	
Popular Democratic Force	2		2			2		3	3	
National Democratic Front	2		2			1	2		3	
People's Electoral Movement	2		2			3	2		3	
National Civic Crusade		1		1		2	1			2
Union for Advancement	1		1			2	2		1	
Revolutionary Party of National Integration	2		2			1	2		2	

The presence of a number in Table 7 indicates that the relevant campaign organization was structured in the manner of the designation above the number. The numerical designation indicates how closely the campaign organization resembled the "ideal type" version of the category: very close = 1, moderately close = 2 and barely closer to the "ideal type" tan to its opposite = 3. For example, the possibilities available under "Vertical Control" are diagrammed in Illustration 9.

ILLUSTRATION 9

VERTICAL CONTROL

	CENTRALIZED			DECENTRALIZED		
IDEAL TYPE	1	2	3	3	2	1	IDEAL TYPE

TABLE 8

PARTY AND COALITION FINANCING IN VENEZUELA THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN OF 1968

Party or Coalition	Overall Available Funds a	Government b	Membership Based b	Foreigners b	Private Interest Groups b				
					Over all	Labor	Business	Peasants	slum dwellers
Social Christians	High	3	1	2	1	3	1	3	4
Acción Democrática	High	1	1	3	1	3	2	3	4
Victory Front	Moderate	4	4	4	1	4	1	4	4
Dem. Rep. Union	Moderate	1	1	4	2	3	3	3	4
Pop. Dem. Force	Low	2	1	4	2	3	3	4	3
National Dem. Front	Low	3	3	4	1	4	1	4	3
People's Elec. Mvt.	Moderate	2	3	4	3	3	4	3	3
Nat. Civic Crusade	Very Low	4	3	4	3	4	3	4	4
Union for Advance	Very Low	4	2	1	3	3	4	4	3
Revol. Pty. of Nat. Integration	Very Low	4	1	4	3	2	4	3	3
Others	Very Low								

a. Indicates the quantity of funds available for the election campaign.

Designation	*Millions of Bolivars*	*Millions of US $*
High	over 20	over 4.5
Moderate	9 . 19.9	2.0 - 4.4
Low	2.2 - 8.9	.5 - 1.9
Very Low	Less than 2.1	Less than .5

b. Indicates the percent of total campaign funding supplied.

Designation	#	*Percent*
Very Important	1	over 20
Moderately important	2	6 - 20
Little Importance	3	1 - 5
Unimportant	4	Less than 1

CHAPTER IV

CAMPAIGN INTERACTION INFORMATION, STRATEGIES AND TACTICS

INTRODUCTION

Campaign interaction encompasses information strategy and tactics. Information will be considered messages from political elites. The flow and content of such information, as an election approaches, becomes increasingly monopolized by campaign communications. Consequently, most campaign issues can be discerned by analyzing political information at the height of campaigning. Campaign issues, as defined in the "Introduction", concern efficiency, stability, ideology and personalities.[1]

Strategies and tactics relate to assembling a winning coalition or one that maximizes electoral potential. Selecting electoral strategies is least complicated when a political party historically has been in a majority. The basic strategic problem for a majority party is retaining its clientele. When uncommitted groups hold the balance of power, however, the choice electoral strategies becomes complicated. To the requirement of retaining past supporters is added that of broadening one's appeal. The latter demands calculations concerning which groups constitute the party's core strength, which identify weakly with it, which are indifferent, which mildly antagonistic and which irretrievably hostile. The strategic problem becomes one of attracting support from the indifferent, or even mildly antagonistic, without alienating those already inclined toward the party.

Election tactics are plans for implementing electoral strategies. Participants in the 1968 election campaign employed seven basic electoral tactics. Five — positive inducements, negative inducements,

1 Cf. the analysis of issues in the "Introduction".

association with legitimating symbols, disassociation with illegitimating symbols and negative symbolic projection — appeared in association with the strategies of reinforcement, attraction and paralysis.[2] The other two, leadership multiplication and issue divisiveness, served to implement the strategy of division. As used by Venezuelan politicians in 1968 the above strategies and tactics were designed to bring success within established "rules of the game". No candidate or party sought to create through their campaigning an environment that would increase the vulnerability of democracy to attacks from either the authoritarian right or left.[3]

INFORMATION

A. Sources and Outlets:

With several earlier noted exceptions political parties, the most important sources of campaign information, supported one of the major presidential nominees. Therefore, campaign information will be discussed in terms of the presidentially-oriented party cluster from which it emanated. This frame of reference is most satisfactory for analyzing information from supporters of Rafael Caldera, Gonzalo Barrios and Luis Beltrán Prieto Figueroa. It is less useful in discussing the coalition behind Miguel Angel Burelli Rivas. Analysis of the latter will be supplemented by examining each supporting party as an autonomous generator of campaign information.[4] Finally, confusion persisted over which major presidential candidate, if any, the Communists and National Civic Crusade supported. Each functioned as an independent source of campaign information.

The only important private group independently generating campaign information was business. Entrepreneurs, however, failed to unite behind a single party or presidential candidate. Competing business networks aligned with rival political parties or coalitions. Thus, the

2 *Ibid.*, contains an expanded definition of tactics within a strife framework.

3 During most of the twentieth century Venezuela was ruled by dictators and others who opposed the establishing of pluralistic democracy. Since the military coup of 1958, however, Venezuela has been a functioning democracy. For a detailed discussion of the coup of 1958, see Philip B. Taylor, Jr., *The Venezuelan Golpe de Estado of 1958: The Fall of Marcos Pérez Jiménez,* (Washington: ICOPS, 1968).

4 Parties supporting Burelli Rivas often failed to coordinate their strategies and tactics. Consequently, campaign information generated by the parties backing Burelli Rivas was heterogeneous and sometimes contradictory. This problem will be analyzed in depth subsequently.

powerful Mendoza Group supported the Social Christians and the Zuloagas favored the Victory Front. In both situations businessmen bargained with the politicians as equals. Spokesmen for labor, peasants and professionals, on the other hand, lacked the independence and economic power of their business counterparts. As discussed earlier, these groups were creatures of the political parties.[5] Party discipline could be invoked against "dominated" interest group leaders, and loss of party support undermined the power of those from whom support was withdrawn. Consequently, the electoral rhetoric of these leaders focused on expanding the dominating party's following among the uncommitted or among peers allied with a rival party. Such information will be considered as emanating from political parties.

Newspapers and periodicals, radio and televisión, mass rallies, party organizations and government served as major outlets for campaign information. Venezuela's most influencial newspapers and periodicals originated in Caracas and were distributed nationally. The Capriles family controlled Venezuela's largest publishing empire. Its most important newspaper was the Caracas daily, *Ultimas Noticias* (circulation 85,000).[6] *Ultimas Noticias* appealed to those who preferred news in an encapsulated and pictorial form, especially inhabitants of the urban slums. *El Mundo,* a sensationalist afternoon daily, also belonged to the Capriles. In addition, the Capriles published the weekly news magazines *Elite* and *Venezuela Gráfica,* along with the women's magazine *Páginas.* Finally, the same chain owned *Crítica,* the city of Maracaibo's second largest daily.[7]

Midway through the election campaign Miguel Capriles and the Social Christians reached an agreement.[8] Capriles and his associates received favorable positions on various legislative lists offered by the Social Christians. In return, the Capriles chain undertook an intense campaign on behalf of Caldera and his party. Opponents were not permitted to make their case in Capriles publications and their cam-

5 As an example, see the discussion of organized labor in JOHN D. MARTZ *Acción Domocrática* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 255-286.

6 For a comprehensive discussion of Venezuelan newspapers, see *U.S. Army Area Handbook for Venezuela* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 289-292.

7 *Ibid.,* pp. 289-294.

8 Miguel Angel Capriles, the dominant figure of the Capriles publishing chain, initially hoped to become the presidential candidate of a coalition encompassing the National Democratic Front, the Popular Democratic Force and the Democratic Republican Union. After the three parties united behind Burelli Rivas Capriles threw his publications to Rafael Caldera and the Social Christians.

paigns were mentioned only in the most derogatory terms. The alliance between Capriles and the Social Christians generated intense controversy among Venezuelan journalists and led several newspapers to bar articles favoring Caldera and the Social Christians from their editorial pages.[9]

El Nacional (circulation 100,000) and *El Universal* (circulation 70,000) were Venezuela's most prestigious dailies. In recent years the former had taken a center-left position, while the latter served as an unofficial spokesman for business.[10] *El Nacional* inclined toward Burelli Rivas, but reported the campaign activity of all major presidential contenders fairly and in depth. However, following conclusion of the pact between the Capriles and Caldera *El Nacional* denied its editorial pages to supporters of the Social Christians. Other parties, including the People's Electoral Movement with which *El Nacional* had little sympathy, retained access to the newspaper's editorial pages. *El Universal,* despite the pact between Capriles and Caldera, printed signed editorials by Social Christian leaders and articles supporting Gonzalo Barrios and Burelli Rivas. In contrast, the conservative daily largely ignored the People's Electoral Movement.

Two smaller Caracas newspapers, *La República* and *La Verdad,* favored *Acción Democrática.* The former, founded in 1961, served as the semi-official voice of the government party. After Prieto Figueroa's supporters were purged from its editorial staff, during early 1968, *La República* dutifully backed Barrios. *La Verdad* belonged to the Zuloagas, one of Venezuela's proudest industrial families, who would have preferred Burelli Rivas as president. However, calculating that the real contest lay between Barrios and Caldera, and suspicious of their rival's alliance with the Social Christians, the Zuloagas inclined toward *Acción Democrática.* Nevertheless, *La Verdad* opened its editorial pages to supporters of Burelli Rivas.[11]

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9 *El Nacional* and *Panorama* responded to the pact between Caldera and Capriles by refusing to carry signed pieces by Social Christians. *El Nacional,* while expressing disapproval, continued to open its editorial pages to supporters of Caldera. Subsequently, however, in all non-Capriles papers Burelli Rivas received sympathetic treatment.

10 *Area Handbook for Venezuela,* pp. 289-292.

11 The Zuloaga family was associated with the economic group which centered around the Volmers, one of Venezuela's oldest and most prestigeous families. The Volmers derived their initial economic strength from ownership of the sugarcane producing area surrounding Caracas. In more recent times, however, the Caracas Electric Company and the National Brewery have been cornerstones of the Vollmer economic empire.

Panorama, Semana and *Momento* were most important among the remaining newspapers and periodicals.[12] *Panorama,* Maracaibo's largest daily, boasted a circulation of 70,000 and was read widely in Western Venezuela. Because of outrage at the Capriles pact *Panorama* refused to print articles favoring the Social Christians. However, the Maracaibo daily made its editorial section available to supporters of Prieto Figueroa, Burelli Rivas and Barrios. *Semana,* an expanding weekly news magazine, was the creation of youthful journalists associated with the Democratic Republican Union. While *Semana* editorially favored Burelli Rivas and the Victory Front, it gave extensive coverage to all presidential campaigns. The editorial staff of *Momento* also inclined toward Burelli Rivas. Nevertheless, *Momento* provided a balanced account of contending parties and their campaigns.

Radio and television emerged in 1968 as increasingly important disseminators of political information for all major parties. One of three families owned a radio receiver.[13] Even settlements in the jungle or tropical savanna could be reached by broadcasts from Caracas or a regional center, such as Maracaibo, San Cristóbal or Ciudad Bolívar. Television, on the other hand, had not penetrated into most small towns or the countryside. However, a tangle of television antennas sprouted from the rooftops of shantytowns in the large cities. Popular wisdom asserted that the intensive media campaign waged by Arturo Uslar Pietri in 1963 had been decisive in his strong urban showing.[14] Consequently, most politicians believed that television could win important support in populous metropolitan centers.

Three commercial radio networks extended throughout Venezuela. Political advertising beamed at the country as a whole originated in Caracas. Other campaign information emanated from local affiliates or independent stations, and concentrated on voters within a region or state. For example, appeals addressed to "People of the Andes"

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12 *Area Handbook for Venezuela,* pp. 293-294.

13 *Ibid.* pp. 294 claimed that Venezuela boasted 2.1 million radio sets or 279 per 1,000 inhabitants. This ratio undoubtedly has increased since then.

14 Venezuela's large cities were becoming increasingly important. For example, between 1950 and 1960 Caracas grew from 495,000 to 787,000. In 1950, 9.8 percent of the population lived in the capital and by 1960 the percentage had risen to 10.5 While in the former year most Caraqueños lived within the legal boundaries of Caracas in the latter the population was spilling into the surrounding metropolitan area. The population of metropolitan Caracas, in 1961, was 1,218,275. Cf. República de Venezuela, *Noveno Censo General de Población — Area Metropolitana de Caracas* (Caracas: Oficina Central de Censo; 1964), XVI and University of California — Los Angeles, *Statistical Abstract for Latin America — 1968* (Los Angeles; UCLA Latin American Center 1969), p. 64.

filled the airwaves over the states of Táchira, Mérida and Trujillo. Political appeals on television lacked a state or regional emphasis, for all television broadcasting facilities were in Caracas.[15] Microwave or cable carried programs to outlying areas. Caracas boasted three commercial television stations: VENEVISION (channel 4), Radio Caracas Television (channel 2) and CANAL 8 (channel 8).[16] Each commercial channel liberally sold time for political advertising to all interested parties and candidates.

The relative affluence of the Social Christians and *Acción Democrática* enabled them to mount massive and skillfully orchestrated television campaigns. The Victory Front and the People's Electoral Movement, in contrast, had fewer commercials to present in the limited time they could afford to purchase. However, a wide variety of talk shows invited participation by leading politicians from all parties. They reduced the advantage of *Acción Democrática* and the Social Christian's larger media budgets. Such programs as *Buenos Días* and the "Renny Show" gave important exposure to candidates who otherwise would have been unable to air their positions on television.

In addition to the commercial mass media the government operated a national radio and television network.[17] While law prohibited public radio and television from accepting political advertisement, its programming throughout the campaign assisted the government party. Special films and reports presented President Leoni inagurating public works and narration stressed the accomplishments of his administration and its responsiveness to the popular desire for a better life. While *Acción Democrática* never was mentioned, the implication was obvious; the past decade had brought great progress and the governing party could best direct continuing modernization. The impact of public television on the campaign nationally remains unclear. In Caracas, however, many regarded its discussion of government perfomance and policies with great suspicion.

Extensive travel, capped by mass rallies in regional towns and cities, served as a third outlet for exposing candidates and their ideas. The

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15 Maracaibo once had its own television station. However, there were not enough regionally oriented advertisers to make the station a commercial success. While facilities for a television station existed in Maracaibo, therefore, they remained inoperative during the 1968 election campaign.

16 *Area Handbook for Venezuela,* pp. 298-300.

17 The government broadcasts on Channel 5. In Eastern Venezuela, where not all commercial stations had outlets, government television was more influential than in Caracas and Maracaibo.

four major presidential contenders toured every state and visited most of the country's 642 municipalities.[18] A typical day of campaigning included motorcades and meetings during the morning and afternoon. The evening was taken up by mass rallies. Party leaders portrayed the rallies as emotional outpourings, thus an important indication of candidate charisma. The most visible indicator of rally success was crowd size. Poorly attended rallies were cited as evidence that candidate appeal was flagging.[19] Consequently, when major rallies were scheduled where a party lacked support militants were trucked to the event from as far away as 500 miles. Rally attendance, therefore, seldom indicated true popularity within a region.[20]

The presidential candidate usually entered an important town or city by motorcade. Party faithful, supporters and the curious lined streets and filled plazas to catch a glimpse. At the rally site, prior to the candidate's arrival, local politicians and supporting civic leaders praised the potential president. Cheering, applause and a thundering ovation inevitably greeted his arrival. All rally audiences were organized to some degree, and none more so than ones assembled by the Social Christians. Drilled cadres from the party youth organization chanted Caldera... Caldera... Caldera... or change... change... change.[21] Sometimes it became unclear which appeals evoked genuine enthusiasm and which only brought responses from those who were expected to cheer the candidates every word. To a lesser degree, the same was true at rallies for Barrios, Burelli Rivas and Prieto Figueroa.

In addition to organized cheering sections, party delegations representing important interest groups often appeared at the rallies. A typical Burelli Rivas rally might include delegations of National Democratic Front Women, National Democratic Front Workers, Nation-

18 The 1961 Venezuelan census, excluding the federal territories, lists 622 Venezuelan municipalities and 22 parishes in the Federal District.

19 Privately, politicians treated the size of a crowd as the function of a party's logistic capability. Size never was equated with support. During the closing weeks of the campaign, however, the Caracas press was filled with claims by each candidates partisans that their crowds had been the largest. Publicy, political leaders portrayed crowd size as an important indicator of popular appeal.

20 During September Barrios made his first campaign swing to Maracaibo, the alleged stronghold of Prieto Figueroa. In order to fill the Olympic Stadium in Maracaibo Barrios supporters were brought from as far away as Caracas and the llanos. This created a monumental traffic jam on the bridge connecting Maracaibo and the main East-West highway.

21 In their enthusiasm the youth sometimes drowned out Caldera and delayed the rally for up to fifteen minutes. Sometimes the candidate seemed genuinely annoyed. In general, however, Caldera graciously accepted the "spontaneous" cheering as a necessary part of election campaigning.

al Democratic Front Peasants and National Democratic Front Professionals. It made little difference that the National Democratic Front had few peasant and union supporters, and little chance of attracting them. The party, like its rivals, felt compelled to appear as a political movement capable of uniting all classes. Belief in the desirability of separate parties to represent differing interests was lacking in both the public rhetoric and private expressions of Venezuelan party leaders.[22] They perceived consensus, rather than controlled conflict, as most likely to bring political and economic progress.

After the mass rally candidates retired to a community center or home of a distinguished supporter in the area. There, in an informal environment, regional party leaders would be encouraged and the influential but uncommitted courted. Also, the presidential candidate's appearance at a major rally sometimes opened or climaxed the local party organization's membership drive. The Social Christians and *Acción Democrática* generally proved most adept at using visits by presidential candidate as opportunities to expand membership.

Finally, the mass rally provided an opportunity for all who attended to participate in the campaign. Party leaders believed that participation gave a feeling of involvement and commitment that media advertising could not duplicate. Most had learned their trade in an era when radio was confined to the major cities and television did not exist. They felt comfortable with the mass rally and doubted the effectiveness of any medium that restricted interaction between the candidate and his audience. This especially was true for *Acción Democrática,* where past triumphs were credited to a combination of disciplined organization and intensive campaigning capped by mass rallies.[23] Consequently, neither *Acción Democrática* nor its less successful rivals were prepared to abandon the mass rally.

In the election's aftermath some politicians spoke of a need to re-evaluate the mass rally's effectiveness. While admitting their rallies provided a necessary sense of involvement, critics pointed out that the goal of at least one major rally in each municipality overtaxed the presidential candidate and inordinately prolonged the campaign. They

22 Most Venezuelan parties aspire to represent all groups in society, and are organized correspondingly. For example, see the discussion of *Acción Democrática's* organization in JOHN D. MARTZ, *Acción Democrática* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 141-192.

23 For a discussion of *Acción Democrática's* emergence as Venezuela's majority party, see *Ibid.*, pp. 49-80.

argued that radio and television should be substituted when the major goal was presentation of a candidate's personality and ideas.[24]

Table 8 summarizes the foregoing discussion by comparing the importance of information outlets in 1968.

TABLE 9

THE IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION OUTLETS
FOR VENEZUELAN PARTIES DURING THE 1968 CAMPAIGN

Candidate Or Party	Newspapers & Periodicals	Radio & Television	Mass Rallies	Party Organization	Government
Barrios	5H	4H	2H	1H	3H
Caldera	4H	3H	2H	1H	5L
Burelli Rivas	4M	3M	1H	2M	5L
Prieto Figueroa	4M	3M	2H	1H	5L
National Civic Crusade	4L	1L	3L	2L	5L
Communists	4L	3L	2L	1M	5L

The number ranks the importance of each information outlet to the candidate or party. Thus, party organization was Barrio's most important outlet while mass rallies held this position for Burelli Rivas. The letters "H", "M", "L", refer to whether a party or candidate's use of the outlet was "Heavy", "Medium" or "Light". Relatively poor or unorganized parties such as the National Civic Crusade, as indicated in Table 9, made only Light (L) use of the outlet most important to its campaign.

B. FLOW:

Campaign information, in the broadest sense, flowed from urban centers to the countryside. Most technicians skilled in creating propaganda resided in cities. Also, cities contained the means for disseminating information — printing presses, television studios and motion picture production facilities. Specifically, the major flow of campaign information originated in Caracas and was directed toward the interior. One stream flowed to the state capitals and another, also emanating from Caracas, went directly to the administrative center of each *Muni-*

24 My own impressions are confirmed independently by JOHN D. MARTZ in "Party Activism and Political Campaigning in Venezuela", (Paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association Convention, New York City, September 2, 1969), p. 27.

cipio.[25] The most common examples of the second were political commercials on national radio and television, and tours by presidential candidates to *municipio* capitals in the interior. The movement of electoral propaganda from state capitals to *municipio* or district capitals constituted a third campaign information flow. When the state capital was a major city, as with Maracaibo, Barquisimeto or Cumaná, it sometimes autonomously generated campaign information. The smaller state capitals, like San Carlos (Cojedes) and San Felipe (Yaracuy), in contrast, were largely information transmission centers.

The final important flow of campaign information moved from the *municipio* capitals to smaller marketing towns and peasant settlements. All major parties aspired to develop and maintain permanent organizations within each *municipio.* Only *Acción Democrática,* prior to the division of 1967, and the Social Christians boasted organizations in most of the 642 *municipios.* Having grass roots politicians disseminate electoral propaganda lent a legitimacy that was lacking when it came directly from state and national leaders. Distrust of the "outsiders" proved especially damaging to *Acción Democrática.* As discussed earlier, many of the party's *municipio* organizations sided with Prieto Figueroa. When partisans of Barrios rebuilt they frequently brought in *Acción Democrática* leaders from other states and *municipios.* Resulting resentment against transplanted organizers, as well as affection for Prieto Figueroa, reduced the effectiveness of *Acción Democrática* propaganda. In many *municipios* where the government party traditionally dominated political communications, therefore, supporters of Prieto Figueroa were the most listened to transmitters of campaign information.

In terms of strategic game categories, campaign information flowed "freely" throughout the 1968 election campaign. Beyond a requirement to cease campaigning 36 hours before the polls opened, no legal restrictions existed on disseminating political information. The year preceding the balloting, consequently, was marked by intensive campaigning. As election day approached the general public seemed bored and exhausted by the unbroken tempo of campaign appeals. Indeed, in the election's aftermath many politicians stated that the campaign had lasted too long. It appeared doubtful, however, that this feeling was strong enough to generate legislation restricting either the length

25 Venezuelan *municipios* resembled townships in the United States. For a more complete discussion of Venezuelan federalism see Public Administration Service, *Relaciones Nacionales, Estadales y Municipios,* (Chicago: n.p., 1959), pp. 32-50.

or intensity of the campaign. Once an administration assumed power, especially given the newness of Venezuelan democracy, the opposition did not feel comfortable with legislation that limited its ability to communicate.

CAMPAIGN ISSUES

Major campaign issues emerged from conflicting perceptions of which societal norms should be given priority, over government and regime perfomance and over the influence exercised by foreigners. Leftists equated justice with equality while the more conservative stressed the need to reward differing abilities. The latter believed *Acción Democrática* already had implemented so many egalitarian reforms that mediocrity was becoming an accepted standard. The former charged that *Acción Democrática* reforms were cosmetic, and that a drastic leveling was necessary before there would be social justice in Venezuela. Table 10 profiles the "unacceptable" gap that leftists were determined to narrow. Leftists also equated foreign presence with foreign domination, and called for nationalization or strict regulation of multinational corporations.

TABLE 10

DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILIY INCOME IN VENEZUELA - 1962

(1 U.S. DOLLAR = 4.5 BOLIVARES)

Monthly Family Income (Bolívares)	Percent Of Total Families
less than 300	21,2
300-499	17.1
500-999	29.4
1000-1499	12.5
1500-3000	10.1
more than 3000	3.7

Source: Primera Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos Familiares de CORDIPLAN — 1962, reproduced in Carlos Acedo Mendoza, *La Vivienda En el Area Metropolitana de Caracas* (Caracas: Ediciones del Cuatricentenario, 1967), pp. 31-32.

A. ISSUES OF IDEOLOGY:

Issues of ideology were cast in the Marxist framework of struggle between capitalism and socialism. Proponents of socialism called for increased regulation of the private sector. Defenders of free enterprise claimed that regulation retarded economic development. Businessmen also decried the government's tendency to look on state corporations as the institutions most suitable for industrializing. Intertwined with the capitalism-socialism issue was the future of Venezuelan subsidiaries of the international petroleum corporations.[26] Because of this question's importance to national economic development, and because of the delicate negotiations that would be involved, major presidential contenders hesitated to move publicly beyond the vague but popular call for greater control over non-renewable natural resources.

The capitalism-socialism issue crystallized in rhetoric about the future of domestic industries and corporations. Among the major presidential candidates three positions emerged. The first, taken by Barrios and Burelli Rivas, implied that only marginal adjustments were desirable.[27] A second position stressed the necessity of reducing the power and influence of private enterprise. Prieto Figueroa was its major proponent,[28] and some of his more radical supporters advocated nationalization of all basic industry. The third position, that of the Social Christians,[29] lay between the other two. Caldera portrayed his party as interested in expanding government services, but without threatening "enlightened" free enterprise. This position, however, was least clear of the three.

The prevailing balance between Venezuela's public and private sectors reflected the priorities and ideology of *Acción Democrática.*

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26 Many concessions under which foreign petroleum corporations operated expire in 1984. Faced with an uncertain future, the corporations began operating to insure maximum profits prior to the concession's expiration. Venezuelans of all ideological persuasions, consequently, felt that unless the range conditions for exploiting petroleum were quickly delineated the corporations would allow production facilities to deteriorate and output to fall. This spelled economic disaster for Venezuela and was unacceptable.

27 *Acción Democrática's* position is set forth at length in the campaign tract, *El Empresario y El Político en el Desarrollo del País.* The Victory Front position appears as "Política Económica" in Burelli Rivas' *Programa de Gobierno.*

28 The People's Electoral Movement's policies are outlined in the section entitled "Política Para El Cambio Económico" of their widely distributed *Programa de Gobierno.*

29 See Rafael Caldera's *Programa de Gobierno* especially the section entitled "El Orden Económico".

During the administrations of Rómulo Betancourt and Raúl Leoni government developed new programs in the areas of health, education and welfare.[30] Additionally, *Acción Democrática* created a domestic steel industry and completed a massive hydro-electric project in the Orinoco Basion.[31] The private sector also expanded. *Acción Democrática's* doctrinaire socialism gave way to cooperation between government and business. Even the private electric industry's most powerful company reached a *modus vivendi* with the Leoni administration.[32] In summary, the mix between the private and public sectors proved more favorable to the former than most entrepreneurs had dared to hope in 1959, when Betancourt's election returned *Acción Democrática* to power.

Burelli Rivas shared the government party's commitment to economic development, but advocated a more central role for private enterprise. However, he stressed that he would not reverse the social legislation of the previous decade. To have done otherwise would have shattered Burelli Rivas' fragile coalition by alienating the Democratic Republican Union and the Popular Democratic Force. These parties appealed primarily to "have nots", and their leaders described alliance with the National Democratic Front as an arrangement with the "progressive bourgeoisie". Coalition supposedly would accelerate the transformation to socialism. However, cynical observers sneered that the Democratic Republican Union and the Popular Democratic Force backed Burelli Rivas only to obtain the financing necessary for survival. Regardless, Burelli Rivas needed every vote that his supporters claimed to command if he was to have any chance of winning. In striving to take positions acceptable to both Marxist and bourgeoisie supporters, however, he sometimes issued pronouncements that satisfied neither.

Dissatisfaction with Gonzalo Barrios' willingness to reserve a large sector of the economy for private enterprise played a significant part in dividing *Acción Democrática* during 1967. However, the People's Electoral Movement and its allies remained vague concerning which entrepreneural activities would be restricted or transferred to the public

30 For a detailed discussion of these policies, see ROBERT J. ALEXANDER, *The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution*, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1964).

31 Corporación Venezolana de Guayana, *Guayana — Cornerstone of the Development of Venezuela*, (Caracas: n.d.).

32 See Chapter II, "La Electricidad de Caracas", in the author's *The Political Process of Urban Development: Caracas Under Acción Democrática*, (UCLA: Unpublished dissertation, 1969).

sector. This strategy of calculated imprecision reflected an uneasiness over whether the "rules of the game" applied to the far left. Prieto Figueroa believed it unwise to specify in advance how the private sector should be transformed. He feared the adversely affected would seek to involve the Army in an intrigue to bar him from exercising influence and power.

The Social Christians positioned themselves between the *Acción Democrática status quo* and Prieto Figueroa's projected leftward plunge. Caldera promised additional government programs, but also praised free enterprise.[33] The intended balance between the public and private sectors was discussed only in generalities. Privately, Social Christian technicians maintained Caldera's intent to "repackage" existing government programs in hopes that they could be made to operate more efficiently.

B. Issues of Efficiency:

Issues of efficiency focused on perfomance by the political elite. Two efficiency issues emerged; the first being the Leoni administration's programs for economic modernization and development. The second centered on crime in the streets and the government's alleged inability to protect law-abiding citizens from criminals. While all opposition parties hoped to turn the first issue of efficiency against *Acción Democrática,* only the Social Christians made extensive use of the second.

1968 marked the tenth consecutive year of *Acción Democrática* domination over the national executive. The party returned to power promising agrarian reform, industrial development, social change and democracy, and claimed to have delivered. Special pride was taken in programs of land redistribution and agricultural diversification.[34] Large land owners were less enthusiastic, claiming that government was subsidizing inefficient production. They argued that greater advances would have resulted had assistance been given to large and medium sized farmers. Prieto Figueroa's more radical supporters, on the other hand, attacked Betancourt and Leoni's land reforms as inadequate and half-hearted. The radicals emphasized that many large estates remained and claimed that most of the redistributed land was underdeveloped and marginal.

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33 Cf. the discussion by Pedro Tinoco, an industrialist supporting Caldera, "El Cambio Triunfa", in *El Universal,* (November 27, 1968) and Guillermo Morón's "El Programa de Copei" in *El Nacional* (September 27, 1968).

34 For a scholarly analysis of this program, see "Agrarian Reform, 1958-1968", John D. Powell, *The Political Mobilization of the Venezuelan Peasant,* (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 100-114.

They considered agrarian reform a hoax.[35] Also, both conservatives and radicals charged the government with having transformed the Ministry of Agriculture and the National Institute of Agrarian Reform into recruiting agencies for *Acción Democrática.* Neither, however, denied that Venezuela had become less dependent on imported food. On balance agricultural development, as an issue of efficiency, appeared to favor the government party.

Presidents Betancourt and Leoni also stressed industrialization.[36] Both attacked General Pérez Jiménez's spending of petroleum revenue on consumption goods. Contrastingly, *Acción Democrática* claimed to have invested in a variety of industries. Steel and electricity already have been mentioned. The Leoni administration also pushed development of aluminum proccessing and expansion of petro-chemical production. Finally, a large industrial park in the city of Valencia had attracted a variety of foreign and domestic factories. *Acción Democrática* presented these achievements as evidence of imaginative, nationalistic and successful industrialization.

Opponents attached the government party's alleged industrial successes. Burelli Rivas charged that in spite of good intentions *Acción Democrática* had saddled the government with inefficient industries producing inferior goods. Such industries, he claimed, could be maintained only by indefinitely continuing high tariffs. Burelli Rivas implied that a more viable and efficient industrialization would have been possible had the government coorperated with the private sector and allowed its entrepreneurs a greater role in managing new industries. Burelli Rivas had promised such cooperation.[37] Social Christian criticisms of *Acción Democrática's* industrialization paralleled those of Burelli Rivas. In addition, Caldera's advisors claimed that Leoni and Betancourt played regional politics in locating new industries. They charged the government party with discriminating against the Andes and favoring the *East,* especially the state of Guayana.[38] Caldera promised a more equitable distribution of government investment among states and

35 Cf. *Ibid.* 112-114 and FREDDIE MELO "El Frente Progresista" in *Documentos Políticos,* II, 13 (Caracas: August, 1968), pp. 4-7. Melo refers to "Betancourt's inheritance" as the "major obstacle" in analyzing why the Communist Party had experienced so much difficulty in Venezuela.

36 For example, see "El Presidente Leoni Inauguró la Gigantesco Represa de Guri", *A.D.* (Caracas: *Acción Democrática,* November 14, 1968) pp. 18-19.

37 Interview given to the author on November 15, 1968.

38 Speech by Rafael Caldera at La Cuñada, Zulia, November 8, 1968.

regions. However, he skirted the problem of whether this could be accomplished with out adversely affecting the East. The Social Christians needed to improve their showing in the East and could not afford to advocate reducing public investment in the region.

Prieto Figueroa and the far left attacked *Acción Democrática's* industrialization policies along predictable lines. They charged the government with opening Venezuela to exploitation by foreign corporations and allowing domestic industry to come increasingly under international control. Prieto promised to end foreign domination in industry. He also indicated that long-range industrial growth and efficiency necessitated "Venezuelanization" of the means of production.

The alleged breakdown of law and order placed *Acción Democrática* on the defensive. Making maximum use of this issue, Social Christian television commercials portrayed Rafael Caldera as the man who would "get tough" with criminals. This theme resembled the one successfully used by Richard Nixon during the 1968 campaign in the United States. Burelli Rivas occasionally referred to the rising crime rate, but was not inclined to use it as a primary avenue for attacking *Acción Democrática.* Finally, Prieto Figueroa considered crime a phony issue which diverted attention from the more pressing problems of social inequality. Even had he been inclined, however, Prieto Figueroa would have found it awkward to press the law and order issue. For most of the preceding decade he had been an important leader in the party whose law enforcement policies he would have been required to attack.

C. Issues of Stability:

Two issues of stability predominated. The first involved government policies in pursuit of the guerrillas. *Acción Democrática* critics chaged that the hard line of Presidents Betancourt and Leoni against all who used or threatened violence had pushed an unnecessarily large segment of the left into open rebellion. They argued that this created instability and retarded the consolidation of democracy. The second stability issue concerned whether any presidential candidate commanded enough support and possessed the experience necessary to govern effectively. The latter issue, contrary to expectations, did not work to the advantage of the government party. Had *Acción Democrática* remained united it would have been otherwise. However, following the clash between Barrios and Prieto Figueroa the government party appeared to be in greater disarray than several of its rivals.

Acción Democrática boasted that its anti-guerrilla effort had succeeded, for only inconsequential bands of insurgents remained.[39] However, the Social Christians charged that the government had manipulated its counter-insurgency campaign to intimidate competitors who challenged *Acción Democrática* infrastructure among the peasants. Caldera also hinted that Betancourt and Leoni acted unnecessarily harshly in pursuing and punishing the insurgents. The guerrillas, he argued, gained sympathy and maintained themselves longer than otherwise would have been possible. Nevertheless, the Social Christians stopped short of an all out attack. They had been part of the Betancourt coalition and shared resposibility for its most important decisions. A major plank in Caldera's campaign, however, was amnesty for the remaining guerrillas.[40]

Prieto Figueroa's position on the anti-guerrilla campaign paralleled that of Caldera. At each major rally Prieto Figueroa called for humane treatment of the insurgents and their reincorporation into national political life.[41] Even more than Caldera, however, Prieto Figueroa, a former leader in the government, balked at attacking its behavior toward the guirrillas. In contrast, Burelli Rivas was not identified with the counter-insurgency campaign. His diplomatic career kept him out of the country during much of the 1960's. Consequently, he was portrayed as the candidate best equipped to bring about reconciliation between government and the remaining guerrillas.

A second stability issue centered on which interests the presidential candidates represented, and whether these formed a coalition sufficiently cohesive to withstand the strains of government. It placed Burelli Rivas and Prieto Figueroa on the defensive. The former as indicated earlier, derived support from an heterogeneous union held together by the belief that only in alliance could each member retain the larger part of its dwindling clientele. Many doubted that Victory Front allies could agree on policies if they elected a president. Uncertainty that Burelli Rivas would be able to govern, therefore, adversely affected the Victory Front.

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39 The most important of these groups was led by Douglas Bravo. Cf. the discussion on RICHARD GOTT, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1972), pp. 214-230.

40 Interview with Luis Beltrán Prieto Figueroa in Barquisimeto, November 21, 1968.

41 For example, see the press coverage of Prieto's campaign rallies in *El Nacional*, November 13, 17, 20 and 25, 1968. Cf. the account of Prieto's final meeting in Maracaibo, *Panorama*, November 26, 1968.

Prieto Figueroa strength was greatest among peasants and the urban poor. His supporters, who also included some Communist Party leaders, urged their candidate to promise a far reaching redistribution of wealth and income. *Acción Democrática* promised a similar redistribution in the election campaign of 1947. Although that campaign ended with an *Acción Democrática* victory, the military permitted the party less than eleven months of power. Redistributive politics, while more acceptable in 1968, if pushed too far might again jeopardize democracy. This possibility seldom was discussed openly. Public mention would have alienated the Army, apparently comfortable in its role as defender of the 1961 constitution. Also, recognition of the unacceptability of many Prieto Figueroa policies to the political-economic elite would have lent credibility to arguments that Venezuelan democracy was a sham and never could produce meaningful change. This "unacceptability", however, caused great anxiety. Among supporters of the constitution of 1961, even the reform oriented, it reduced Prieto Figueroa's appeal.

Ability to govern as an issue favored the Social Christians, but not so much as might have been expected. The party acquired executive experience in the Betancourt administration and boasted a trained cadre of young professionals. A Social Christian administration was expected neither to undo reforms of the past decade nor to undermine the elite. However, *status quo* policies of this ilk ran a danger of alienating important elements within the party. It was easy to envision Social Christian leftists imitating *Acción Democrática* dissidents of 1960 and splitting with Caldera because of an alleged unwillingness to undertake "meaningful" reforms.[42] While Caldera appeared better able to govern than Prieto Figueroa or Burelli Rivas, therefore, the issue of stability also focused attention on potentially crippling schisms within his party.

D. Issues of Personality:

Presidential politics stress personality. Latin American culture attachs supreme importance to a man's spiritual essence. Having *"duende"* or spirit is a more valued quality for leadership than training

42 A small group of radical Social Christian youth already had broken with the party and formed the *Izquierda Cristiana* (Christian Left) movement. Nevertheless, as indicated earlier, most Social Christian youth remained loyal to Caldera.

or administrative ability.[43] Also, simultaneously holding contests for president, congressmen and lesser legislators magnifies the impact of Venezuelan presidential candidates. Conventional wisdom assumes that since the presidential race overshadows lesser contests it influences choices in the latter. Voting in 1947, 1958, and 1963, confirmed this assumption.[44] In none of the above did a significant portion of the electorate choose the presidential candidate of one party and the legislative slate of another. Consequently, party propaganda in 1968 centered on presidential nominees. Each was portrayed as charismatic, strong and competent.

The image *Acción Democrática* projected of Gonzalo Barrios departed sharply from previous propaganda. Betancourt and Leoni's campaigns stressed party affiliation. Strategists portrayed them as tough but compassionate political warriors who would lead the struggle for a just and egalitarian society. Appeals were almost exclusively to the party's rank and file, long Venezuela's largest bloc of voters. Following Prieto's expulsion, however, Barrios strategists believed victory was possible only if they attracted voters previously indifferent or hostile to *Acción Democrática.* Consequently, Barrios was painted as an experienced statesman-politician. His boyhood in the Plains allegedly enabled him to understand peasants and problems of the interior's small towns.[45] His Spanish education and government experience added versatility and a touch of the cosmopolitan. Gonzalo Barrios, therefore, could be expected to govern for the good of all groups rather than on behalf of the narrow interests historically associated with *Acción Democrática.* His often-used campaign slogan, "Gonzalo — a great president," implied political statesmanship of this ilk.

The statesman image of Barrios came under attack from several directions. Prieto Figueroa, and to a lesser extent Caldera and Burelli Rivas, asked how Barrios could be considered a unifier after having divided his own party. This placed Barrios on the defensive. An impression lingered that he had refused to accept the openly arrived at verdict of his party's rank and file when he challenged Prieto Figueroa's victory in the primary of August, 1967. Also, Barrios' capacity to be

43 Cf. the discussion of "Valued Personality Type" in TOMÁS ROBERTO FILLOL, *Social Factors in Economic Development* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1961), pp. 14-21. The use of the term *duende* in Venezuela is analagous to what Fillol calls "Being".

44 Cf. the large card and small card voting returns in Appendix B.

45 Barrios came from the "Plains" state of Portuguesa. For a more complete biography, see Appendix A.

a "great president" was depreciated by subtle references to his marital status. Barrios remained single, and Venezuelan culture looks with suspicion on unmarried men of middle age. The bachelor is seen as lacking the *"duende"* that would enable him to become "great". *Acción Democrática* considered the marital issue potentially serious and planted rumors that after the election Barrios and his "girl friend" would be married. Finally, opponents charged that Barrios was a lacky of former President Betancourt. In a society placing great value on individualism and independence, of course, appearing as a spiritless marionette is political suicide. Accordingly, evidence was circulated that Betancourt planned Prieto's expulsion from *Acción Democrática* and would use a Barrios administration to prepare for his own return to power.[46] In summary, opponents attacked Gonzalo Barrios as partisan, divisive, unfair and effete.

The Social Christians, like *Acción Democrática,* courted undecided middle class voters. Not surprisingly, the personality projected by Caldera strategists resembled the one *Acción Democrática* presented of Gonzalo Barrios. Caldera emerged as a statesman-president who would replace the partisanship of *Acción Democrática* with an administration governing on behalf of all groups and classes. Only Caldera allegedly possessed the qualities needed to bring social and political change while stimulating economic growth. The theme of change directed by a capable statesman underlay the most important Social Christian campaign slogans: "The Change Goes" and "Confidence with Caldera". Change appealed to the supposed majority who were dissatisfied and tired of *Acción Democrática.* However, the social alternative would not be directed by an unknown quantity, like Burelli Rivas, or a potentially disruptive one, such as Prieto Figueroa. With Caldera the voter could have both stability and something new. Gonzalo Barrios considered Caldera his most dangerous opponent. Nevertheless, the *Acción Democrática* candidate muted personal attacks against his Social Christian counterpart. Caldera, an ally during the Betancourt administration, retained many friendships with government party leaders. *Acción Democrática,* however, stressed that the Social Christians represented reaction and elitism.

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46 For example, the People's Electoral Movement circulated a letter Rómulo Betancourt allegedly wrote to his supporters in *Acción Democrática* on July 15, 1967, In it he instructed them to seek the expulsion of Prieto and Paz Galarraga.

The Victory Front attacked the Social Christians more directly, portraying them as fascists and comparing Caldera to Adolph Hitler. A Social Christian victory would be the first step in transforming Venezuela into a tropical Nazi Germany. In addition, Victory Front strategists painted the Social Christians as pro-clerical, remote, calculating and pawns of the traditional elite. With this portrayal they hoped to estrange the middle class from Caldera. The presumed beneficiary of estrangement was Burelli Rivas.

The People's Electoral Movement presented Prieto Figueroa as a populist, choosing the slogan, "Prieto *is* the People." In addition, the People's Electoral Movement adopted the ear as its symbol. Opposition cartoonists initially drew Prieto Figueroa's ears to accentuate his allegedly ugly appearance. However, supporters discovered that what middle class cartoonists perceived as physically unattractive might solidify their candidate's identification with the masses. The ear became a symbol that Prieto Figueroa listened to the "people", and implied that he was the candidate who would best respond to their demands. Prieto Figueroa's popularity early in the campaign created the impression that he would assemble a majority coalition of peasants and the urban poor. However, as Barrios' supporters brought superior resources into play they began convincing the peasants that Prieto Figueroa had betrayed them. As painted in Barrios propaganda Prieto Figueroa had divided *Acción Democrática* and created an opportunity for the traditional elite to recapture power. Movement toward Barrios became evident in the countryside. Without overwhelming peasant support, at least outside of the Andes, Prieto was in serious trouble. His identification with redistributive policies precluded support from the growing middle class. In addition, he faced a powerful challenge in the slums. Wolfgang Larrazábal, long a hero to the urban poor, campaigned intensively for Burelli Rivas and divided "have not" voters in the cities.

Publicists for Burelli Rivas presented him as a new face who would "get the country moving again", in the manner of John F. Kennedy's campaign of 1960 in the United States. Burelli Rivas' lovely wife, María, received considerable publicity and campaigned extensively. Voters were asked to cast their ballots for the "presidential couple". In addition, campaign propaganda projected Burelli as a statesman, a visionary, and above all, a unifier. The latter theme received emphasis in the slogan, "A man of peace — he never had anything to do with the violence".

Initially dismissed by Barrios, Caldera and Prieto Figueroa, Burelli Rivas became well known and increasingly popular. Stinging personal attacks marked the attainment of major contender status. Most damaging was the accusation that Burelli Rivas was a powerless mouthpiece for Uslar Pietri, Villalba and Dáger, each an important leader in the Victory Front's component parties. Also, the Social Christians portrayed Burelli Rivas as a spoiler, arguing that voting for him reduced the anti-*Acción Democrática* majority's chances of capturing the presidency. Caldera, not Burelli Rivas, was the only viable alternative to the government party. Nevertheless, as election day approached Burelli Rivas' personality appeared as an increasingly positive asset.[47]

STRATEGIES AND TACTICS

Each major presidential contender, at some phase of the campaign believed that he could be elected. Consequently, strategists for Caldera, Barrios, Burelli Rivas and Prieto Figueroa were relatively unconcerned with long-range goals, such as voter education and ideological conversion. They focused instead on attracting a winning coalition.

Division in 1967 made it unrealistic for Barrios to anticipate unanimous backing from *Acción Democrática's* historic majority. Caldera, in contrast, entered the campaign leading a united Social Christian Party. Therefore, for the first time, an *Acción Democrática* victory depended on attracting slum dwellers and middle-class interests previously opposed to the party. Prieto Figueroa also looked toward strategies of reinforcement and attraction. Reinforcement nurtured his image as the legitimate heir of *Acción Democrática* and fiery socialist rhetoric appealed to the left. Victory Front leaders hoped that a reinforcement strategy alone would hold voters who in 1963 backed the Democratic Republican Union, the Popular Democratic Force and the National Democratic Front. The Social Christians, however, also courted Victory Front clientele. Consequently, the Front directed a paralysis strategy against the Social Christians.

A. The Social Christians:

Despite earlier defeats Rafael Caldera remained popular among Social Christians. Appealing to historic supporters once the *Astronautas*

47 For example, Burelli Rivas' interview on the "Renny Show" was deemed so effective that Victory Front strategists purchased television time to have it rerun on the last nights of the campaign.

were placated proved relatively easy. Two tactics were chosen to implement reinforcement. First, the party offered positive inducements to maintain the enthusiasm of militants by sponsoring political activities. Discussion groups were organized and provided a forum in which the leaders and rank and file could exchange ideas. In addition, the operational party organization offered positions of responsibility for those who wished actively to become involved. Involvement assisted in binding more closely the rank and file to party leaders.

The second implementation tactic, a variation of "association with legitimating symbols," depended upon the tacit support of Venezuela's ecclesiastical hierarchy. The church, while exercising important political influence, did so with great care in the predominately anti-clerical cities. Throughout the Andes, where the church remained largely unchallenged, the ecclesiastical hierarchy openly supported the Social Christians. Indeed, when *Acción Democrática* first captured the presidency in 1947, with a national majority of more than 70%, the church was the principal architect of Social Christian victory in the Andean states of Táchira and Mérida.[48] Clerical influence oriented a wide range of traditional interests throughout the nation toward the Social Christian Party. Officially, however, the church refrained from endorsing any presidential candidate in 1968[49]

Attraction, the second Social Christian strategy, focused primarily on the urban lower and middle classes. Overwhelming peasant support for *Acción Democrática* cancelled out urban preferences in the past.[50] However, in 1968 peasants were divided between Barrios and Prieto Figueroa. Also, peasants constituted a smaller proportion of the total population. Cities, in contrast, were growing rapidly.[51] Social Christian leaders, like their counterparts in *Acción Democrática* and the People's Electoral Movement, doubted that the presidential candidates who carried the urban areas in 1963 — Arturo Uslar Pietri and Wolfgang Larrazábal — could repeat their success in 1968. Consequently, the Social Christians anticipated that one key to victory lay in attracting

48 Another element in the Social Christians' Andean strength was the opposition of regional leaders to Acción Democrática, the party that ended Andean rule over Venezuela. See DOMINGO ALBERTO RANGEL, *Los Andinos en el Poder* (Caracas: n.p., 1966).

49 See footnote 69.

50 Cf. the discussion in MARTZ, *The Venezuelan Elections of December 1 1963*, Part I, pp. 34-46.

51 Alberto Morales Tucker, "The Urban Development of Venezuela:: The Case of Caracas", in PHILIP B. TAYLOR, JR., ed., *Venezuela: 1969*, (Houston, Texas: Office of International Affairs, University of Houston, 1971), pp. 146-168.

many of the 745,000 voters who previously cast their ballots for Uslar Pietri and Larrazábal. The attraction strategy also targeted diverse social, economic and regional interests. Social Christian planners hoped these "tailored approaches" might attract voters whom earlier strategies had overlooked or on whom they proved ineffective.

Positive inducement tactics operationalized the Social Christian attraction strategy. Relations with the minuscule Liberal Party illustrate the offering of one kind of inducement. The Liberal Party appealed to middle class professionals whose support was considered essential for a Caldera victory. In return for not running their own list of candidates, Liberal leaders received places on the Social Christian legislative lists. Miguel Capriles and his allies, as indicated earlier, received similar rewards after committing their publishing chain to Caldera's election. In addition, the Social Christians offered less tangible inducements in special appeals to women, youth, professionals naturalized Venezuelans, artists, inhabitants of Caracas, Zulia and other regions. These groups received a psychological satisfaction — having their interests singled out as important. Also, in a general way the Social Christians promised that a Caldera administration would attend to each groups needs more effectively than its *Acción Democrática* predecessor. The emphasis given to women, youth and professionals, requires further discussion.

Women, possibly because of strong clerical influence, disproportionately favored the Social Christian Party.[52] Social Christian tacticians made adding to their feminine support a matter of highest priority. More than two years before the elections they inaugurated meetings called "Coffee with Caldera". In these "coffees" the presidential nominee discussed political problems with women and appealed for their backing. Caldera stressed sanctity of the home, the need for better police protection and the importance of women taking a more active role in national life. The Social Christians also gestured toward the feminine vote with massive meetings and parades exclusively for women. Near the end of the campaign, however feminine leaders in the National Democratic Front placed their Social Christian counterparts on the defensive. The former criticized Caldera and his lieutenants for failing to place more women on the party's legislative lists.

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52 Empirical studies comparing the voting of men and women in Venezuela are not available. Politicians agree, however, that more women than men support the Social Christians. In future studies of Venezuela sex should be treated as an explanatory variable.

The Social Christians also attached great importance to attracting those who would vote for the first time in 1968. In contrast to *Acción Democrática* the Social Christians retained a vigorous youth movement.[53] As indicated earlier, friction existed between spokesman for the Social Christian youth and other party leaders. The former advocated communal control over the means of production even though entrepreneurs financed much of their election campaign. However, all Social Christians were passionately committed to removing *Acción Democrática* from power. The pending elections offered an excellent opportunity to place new leadership in the national executive. With presidential power the country could be moved in different directions. Party leftists gambled they could influence a Caldera administration, and closed ranks for the election. United, the Social Christians anticipated increased youth support. Finally, professionals received special attention. Party professionals invited their independent colleagues to participate in drawing up the Social Christian program for governing between 1969 and 1974. Efforts to involve independent professionals in political planning were seen as opportunities to gain converts. Professionals constituted the most prestigious and influential segment of the urban middle class, a special target group.

The Social Christians employed negative symbolic projection in association with attraction strategy. Peasants and inhabitants of the small towns, excluding the Andes, traditionally supported *Acción Democrática* or the Democratic Republican Union. In the calculations of Social Christians strategists the recent behavior of leaders in both parties fanned discontent within the rank and file. Consequently, the Zone Organization Committees trained party militants throughout the countryside to turn the "unresponsiveness" issue to their advantage.

In the cities the National Democratic Front and The Popular Democratic Force became the principal target of Social Christian "negative symbolic projection". The former two parties' strength in the populous Core Region made Burelli Rivas an important rival to Caldera among the middle class and in the slums. The Social Chris-

53 The Social Christian Party Youth Movement is called the *Juventud Revolucionaria Copeyana.* It had significant support among all classes and was the second strongest political force in the Venezuelan universities. No other major political party possessed a youth movement approaching the strength of the *Juventud Revolucionaria Copeyana.*

tians labeled the Victory Front a "parasitic union"[54] and sneered at its chances of capturing the presidency. Caldera's lieutenants hoped that raising doubts about the Front's electoral potential would convince independents that their party was the only realistic alternative to *Acción Democrática.* Also, the Social Christians implemented an attraction strategy using the tactic of "disassociation with illegitimating symbols". Middle class professionals favorable to Caldera organized as the Movement of Democratic Independents and offered a separate legislative state. Caldera became the new party's presidential candidate. The Movement of Democratic Independents gave independents opposed to the Social Christian Party, but inclining toward Caldera, an opportunity to vote for the latter vithout supporting the former. Movements of this ilk, as will be discussed subsequently, also appeared in the campaigns of Barrios, Burelli Rivas and Prieto Figueroa.

B. ACCIÓN DEMOCRÁTICA:

Acción Democrática emphasized strategies of reinforcement and attraction. Given Prieto Figueroa's candidacy, party strategists anticipated that at most they could convince 70% of their former supporters to vote for Barrios. Should less than 55% rally behind Barrios they saw no chance of retaining the presidency. If more than 55% remained loyal, the outcome would turn on the success of their attraction strategy.

Negative symbolic projection emerged as the government party's first tactic of reinforcement. It portrayed Prieto Figueroa as a traitor to *Acción Democrática* whose personal ambition jeopardized the accomplishments of Betancourt and Leoni. A public opinion survey commissioned by *Acción Democrática,* the results of which became available in June, 1968, suggested this tactic.[55] The survey indicated that Prieto Figueroa was ahead of all other candidates, that Caldera placed second, and that Barrios ran a distant third.[56] It also revealed that

54 This tactic can be observed in the writing which appeared in *Ultimas Noticias* during November 1968. Also, see the discussion of Burelli Rivas' campaign in *Elite,* November 233, 1968, p. 57.

55 The leaders of *Acción Democrática* have made public neither the detailed results of this poll nor the methodology used in securing it. The poll was taken by an independent marketing agency and its impact on Gonzalo Barrios and his supporters was substantial.

56 This poll was done during early April, 1968, before the emergence of Miguel Angel Burelli Rivas as a major contender for the presidency.

many who planned to vote for Prieto Figueroa believed he was the presidential nominee of *Acción Democrática.* Finally, the poll found that among its historic clientele loyalty to *Acción Democrática* appeared stronger than to either Prieto or Barrios. For Barrios partisans these findings revealed a need to transform Prieto Figueroa's image into that of party destroyer.

Acción Democrática also implemented reinforcement by associating Barrios with party tradition and symbols. This meshed with portraying Prieto Figueroa as a traitor. Barrios' linkage to *Acción Democrática* reached a high point during the final month of campaigning, when Rómulo Betancourt returned from Switzerland and appeared with Barrios. Prieto Figueroa's advisors privately estimated that the former president's return cost them 100,000 votes.[57] Finally, a variation of the positive inducement tactic was used by President Raúl Leoni and his Minister of Public Works, Leopoldo Sucre Figarella. From April through November, 1968, Leoni and Sucre Figarella toured the countryside and inaugurated public works. The new public works were presented as evidence that *Acción Democrática* was keeping its promises to develop the interior.[58] Opponents replied that Leoni had accomplished little except to delay all inaugurations of public works until the campaign. While public works inaugurations generated favorable publicity, therefore, it is uncertain that this influenced voting.

Acción Democrática's second strategy, attraction, raised different problems than reinforcement. Uncommitted voters resided disproportionately in the "core" region and in cities of more than 45,000. Metropolitan Caracas, which contained the largest concentration of uncommitted voters, held one fifth of the national population. As discussed earlier, it overwhelmingly rejected *Acción Democrática* in 1958 and 1963.[59] New tactics were called for if Barrios was to make the strong showing among the uncommitted voters his advisors believe essential.

Acción Democrática appealed to independents first by projecting an image of Barrios distinct from that of the party. Given the anti-*Acción Democrática* history of many independents, this disassociated Ba-

57 Interview with Adelso González Urdaneta, December 10, 1968.
58 Cf. RÓMULO BETANCOURT, *Tres Años de Gobierno Democrático,* I (Caracas: OCI, 1962), p. 22.
59 See footnote 51.

rrios from an illegitimating symbol. Independents, because of past sectarianism, perceived the government party as interested only in parceling out patronage in return for support. They also saw the disastrous struggle between Barrios and Prieto Figueroa as additional evidence that *Acción Democrática* would not work with those it could not control. To counteract this image party strategists emphasized Barrios' cosmopolitan background, his fairness and his ability to interact with a variety of interests. One manifestation of disassociation was the much-used slogan, "With Gonzalo — Five Years of Confidence". Posters with this caption bore a large likeness of Barrios but usually omitted the *Acción Democrática* symbol or party label.

Another example of disassociation was the creation of autonomous professional organizations and splinter parties. They strengthened the impression that support for Barrios extended beyond *Acción Democrática.* Specially established for this purpose were the Popular Alliance of Independents (A.P.I.), the Independent Revolutionary Action (A.I.R.), the Independent Transport Professionals (PRIVO) and the Organization of Revolutionary Independents (O.P.I.R.). In addition, Marcos Falcón Briceño, a former Foreign Minister, presided over a national committee of *Independientes-Pro-Gonzalo.* The splinter parties and the Briceño Committee gave Barrios the least partisan image of any *Acción Democrática* presidential candidate since the party's founding. Also, *Acción Democrática* specifically courted young voters, even promising to establish a special Ministry of Youth. A much used television commercial touted this proposal while stressing Barrios' integrity and political skill. The party's infrastructure carried the same message to peasant youth in the rural areas.

Finally, the Barrios campaign employed negative symbolic projection by associating major opponents with uncertainty. In contrast, Barrios was presented as the candidate of stability and continuity. The slogans, "Five Years of Confidence" and "Better a known evil than an unknown good", played on this theme.[60] *Acción Democrática* strategists believed that independents, particularly professionals, considered themselves relatively well off. Untested leaders might pursue radically egalitarian policies. Consequently, independents were asked to vote for Barrios, a politician about whom they had never been enthusiastic

60 In spanish these slogans read *Cinco años de Confianza* and *Mejor un malo conocido que uno bueno por conocer.* The former was more often used than the latter.

but from whom they knew what to expect. Continuity and confidence were also stressed in appeals to businessmen.

C. The Victory Front

Victory Front members implemented reinforcement by associating Burelli Rivas with symbols they perceived as legitimating — their traditions and party apparatus. Burelli Rivas appeared at mass rallies with representatives of F.D.P., U.R.D. and F.N.D. In the most important *municipios* he was accompanied by either Villalba, Uslar Pietri or Larrazábal, and on occasion by all three. Initially the better-known politicians overshadowed the presidential candidate, who appeared stiff and uncomfortable. After a month of campaiging, however, Burelli Rivas developed an effective style and increasingly became the center of attention at Victory Front rallies. Often he would plunge into crowds, shaking hands and exchanging greetings with enthusiastic onlookers. In addition, María de Burelli Rivas, the candidate's wife, proved a surprising campaigner and added to her husband's appeal.

Burelli Rivas' personal staff believed that many who voted for Uslar Pietri and Larrazabal in 1963, and to a lesser degree, Villalba, were expressing alienation from party politics as practiced by *Acción Democrática* and the Social Christians. The alienated were seen as supporters only if Burelli Rivas did not appear subserviant to established political parties. Consequently, the personal staff launched a publicity campaign that stressed Burelli Rivas' individuality and independence. This theme underlay the slogans, "A new generation to power" and "He never had anything to do with the violence — think it over carefully". Efforts by the personal staff to establish Burelli Rivas' autonomy, however, contradicted the earlier tactic of identifying with the Victory Front's component parties. Both tactics were employed nationally. Their incompatibility created a credibility gap which Burelli Rivas never fully overcame.

The Victory Front also implemented reinforcement with tactics of negative symbolic projection, identifying the Social Christians with an international ideology and its difficulties. "Anonymous" sources distributed literature charging that if elected Caldera would recreate the "disaster" of Chilean Christian Democracy. The scenario would begin by inflating the hopes of the masses to unrealistic levels. Since the Social Christians could never fulfill their promises, resulting frus-

tration would lead to revolution. The way would then be open for the Communists.[61]

A conservative Brazilian archbishop was brought to Caracas to lend credence to these arguments.[62] In an *El Nacional* interview he stated that the ideology of Christian Socialism was contrary to church teaching. This brought a reply from the Venezuelan hierarchy that nothing in the program of the Social Christian Party violated church doctrine.[63] However, the reply revived accusations that the Social Christian Party was a political arm of the church. Until the Brazilian archbishop's interview the Social Christians successfully downplayed any association with the church, even to the point of dropping the formal name Social Christian Party from its campaign literature and using the initials COPEI.

Finally, the Victory Front employed a paralysis strategy against the Social Christians. The former painted the latter as fascists, a charge that never was satisfactorily rebuted. Shortly after the Social Christians presented their lengthy "Program of Government" in August, 1968, Uslar Pietri asserted that Caldera planned to transform Venezuela into a corporate state. Ramón Díaz, a prominent Caracas lawyer, appeared on television and equated the Social Christian "Program of Government" with Mussolini's policies in Italy.[64] Arístides Calvani, one of the Social Christians most distinguished intellectuals, agreed to debate his party's program with Díaz on national television. Unfortunately for the Social Christians, the content of Calvani's defense was overshadowed by his opponent's flamboyant style.[65] Even Social Christians who felt that Calvani argued more logically admitted that the debate had a negative impact for the party.

Following the dabate between Calvani and Díaz opponents redoubled efforts to paint the Social Christians as fascists. Swastikas were drawn on the party's campaign literature, and in retouched photographs Caldera bore a striking resemblance to Hitler. More than anything else the fascism attack caught the Social Christians unprepared.

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61 Under the title *El Programa en Chile,* opponents of the Social Christians distributed printed copies of a lengthy review of the book *Frei, El Kerensky Chileno.* This book review appeared as a supplement to the major newspapers on November 17, 1968.

62 *El Nacional,* November 24, 1968.

63 *El Nacional, Ultimas Naticias , El Universal,* and *La Religión,* November 28, 29, 30, 1968.

64 Arturo Uslar Pietri first openly accused the Social Christians of fascism in an article in *El Nacional,* September 7, 1968. Soon afterwards Ramón Díaz's accusations appeared in *El Nacional* and *La Verdad.*

65 *El Nacional,* September 27, 28, 1968.

Following the elections party strategists privately claimed that it cost them heavily among the urban middle class and was responsible for the rise of Burelli Rivas' popularity during the final months of campaigning.

D. THE PEOPLE'S ELECTORAL MOVEMENT:

The People's Electoral Movement organized its campaign around three strategies — reinforcement, division and attraction. Reinforcement appealed to *Acción Democrática's* historic clientele. While anticipated, this accentuated the already bitter struggle between Barrios and Prieto Figueroa. Each realized that in large measure victory or defeat would be determined by the success of his respective reinforcement strategies. Prieto Figueroa looked to association with the legitimating symbol of this election "victory" to implement reinforcement. Consequently, the People's Electoral Movement stressed that unscrupulous maneuvering defrauded their leader of *Acción Democrática's* presidential nomination. Those allegedly responsible, Barrios, Betancourt and their "henchmen", were portrayed as selfish schemers who refused to relinquish control of the party in spite of the expressed will of the rank and file. In contrast, Prieto Figueroa reflected the "true" aspirations of *Acción Democrática's* grass roots.

The People's Electoral Movement's division strategy focused on the clientele of the Democratic Republican Union and employed the tactic of issue divisiveness. Jóvito Villalba dominated the Democratic Republican Union and his unwillingness to share power had alienated many young and talented leaders. Villalba's decision to support Burelli Rivas was unpopular among the rank and file. Several municiple party organizations rebelled against Villalba's leadership and the national party organization was forced to remove local leaders in the states of Zulia, Bolívar and Sucre.[66] The People's Eelectoral Movement played upon Villalba's alleged unresponsiveness to grass roots sentiment in hopes of splitting off many of Democratic Republican Union backers.

Finally, Prieto Figueroa and his advisors pursued an attraction strategy that focused on urban independents and new voters. Like *Acción Democrática* and the Social Christians, the People's Electoral Movement hoped to capitalize on the disrepute into which parties once favored by urban independents supposedly had fallen. Prieto Figueroa

66 In addition, there were rumblings of discontent in Anzoátegui, Miranda, Nueva Esparta and Carabobo.

aimed his appeal at slum dwellers, previously supporters of the Popular Democratic Force, and at middle class socialists who felt *Acción Democrática* had been unnecessarily hesitant in implementing the transformation to democratic socialism.[67] The People's Electoral Movement also directed appeals toward youth regardless of class background. Party strategists believed that Prieto Figueroa's long experience as a teacher and his commitment to an egalitarian society made him attractive to the 700,000 who would vote for the first time.

Prieto Figueroa's most important tactic for attracting independents and youth was association with the legitimating concepts of integrity and responsiveness to the popular will. A national publicity campaign stressed that his candidacy sprang from the expressed wishes of the people. Coupled with integrity and responsiveness was the assumption that Venezuelans wanted most to increase the rate of social change and economic modernization. Correspondingly, Prieto Figueroa staked out a position on the far left of the democratic spectrum. While Prieto Figueroa promised the most radical administration of any major presidential nominee, the transformation he envisioned was less complete than many Marxists would have liked. Prieto Figueroa tolerated free enterprise when in benefited the collectivity and had no objection to "properly-regulated" foreign investment.[68] The public school system was to be strengthened, but church sponsored and other private schools would not be closed.[69] Prieto Figueroa's appeal, therefore, was to elements that gave high priority to narrowing the gap between rich and poor, but not at the price of destroying private enterprise, clerical education and pluralistic democracy.

Finally, for some the People's Electoral Movement was merely the most sectarian wing of *Acción Democrática,* a party that long denied any political role to independents. Independents perceiving the People's Electoral Movement in this light, but favoring Prieto Figueroa's candidacy, were given the option of voting with the ballots of National Opinion (OPINA). National Opinion, an organization of urban independents founded by Armando Cornelius, adopted

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67 Middle class professionals of this ilk were in a minority. As indicated earlier, most either fared well in the private sector or tied their careers to *Acción Democrática.*

68 Dr. Luis Beltrán Prieto Figueroa's *Programa de Gobierno* appeared in a special supplement of the Caracas newspapers on August 11, 1968. It is a detailed statement of the policy positions of the electoral movement of the people.

69 *Ibid.*

Prieto Figueroa as its presidential candidate on June 5, 1968.[70] National Opinion, therefore, served the same function for the People's Electoral Movement's campaign as did API, AIR, and PRIVO for *Acción Democrática.*

E. MINOR PARTIES:

Among minor parties the campaign strategies of two, the Communists and the National Civic Crusade, merit special attention. The former employed a reinforcement strategy hoping that despite six years in the underground they could recapture support of the 160,000 who voted Communist in 1958.[71] However, on the issue of which major presidential contender the party would support, if any, its leaders could not agree. Caldera and Barrios were not considered. In addition to being defenders of the *status quo* both participated in the Betancourt administration's anti-guerrilla campaign. Communist Party options narrowed to Burelli Rivas and Prieto Figueroa. Each had partisans within the party hierarchy. One faction, led by Pompeyo Márquez, favored Prieto Figueroa, but Eduardo and Gustavo Machado leaned toward Burelli Rivas.[72] Consequently, at the party's September convention militants were urged to vote "progressive". Caldera and Barrios were specifically excluded from the "progressive" category.[73]

National Civic Crusade leaders linked themselves with Pérez Jiménez. Luis Damiani and Edwin Burguera, the former presidents private secretaries, dominated the National Civic Crusade's largely phantom party apparatus. From his exile in Madrid Pérez Jiménez declared that Burguera and Damiani's organization was the only party authorized to represent him.[74] This reduced the appeal of splinter groups claiming to speak for the ousted general, such as the one led by Antonio Reyes Andrade.

Established parties and the major presidential candidates initially considered any association with the National Civic Crusade a

70 *El Nacional,* June 6, 1968.
71 MARTZ, *The Venezuelan Elections of December 1 1963,* III, p. 19.
72 See *La República,* August 1, 1968, for the statement by Radamés Larrazábal, a leader of the Union for Advancement, that there were two trends in the party regarding strategy for the presidential race.
73 See *Ibid.,* September 24, 1968 for an account of the party's convention.
74 As late as September 26, 1968 Antonio Reyes Andrade partitioned the Supreme Court to declare the organization he controlled to be the legitimate National Civic Crusade.

liability. However, on November 28, *La Verdad,* the Caracas daily, announced that the National Civic Crusade was urging Pérez Jiménez's supporters to vote for Burelli Rivas. The following day *Ultimas Noticias,* the keystone of the Capriles chain, titled the front page article "Burelli Rivas is not the presidential candidate of the National Civic Crusade". The implication was clear — that Pérez Jiménez sympathizers should also consider Caldera, the candidate favored by *Ultimas Noticias.* At the last moment the established parties began to suspect what turned out to be the case, that Pérez Jiménez remained a charismatic figure.

In summary, the strategies and tactics of major campaign organizations placed the four presidential contenders in direct competition for the votes of most social, economic, political and regional interests. Only the Social Christians' traditional clientele — Andeans, landowners and the clerically oriented middle and upper classes — appeared firmly behind the political party they historically supported. In contrast, *Acción Democrática's* clientele — Plainsmen, peasants and organized labor — was torn between the conflicting claims of Barrios and Prieto Figueroa. The Social Christians anticipated attracting disillusioned *Acción Democrática* militants. On the other hand, the Victory Front parties almost exclusively appealed to voters who supported them in 1963. Finally, Caldera, Barrios and Prieto Figueroa all competed for youth who would cast their first ballot in 1968.

Intense competition and uneasiness about the loyalties of established party's historic clientele made the 1968 campaign more bitter and divisive than its predecessors. During the 1963 campaign the greatest uncertainties stemmed from attempts by guerrilla terrorists to disrupt the balloting and discredit the government and loyal opposition. This created a common interest among democratic politicians that sometimes bordered on camaraderie. Camaraderie strengthened their resolve to made Venezuelan democracy work. During the 1968 campaign, in contrast, little camaraderie remained.

CONCLUSIONS

The election campaign of 1968 culminated in orderly and scrupulously honest balloting on December 1. For more than a week, however, the outcome remained in doubt. A newly computerized voter tabulation system malfunctioned, and as hand-counted returns were posted the lead shifted from Caldera to Barrios, and back again to Caldera. Tension mounted and streets in the capital fell strangely silent. With confirmation of Caldera's victory, however, *caraqueños* resumed their normal routines. Concluding analysis profiles returns and generalizes in directions that suggest middle range hypotheses about election campaigns.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RETURNS (large cards)

The order in which major contenders finished proved a mild surprise. While Rafael Caldera became the new president his razor thin plurality disappointed supporters and startled Social Christian strategists. *Acción Democrática* came within .8 percent of retaining the presidency despite the division of 1967. Miguel Angel Burelli Rivas did better than anticipated by finishing third, with 22 percent of the vote. On the other hand, Luis Beltrán Prieto Figueroa and the radical left ran a disappointing race. With only 19 percent of the total vote Prieto finished last among the major presidential candidates.

Seen from the perspective of Venezuela's five electoral regions Caldera's victory resulted from a general, nation-wide advance by the Social Christians. The only major region in which the party ran weaker in 1968 than in 1963 was the Andes, and here the Social Christians retained a commanding 49.5 percent of the total regional vote. Spectacular gains occurred in the Western region and support increased in the Plains and the urbanized Core. Only in the East did the Social Christians make a disappointing showing, with Caldera running a weak fourth and receiving less than 15% of the total regional vote.

Acción Democrática continued to dominate the East, but defections to Prieto Figueroa caused Barrios' share of total regional vote to fall considerably below the 50% received in 1963. The Eastern cushion with which the government party historically more than offset Social Christian strength in the Andes shrank. In the Plains *Acción Democrática* continued as the strongest political force, although increased Social Christian strength and a siphoning off of votes to Prieto Figueroa placed Gonzalo Barrios and Rafael Caldera in an extremely close race. Finally, while Barrios' total throughout the populist Core exceeded Raul Leoni's showing in 1963, Social Christian gains were greater.

Acción Democrática lost the presidency because of overwhelming defeat in the Andean and Western regions. In the Andes, Barrios repeated Leoni's weak second place finish of 1963. Disaster in the populist Western states of Zulia and Lara gave Caldera an advantage of 62,000 votes over Barrios. In Falcón and Zulia, the other Western states, the two ran neck and neck. Zulia and Lara were traditional *Acción Democrática* strongholds and the magnitude of Barrios' losses there came as a surprise. Defeats in the Andes and the West, one expected and the other not, were by such margins, therefore, that the government party's reduced Eastern plurality could not counterbalance them.

The Victory Front carried the populist Core for Burelli Rivas, although all four major candidates ran well in the region. Throughout the East, where the Democratic Republican Union anticipated that alliance with the National Democratic Front and Popular Democratic Force would guarantee Victory Front dominance, Burelli Rivas finished a disappointing third. Many supporters of the Democratic Republican Union, historically the region's second party, apparently voted for Prieto Figueroa. The National Democratic Front and the Popular Democratic Force sustained even greater losses in the East, never a region in which they enjoyed great popularity. Burelli Rivas also finished third in the Plains and in the Andes, drawing only thirteen percent of the total regional vote.

The Victory Front's most feeble showing came in the West, where Burelli Rivas finished last among major presidential contenders. Most of Burelli Rivas' Western strength was concentrated in the populous state of Zulia. Here the Democratic Republican Union retained support among workers in the petroleum producing area around Cabimas, and Larrazábal remained a hero to Maracaibo slum dwellers. However,

even in Zulia the Victory Front received fewer votes than anticipated. A major factor in its poor showing was the disappearance of urban middle class support for the National Democratic Front in Maracaibo and in cities along the Eastern shore of Lake Maracaibo.

Luis Beltrán Prieto Figueroa's fourth-place national finish proved the elections greatest surprise. When the colorful educator split from *Acción Democrática* he was considered Venezuela's most charismatic politician. Either early analysis grossly overestimated his appeal or it had eroded dramatically during the intervening year.[1] Prieto Figueroa's best regional showing was throughout the East, where he ran second behind Gonzalo Barrios. In the West, aided by a strong showing from the populous state of Zulia, Prieto Figueroa received 21% of the total regional vote and finished third. Nevertheless, results from Zulia proved disappointing. The state was the cradle of Prieto Figueroa's rebellion against *Acción Democrática,* and most of its Zulian party apparatus deserted to the People's Electoral Movement. Prieto Figueroa had expected to carry Zulia. The People's Electoral Movement finished fourth in the Andes, with only 9.3 percent of the total regional vote. Prieto Figueroa also placed fourth in the Plains and the Core, although in the latter he received 20% of the total vote. This was a disappointment, however, for Prieto Figueroa's advisor had expected to win a plurality in the populous Core cities of Caracas, Valencia and Maracay. Therefore, despite being the most successful division from *Acción Democrática* the People's Electoral Movement proved weaker than supporters anticipated or than opponents dared to hope.

Table 11 profiles each major presidential contender's regional showing.

LEGISLATIVE ELECTION RETURNS (small cards)

For the 1968 election, in contrast to contests in 1958 and 1963, small card returns varied substantially from the large cards.[2] All major parties received fewer small card votes than had been cast for their presidential candidates. The difference in large and small cards proved greatest for Prieto Figueroa and the People's Electoral Movement, 6.4

1 See footnote #55 in Chapter IV.

2 Party voting in the elections of 1958, 1963 and 1968, for both the large and small cards, appears in Appendix B.

percent, and smallest for Gonzalo Barrios and *Acción Democrática,* 2.5 percent. For the Christians and parties of the Victory Front, as can be seen by comparing Tables 11 and 11a, the difference between presidential and legislative support was approximately 5 percent.

TABLE 11

1968 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE BY REGION WITH MAJOR CANDIDATES VOTES AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL REGIONAL VOTE

Region	Total	%	Caldera	%	Barrios	%
Andes	425,876	100.0	210,934	49.5	115,572	27.1
West	915,829	100.0	298,244	32.5	241,661	26.3
Plains	375,146	100.0	113,951	30.4	132,753	35.4
Core	1,330,991	100.0	361,403	27.1	314,700	23.6
East	675,868	100.0	98,408	14.6	246,648	36.5
Venezuela	3.723,710	100.0	1,082,941	29.0	1,050,834	28.2

Region	Burelli	%	Prieto	%
Andes	55,810	13.1	39,483	9.3
West	174,275	19.0	193,162	21.1
Plains	71,771	19.1	49,767	13.3
Core	376,563	28.3	266,170	20.0
East	150,984	22.3	175,837	26.0
Venezuela	829,403	22.2	724,419	19.4

Source: Consejo Supremo Electoral de Venezuela.

TABLE 11a

SMALL CARD VOTES BY REGION WITH IMPORTANT PARTIES' VOTES AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL REGIONAL VOTES

	Total[1]	%[2]	AD	%	COPEI	%	URD	%	FND	%
Andes	419,361	98.4	107,800	25.7	195,444	46.6	20,592	4.9	9,699	2.3
West	899,994	96.6	223,212	24.8	257,488	28.6	77,051	8.6	19,532	2.2
Plains	369,823	97.0	126,013	34.1	102,024	27.6	40,787	11.0	9,972	2.7
Core	1,292,898	95.2	250,110	19.3	242,905	18.8	107,852	8.3	41,371	3.2
East	664,534	97.6	232,624	35.0	85,953	12.9	93,518	14.1	15,453	2.3
Venezuela	3,646,610	96.2	939,759	25.7	883,814	24.2	339,800	9.3	96,027	2.6

	FDP	%	PRIN	%	MEP	%	CCN	%	UPA	%
Andes	5,888	1.4	4,091	1.0	31,491	7.5	33,390	8,0	2,270	1.0
West	45,985	5.1	24,328	2.7	137,397	15.3	61,861	6.9	21,483	2.4
Plains	14,816	4.0	8,312	2.2	38,455	10.4	15,170	4.1	3,460	0.9
Core	100,387	7.8	25,995	2.0	137,314	10.6	265,559	20.5	60,801	4.7
East	27,663	4.2	22,968	3.5	131,252	19.7	24,113	3.6	15,354	2.3
Venezuela	194,739	5.3	85,694	2.3	475,909	13.0	400,093	11.0	103,368	2.8

1. The total absolute figures include all 18 parties in the parties in the small card election.
2. The total percentages include only the nine parties listed in this table, although they are based on the returns for all 18 parties. See footnote to Table 3, Appendix B, for the other nine parties.

Source: Consejo Supremo Electoral de Venezuela.

The regional strengths and weaknesses of *Acción Democrática's* small card vote generally followed the pattern of large card support for Gonzalo Barrios. The difference in Gonzalo Barrios' vote and *Acción Democrática's* small card totals was greatest in the Core, where some independents voted for Barrios while rejecting the government party's legislative candidates. In the East, on the other hand, Barrios received only 1.5 percent more votes than *Acción Democrática's* small card slate. Nationally, minute differences between presidential and legislative support meant that *Acción Democrática,* despite loss of the presidency, outdistanced its nearby rival, the Social Christians, by more than 56,000 votes in the legislative balloting.

The Social Christians received their highest percent of small card ballots in the Andes and their lowest in the East. The greatest variations between support for Caldera and his party's legislative slates occurred in the Core, where almost 9 percent of those favoring the former failed to support the latter. Comparison of Tables 10 and 11 indicates that this disparity apparently resulted from voters casting their small card ballot for the National Civic Crusade and their large card for Rafael Caldera. This is difficult to prove, however, for patterns of split voting were not recorded.

In each major electoral region the combined small card vote for major parties in the Victory Front falls short of Burelli Rivas' presidential total. Disparities are greatest in the Core, where 9% of those supporting Burelli Rivas for president choose not to vote for Victory Front legislative candidates. In the East, contrastingly, only 2% fall into this category. Differences in Burelli Rivas' presidential vote and the small card totals of supporting parties, as was true for Caldera's presidential totals and legislative voting for the Social Christians, seems largely to be the work of partisans of the National Civic Crusade. It is also likely that many Communists voted for Burelli Rivas, the choice of a significant faction within the party.[3]

Disparities between the vote for Prieto Figueroa and balloting for legislative candidates of the People's Electoral Movement stemmed partially from support given by the Revolutionary Party of National Integration. Even adding this support, however, there remained a 4% difference between the legislative and presidential totals received by the People's Electoral Movement. Part of this 4% apparently came from the Communists.[4] However, as indicated earlier, many Communist

3 See footnote #75 in Chapter IV.
4 *Ibid.*

leaders favored Burelli Rivas. Even if the entire Communist legislative vote was added to small card totals for the People's Electoral Movement and The Revolutionary Party of National Integration, the result would not equal Prieto Figueroa's presidential showing. It seems inescapable, therefore, that some who voted with the small card for the Nation Civic Crusade supported Prieto Figueroa.

By polling 11% of the small card vote the National Civic Crusade provided a major surprise. Its support exceeded the vote of each member of the Victory Front and fell only slightly below that of the People's Electoral Movement. Regionally, the National Civic Crusade's appeal varied greatly. It ranged from a high of 20% in the Core to a low of 3.6% in the East. That the party did so well in the highly urban Core confirmed that elements in the cities, especially Caracas, remained highly susceptible to personalistic appeals.

Communist Party leaders were disappointed with the 103,000 small card ballots they received. It was only one-fourth of the support they claimed publicly, and less than 3 percent of the total small card vote. Relatively, the Communists were strongest in the Core and the West and weakest in the Andes and the Plains. This distribution confirmed the historic pattern of Communist support. It also suggested that the party remained electorally insignificant.

THE STRIFE FRAMEWORK: CONCEPTUAL GENERALIZATIONS

The strife framework portrayed Venezuela's 1968 election campaign as a multi-party strategic game involving nine important players, political parties. They included *Acción Democrática,* the Social Christians, the People's Electoral Movement, the National Civic Crusade, the Democratic Republican Union, the Popular Democratic Force, the Revolutionary Party of National Integration, the National Democratic Front and the Communists. Interest of the nine were "mixed". In other words, game players possessed both "overlapping" and "opposing" interests.[5] Interests "overlapped" for each had a stake in maintenance, at least in the short run, of procedures guaranteeing freedom of speech and minority rights. Low level guerrilla activity by opponents

5 Cf. JOHN C. HARSANYI, "Game Theory and the Analysis of Internal Conflict", in JAMES N. ROSENAU, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 376.

of these procedures persisted, but was not considered serious.[6] Contrastingly, "opposing" interests loomed large. Electoral offices captured by one political party were denied to others. "Overlapping" interests, therefore, appeared less immediate and urgent than ones of "opposition".

If the analogy is not pushed too far, election campaigning in Venezuela usefully can be compared to draw poker.[7] In draw poker, as in most games, participants expect to play according to agreed upon rules. If players have cheated in past games or have refused to recognize game outcomes, their subsequent participation will be tolerated only if no satisfactory alternative exists. Once the new game is underway, however, the longer play by the rules continues the greater the expectation that such rules will govern future play. This is analagous to levels of legitimacy consolidation in the strife framework. For example, that balloting in 1958 and 1963 did determine who ruled, in contrast to the aborted 1952 election, strengthened expectations that voting results would be respected in 1968.

Continuing the poker analogy, viewing societal backing with the strike framework resembles analyzing the professional biographies of competing poker players. A player's minimal professional biography would indicate his origins, where he played, with whom and his won-lost record against various opponents. In an election campaign, regional and socio-economic profiles reveal where and with which interests parties have experienced success and failure. Ideology, on the other hand, resembles the poker players style of play. A player's tendency to be reckless, cautious, astute or whatever — unless strategy includes a conscious effort to play contrary to one's inclinations for several hands — soon becomes evident. Similarly, party ideology "comes through" during election campaigning. Ideology affects such decisions as abstention or participation in the election, acceptance or rejection of a proposed electoral coalition and the choice of issues to be stressed during the campaign.

A campaign competitor's size and structuring are comparable to the strength of a poker player's hand and the card combination producing the strength. Financing appears as a currency allowing players to purchase chips with which the game is played. The sequence of cards a player's seeks to assemble on the "draw" can be compared with the

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6 RICHARD GOTT, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1972), pp. 214-220.

7 Draw poker is discussed in RICHARD L. FREY, ed., *According to Hoyle* (Greenwich, Connecticut: Faucett Publications, 1970), p. 15.

selection of campaign strategies. Finally, how a poker player uses his hand in betting against opponents resembles the selection of tactics by campaign competitors.

There also are similarities in judging success and failure between election campaigning and draw poker. Capturing the national executive can be equated with having the highest winnings after an evening's play. "Breaking even" or not suffering financiailly significant losses is roughly analagous to capturing that number of offices needed for a party to "play the game" during the subsequent constitutional period. Three of the nine important competitors — the Communists, the National Democratic Front and the Revolutionary Party of National Integration — failed to win enough offices to qualify as participants in the same game played by the remaining six.[8]

Finally, Venezuelan data suggests specific generalizations and hypotheses. These fall into three categories; interaction between environment and the campaign system, relationships among elements of the campaign system and how campaigning affected electoral outcomes.

ENVIRONMENT AND THE CAMPAIGN SYSTEM

Campaign environment encompasses legitimacy consolidation levels and societal backing. Opponents appeared less capable of challenging the regime in 1968 than in 1963 or 1958. The guerrillas, reduced to a small band in the "West", were more pitied than feared. Rival presidential candidates floated proposals how best to reintegrate them into normal political life. Rightist threats evoked even less concern, although General Pérez Jiménez offered candidates for the first time in more than a decade. Until the National Civic Crusade's demonstration of strength, few took the ousted dictator's supporters seriously. Perceiving themselves without powerful anti-regime challenges, the concern of democratic politicians focused almost exclusively on getting as much as possible out of the multi-party "game". Thus, long time allies in *Acción Democrática* turned on each other, personalistic rivalries further shattered the Democratic Republican Union and inflammatory charges of fascism were hurled at Rafael Caldera, a leader in the underground that overthrew Pérez Jiménez.

8 This was a drastic lowering in status for the National Democratic Front (F.N.D.). The others remained as they had been prior to the election.

Changes in campaign behavior between 1963 and 1968 suggest that cooperation among campaign competitors supporting a democratic regime varies inversely with perceptions of legitimacy consolidation. High levels of cooperation will prevail when legitimacy consolidation levels are low, as in the period of Admiral Larrazábal's provisional *junta*. With rising levels of legitimacy consolidation, however, regime supporting political parties will reduce cooperation and focus on electoral competition. This opens the way for demagogic and inflammatory charges that can discredit established competitors and lead to increased popularity or anti-regime political elites. Anti-regime elites are recognized as playing for victory or vanquishment stakes. Increased support for such parties will be taken as an expression of dissatisfaction with the regime and an indication of falling levels of legitimacy consolidation. Therefore, a corollary to the above hypothesis sees anticipated support for anti-regime competitors as a direct stimulus to cooperation among regime supporting political parties in a democratic milieu.

Chapter 1 suggested lines along which societal backing influenced campaigning. Involved were the structuring of participating units, the selecting of strategies and tactics and the stressing or downplaying of specific campaign issues. In regard to structuring, the Social Christians redesigned their campaign apparatus in 1966, organizing so that new institutions could take maximum advantage of class differences in tailoring appeals. This departed from historic structuring that recreated miniature national organizations in each administrative subdivision throughout the country. Social Christian success argues that the new organizational emphasis will be adopted by *Acción Democrática* and other.

Two kinds of class oriented campaign organizations emerged; those seeking middle class converts and those appealing to the masses. Data from the 1968 campaign indicates that middle class oriented campaign organizations are relatively decentralized and stress policy making prerogatives as rewards for joining. Mass oriented campaign organizations, in contrast, are more centralized. The stressed benefits of membership are acquisition of a patron and promises of preferential treatment.[9]

9 Cf. the discussion by JOHN D. *Powell*, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics", *American Political Science Review*, 64 (June 1970), pp. 411-429.

Two strands of influence appear between societal backing and the choosing of strategies. First, parties historically receiving majority support rely primarily on reinforcement strategies. Reinforcement seeks to reassemble the social, economic and regional alliances that facilitated past victories. However, if a campaign contender not traditionally the majority party is serious about achieving system dominance, stress will be placed on developing an optimum strategy mix. An optimum strategy mix holds one's historic clientele while appealing to others whose interests are considered compatible. Who comprises the historic clientele, of course, determines which interests can be courted without alienating the party faithful. Societal backing also affects decisions concerning entry into an electoral alliance. In a multi-party election campaign regional parties and those drawing support from a restricted socio-economic base will seek alliances with competitors having appeal in other regions or among different groups. This occurred in 1968 when the Popular Democratic Force, supported by urban slum dwellers, the National Democratic Front, a party of the urban middle class, and the Democratic Republican Union, strongest throughout the "East" and in small towns, coalesced in the Victory Front. Internal rivalries and divergent interests in such coalitions incline participants to adopt a "feudal" organization. Each member, consequently, remains relatively free to mount a campaign tailored to it's specialized clientele.

Finally, societal backing influences the presentation of campaign issues. The Social Christians, for example, counted on support from traditional land owners and some of Venezuela's most disadvantaged peasants. Specific programs to redistribute wealth, regardless of content, would have alienated the former. Party strategists, consequently, appealed to their peasant supporters with promises of social justice but discussed the redistribution of wealth and income only in vague generalities. In contrast, *Acción Democrática* programs were presented as inept or counter-productive, and attacked in detail. This confirms that political parties with diverse societal backing mute issues drawing attention to their clientele's incompatible interests. Also, leaders of such parties seek to portray the opposition as so flawed and dangerous that militants will overlook differences and unite against the common enemy.

Widely shared party interests receive emphasis under most circumstances. Prieto Figueroa trumpeted specific promises of income redistribution to his relatively homogeneous "have not" following. However, he vetoed suggestions that he promise the nationalization of

specific private corporations. Prieto Figueroa felt victory was within his reach, and he remembered entrepreneurs pleading with the Army to remove President Gallegos in 1948, following a year of far reaching reform. This reluctance to promise nationalization suggests that politicians perceiveng themselves with a reasonable chance of winning under existing "rules of the game" will avoid emphasizing an issue, regardless of its appeal, that appears likely to push opponents into anti-regime violence.

Another restraint on issue choice associated with societal backing, especially for historic minority parties, concerns whether or not the stressed issue reduces the capability to attract beyond one's hard core clientele. Social Christian strategists, for example, perceived many potential converts as anti-clerical or suspicious of ecclesiastical influence on education and social work. Therefore, despite a highly favorable attitude toward parochial education and Catholic charities the Social Christians were careful not to appear overly supportive of church activities. The Communist Party, with no chance of achieving system dominance and a thinly veiled hostility toward the regime, behaved differently. Party spokesmen called for comprehensive nationalization, secularizing education and radically redistributing wealth and income. Major concern appeared to be sounding a clarion call and regrouping the party faithful for battle with Castroite advocates of guerrilla warfare as the only road to revolution.[10]

RELATIONSHIPS AMONG CAMPAIGN SYSTEM ELEMENTS

The "introduction" defines rules participants, information, issues, strategies and tactics as elements of the campaign system. Prior analysis indicated issue choice was related to the societal backing of campaign participants. Subsequent discussion will link strategies and tactics to electoral outcomes. Present concern focuses on internal campaign system relationships which neither appeared as dependent on societal backing nor as having a direct impact on electoral outcomes. Relationships in this category were between rules and the extreme dominance by presidential candidates of campaign information, between participant structuring and behavoir, between financing and information, between the structure of information networks and the consequences of dis-

10 ROBERT D. JACKSON, *Castro, The Kremlin and Communism in Latin America* Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1969), pp. 59-67.

seminating inconsistent political information and between selective information distortion and overall information content.

The impact of rules on information appears in the emphasis given by political reporting and advertising to Caldera, Barrios, Burelli Rivas and Prieto Figueroa. In contrast, candidates for the national congress received little publicity and potential municipal councilmen and state legislators were all but invisible. Since presidential candidates, with the exception of Burelli Rivas, dominated their respective political parties, and since the electorate chose among party lines, rather than voting for individuals, the personalities of candidates for legislative offices appeared marginal to party success or failure. Fused, party dominant and presidential rules so focused attention on the presidential race that legislative balloting almost became an afterthought. Parties failing to nominate a presidential candidate, such as the Communists and the National Civic Crusade, may have constituted an exception. However, the greater part of public concern with the Communists and the National Civic Crusade stemmed from a widespread impression that their clientele, lacking a large card ballot, could determine which of the major contenders became president.

Coordination difficulties within the Victory Front, with the result that member parties never agreed on an electioneering master plan, illustrates the first impact of structuring on campaign behavior. Individually, allies balked at taking action beneficial to the entire Front if such a course risked the loss of historically supportive groups. The Democratic Republican Union and the Popular Democratic Force, for example, coordinated only marginally in the urban slums, where each anticipated substantial support. The most important consequence of such behavior was that despite existence of a "High Policy Committee" the Democratic Republican Union, the Popular Democratic Force, the National Democratic Front and the personal staff of Burelli Rivas conducted semi-autonomous campaigns. The folly of uncoordinated campaigning became evident when various Front parties stressed Burelli Rivas' links to them while the candidate's personal staff presented him as an independent and charismatic leader. The two portrayals were incompatible. Resulting confusion reduced Burelli Rivas' credibility and blurred his appeal. Feudal campaign organizations, therefore, by tolerating semi-autonomous centers of policy making, increased the opportunities for contradictory or suboptimal behavior.

The degree of campaign structure permanency also influenced relationships within the campaign system. For example, some local U.R.D. leaders opposed the presidential candidacy of Burelli Rivas. Jóvito Villalba and his national staff expended untold energy in persuading and cajoling dissidents to accept the Victory Front. Recalcitrant grass roots leaders were expelled, often forcing the Democratic Republican Union to rebuild the locally leaderless campaign apparatus. Similarly, the M.E.P. and *Acción Democrática* created grass roots party infrastructure while fighting the 1968 election campaign. Their methods suggest that national politicians contending with dissatisfied infrastructure, or forced to rebuild while seeking votes, will give highest priority to subduing intra-party rebellion and to reconstituting the decimated grass roots, Given internal difficulties, loyal and operational infrastructures will be permitted great autonomy. However, COPEI demonstrated that if permanent campaign structures remain loyal and are in place before intensive campaigning begins, national leaders are capable and desirous of controlling them.

Permanent operational campaign structures are expensive. Only the Social Christians and *Acción Democrática* could afford to maintain such organizations throughout the 1963-1968 constitutional period.[11] Outside of the private sector few commanded the resources needed either to maintain permanent campaign structures or to "flesh out" those existing between elections only on organization charts. Contributions by businessmen to the campaigns of Caldera, Barrios and Burelli Rivas financed the sophisticated apparatus that enabled these three to place first, second and third in the presidential race. Dependence on private sector financing was heightened by the growing use of costly radio and television time. In Venezuela, as in Western Europe and the Anglo-American democracies, therefore, modern campaigning increases the importance of affluent private contributors.

Unless "have not" interests can pool resources behind anti-*status quo* candidates, increasing reliance on campaign contributions from the affluent will weaken the commitment of reformist political parties to redistribute wealth and income. *Acción Democrática,* for example, received significant private sector support for the first time in 1968. Correspondingly, the party's mild socialist rhetoric scarcely

11 Unfortunately, detailed figures are unavailable. See the discussion of financing in Chapter III.

resembled the fiery promises of past campaigns. If spending is unregulated and information free-flowing, therefore, modern electioneering reduces the likelihood that powerful economic interests in a pluralistic democracy will be eliminated as power contenders.[12]

Campaign length also was affected by the absence of regulation. Soon after President Leoni's inauguration, in 1964, campaigning resumed at a low level. Intense electoral competition began between twelve and eighteen months before the balloting of December 1, 1968. Venezuelan experience, therefore, confirms that freely flowing information encourages chronic campaigning. Each contender hopes to gain advantages by starting earlier than the opposition. The only limits appeared to be financial and a fear of over exposure.

Semi-autonomous political communication networks lessened the possibilities of over exposure. One network encompassed small towns and the countryside and the other metropolitan areas. Political messages circulating in the "rural" network seldom came to the attention of city dwellers. Small town inhabitants and peasants had a vague and incomplete idea of urban communications. Incomplete integration of the two networks permitted contradictory communications to be circulated in each with minimal consequences for competitors involved in the inconsistencies. For example, *Acción Democrática* was relatively successful in identifying Gonzalo Barrios with the party throughout the countryside while establishing his separate identity in the cities. The two networks, however, likely will merge as improved transportation and nationally available radio and television speed information from Caracas to the most remote village. In the future, circulating contradictory campaign messages in the two networks could destroy credibility.

Political party maintenance of special organizations for a wide spectrum of interests throws additional light on relationships among elements in the campaign system. The Social Christians, *Acción Democrática,* the People's Electoral Movement and the Democratic Republican Union nurtured organizations of workers, peasants, professionals, women and others. Information originating within each sought to attract other interest group members to the party, rather than pressuring party leaders to adopt programs and courses of action bene-

12 The concept of "power contender" is developed in CHARLES ANDERSON, *Politics and Economic Change in Latin America* (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1967), p. 67.

ficial to the group. Thus, in a campaign, where pressure groups are creatures of the political parties information flowing from the former primarily will reflect the interests of the latter.

Finally, an overt attempt at unfairly biasing sources of information from which a degree of objectivity was expected, newspapers, radio and television, embittered relations among campaign participants. The pact between Social Christians and the Capriles publishing empire led to the most stilted political reporting since the overthrow of General Pérez Jiménez. In reaction, independent journalists condemned both the Social Christians and the Capriles, asserting that their alliance was incompatible with a free press. Several newspapers retaliated by refusing to report Social Christian campaigning, and while surveys are lacking, a wide range of voters apparently ceased paying attention to political news in Capriles publications.[13] Given freely flowing information, therefore, blatent attempts to bias supposedly "objective" information sources appear likely to generate so much unfavorable backlash that the overall balance of campaign propaganda for those making the attempt will be unchanged or negatively affected.

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CAMPAIGNING AND OUTCOMES

Democratic elections, barring overthrow of the regime, determine which parties or coalitions exercise governmental authority, which emerge as viable challengers and which are inconsequential. The events of 1968 suggest several kinds of relationships between democratic campaigning and election results. They include the possibility of no direct impact or of influence traceable to structural differences, communications patterns, information techniques, issue intensity and strategy choices.

If a single political party, like the Revolutionary Institutional Party of México (P.R.I.), commands overwhelming support, campaigning only marginally affects the outcome of elections.[14] *Acción Democrática* spoke for a large majority during the late 1940's, when its candidates polled between 70 and 85 percent of the total vote.

13 Survey data confirming or refuting this impression is unavailable.

14 Cf. PHILIP B. TAYLOR, JR. "The Mexican Elections of 1968: Aftermath of Authoritarianism", *Western Political Quarterly*, XIII (September 1960), pp. 722-744.

With the return of competitive party politics in 1958 *Acción Democrática,* while still Venezuela's strongest political party, received slightly under half of the total vote. A decade later *Acción Democrática* and the Social Christians were running neck and neck. Instead of only marginally affecting the outcome campaigning was the hinge on which the election turned.

Acción Democrática and the Social Christians, in contrast to parties of the Victory Front, assembled a pervasive and operational grass roots campaign apparatus between 1964 and 1967. The former finished first and second in both the presidential and legislative contests, and the People's Electoral Movement, having inherited much of *Acción Democrática's* local campaign apparatus, finished third in the legislative balloting. Victory Front allies, on the other hand, relied on intermittent campaign structures. The Democratic Republican Union's fifth place showing was the strongest made by a Front Party. Permanent campaign structures, therefore, even if "fleshed out" during intensive campaigning, appear more efficient than their intermittent counterparts. Special campaign structures such as "Independents for Gonzalo" or "Women for Caldera" — themselves intermittent, may make a difference, but only in an extremely close race.

The Social Christians, *Acción Democrática* and the People's Electoral Movement exercised comparatively "centralized" and "consolidated" control over their campaign apparatus. Contrastingly, Victory Front parties favored "decentralized" and feudal organizations. Greatly reduced support for the latter argues that feudally organized campaigns are inefficient. Also, opposition to the Front among minority factions within each party would have complicated problems of coordination even if the "High Policy Committee" had been able to agree on an election master plan. Where opposition was intense many left the party or refused to contribute to the subsequent campaign. This leads to speculation that the maximum vote available to any "last minute" electoral alliance will be lower than the combined total polled by its members in the previous election.

Some communications patterns appear more efficient than others. *Acción Democrática* and the People's Electoral Movement encountered special problems where they relied on outsiders to reconstruct a shattered local apparatus. Even local militants who had been working for the party in other regions, when recalled to their native municipality, were viewed with suspicion. Grass roots voters seemed trust-

ing of communications from national and state party headquarters only when messages were interpreted by someone with whom residents had frequent personal contact. This raises serious questions about the effectiveness of political information transmitted directly from Caracas. If radio and television messages are viewed with suspicion in outling regions, campaigning politicians would do well to rely primarily on mass rallies in such areas.

The mass rally provided a forum for interaction between state, national and local party leaders. However, campaign strategists failed to schedule rallies according to calculations that in a certain situation personal interaction would be more effective than media techniques. Their goal often seemed to be sending the presidential candidate to as many of the 642 municipalities as was physically possible. Also, radio and television advertising in outlying areas seldom provided for special interpretations by regional leaders. In the future, therefore, candidates whose media presentations and mass rallies are integrated into a reinforcing and "interpreted" information package should enjoy greater success than those who continue as in the past.

While intuition suggests critical linkages between issues and party voting in 1968, the lack of attitude surveys limits the data from which hypotheses can be drawn. For example, subsequent generalizations concerning efficiency issues depend upon speculation about the impact of party propaganda. *Acción Democrática* literature stressed the accomplishments of Presidents Leoni and Betancourt in education, agrarian reform, public works and in consolidation of democratic "rules of the game". In contrast, opponents played on widespread uneasiness over rising urban crime, inefficiencies in the national health system and alleged shortcomings in the government party's agrarian reforms. *Acción Democrática* and the opposition both appeared to strike responsive chords. The absence of a balance widely perceived as outstanding or a fiasco transformed issues of efficiency into a two-edged sword. Their impact on the outcome, consequently, was marginal and confused.

Relationships between personality and voting also could have been analyzed more precisely had survey data been available. Clearly, however, political parties dependent on the popularity of Villalba and Uslar Pietri sustained significant losses. Strong showing by Prieto Figueroa and former dictator Pérez Jiménez, on the other hand, demonstrated the continuing political significance of charisma. Neither

of the latter sought the presidency in earlier democratic elections. In contrast, the former were unsuccessful candidates in 1963. Perhaps defeat irrevocably tarnished charisma, thus ending presidential possibilities. However, the case of Rafael Caldera argues that relationships were more complex. Three times defeated for the presidency, Caldera won on his fourth try. Between unsuccessful candidacies he organized tirelessly, and his triumph suggests that in the long run a strong grass roots party apparatus was more important in capturing the presidency than personal magnetism.

The stability issue, underscored by guerrilla activity during campaigning in 1963, appeared relatively unimportant in 1968. Democratic governments had reigned for a decade, power had been passed from one constitutionally elected chief executive to another and most guerrilla leaders were dead, imprisoned or competing in the election campaign. Nevertheless, democracy was not so securely established that stability issues were meaningless. Social Christian unity, in view of the fragmenting party system and Venezuela's turbulent political history, strengthened Caldera's appeal among voters attaching great important to maintaining order and tranquility. The failure of democratic politicians to perceive a need to rally around the regime, however, argues that stability issues become primary only when levels of legitimacy consolidation are dangerously low or falling rapidly.

Strategy is a plan to assemble the desired electoral coalition. Events leading to the 1968 election campaign alienated factions in every important political party except the Social Christians. Consequently, the likely returns from programs to sever historically loyal clienteles strategies of division appeared high. Some succeeded, for *Acción Democrática,* the Democratic Republican Union, the Popular Democratic Force and the National Democratic Front, received far fewer votes than in 1963. On the other hand, the Social Christians withstood attempts by *Acción Democrática* to weaken their following among Andean peasants and by the Victory Front to capture their middle class clientele. Social Christian solidarity, when contrasted with defections among their rivals, inidicates that strategies of division are effective only among the clienteles of parties within which there have been major unresolved clashes since the last election. The Social Christians, however, lost ground during the campaign's final weeks, when opponents cleverly executed the strategy of paralysis. As discussed in Chapter IV, charges of nascent fascism were never

refuted satisfactorily by Caldera or his lieutenants. Support fell among elements of the middle class weakly leaning toward the Social Christians, although not among party militants. Paralysis strategies, therefore, appear most effective in limiting a contender's capability to attract undecided or wavering voters.

Division and paralysis strategies usually are countered with strategies of reinforcement. All contenders in the 1968 election campaign sought to reinforce the allegiance of their clientele. However, only one grouping, the Victory Front, relied almost exclusively on reinforcement strategies. A major factor in the dramatic defeat suffered by individual Victory Front parties may have been their failure to appeal beyond historic clienteles, elements of which had been alienated since the 1963 election. This suggests a final hypothesis about campaigning and election outcome — that political parties or coalitions relying exclusively on reinforcement strategies can expect their percent of the total vote in the culminating election to be lower than in the one immediately preceding.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Application confirms the strategic game framework's utility for interactive analysis leading to middle range theory. In the long run, however, middle range theorizing must draw data from campaigns in countries of both the developed and developing areas. Specifically, framework oriented case studies are needed for the Soviet Union's single party system, for a multi-party system in Western Europe and for a two party system, such as Great Britain. Also, studies of campaigning in several single party regimes of the developing world would offer informative contrasts to the Venezuelan experience.

Viewed in retrospect, campaigning in Venezuela suggests two additional kinds of information relevant for the construction of middle range theories of campaigning. They are attitude surveys and ecological analysis of the social basis of party voting.[15] Four varieties of survey data would be useful. First, a profile of attitudes toward Venezuelan democracy and President Leoni's administration might have

15 A variety of uses of this technique appear in MATTEI DOGAN and STEIN ROKKAN, eds., *Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969).

facilitated development of an embryonic legitimacy consolidation index. A cross national index of this ilk could suggest hypotheses concerning the impact of alternative levels of legitimacy consolidation on interparty cooperation. Also, the legitimacy consolidation index would itself measure alienation. Varieties and intensities of alienation could then be related to threshholds at which support for the regime is withdrawn and the acceptance of constituted authority gives way to violence.

Attitude surveys also could reveal the intensity and impact of campaign issues. For example, as employed the strife framework suggested that to the extent stability issues affected voting they inclined independents toward Rafael Caldera. A Prieto Figueroa victory was seen as inviting military intervention, the Burelli Rivas coalition appeared unworkable and Gonzalo Barrios and *Acción Democrática* seemed tired and dangerously inflexible. Caldera, by contrast, radiated the confidence of a seasoned politician who, having unified his supporters, expected to win. His image and his party's comparatively conservative history gave Caldera an upper hand in appealing to the undecided middle class voter's desire for tranquility. However, such generalizations concerning the impact of stability issues are largely impressionistic. More precise measures would have been possible had interviews been available focusing on with whom stability issues, as well as those of ideology, personality and efficiency, proved decisive.

Finally, surveys are needed that reveal the intensity and distribution of party identification. It would have been useful to have known which voters were strong supporters of *Acción Democrática,* which weakly related to the Social Christians, which considered themselves independents and so forth. Lacking such information, generalizations concerning the social and economic underpinnings of Venezuelan party politics and analysis of perfomance by party strategists seeking to assemble electoral coalitions remains highly speculative or derived from "shadows".

Given the absence of surveys, "shadows" — explored by use of quantitative ecological analysis — may hold important new insights.[16] In looking at relations between class, status and party clientele, this technique correlates percent of the total population in a territorial unit, like the state or municipality, possessing a socio-econo-

16 Cf. the discussion of methodological problems in Part I of *Ibid.*

mic trait with the percent of the total territorial unit vote received by each campaign competitor. It allows for generalizations such as the percent of total municipality vote received by party "X" (e.g. *Acción Democrática*) increases as the percent of municipality inhabitants displaying trait "Y" (e.g. poverty) increases. Quantitative ecological analysis, however, would not justify a statement that poverty stricken voters disproportionately support *Acción Democrática,* which would commit the "ecological fallacy".[17]

In summary, the data remains insufficient to formulate middle range theories of election campaigning. Case studies in diverse settings appear as fruitful avenues for obtaining needed information. Oriented around the strategic game perspective future research would not begin anew the search for conceptual frameworks and explanatory concepts. Also, the goal of middle range theory cautions analysts against the traps of describing without explaining and seeking to explain with definitional concepts of such inclusiveness as to be tautological.

17 WILLIAM S. ROBINSON, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals", *American Sociological Review,* 15 (1950), pp. 351-357.

EPILOGUE

STRUCTURAL CLEAVAGES, PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS IN LATIN AMERICA: THE CASE OF VENEZUELA

PARTY SYSTEMS AND SOCIAL CLEAVAGES: SOME COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

During the past decade scholars have focused increasingly on measurement of relations between structural cleavages, voting and the evolution of party systems.[1] Pioneer efforts included studies by Erik Allardt, Yrjo Littunen, Richard Rose, Mattei Dogan, and others.[2] Emphasis was

1 The definition of structural cleavage adhered to in this paper is that made explicit by ERIK ALLARDT and PERTH PESONEN in "Cleavages in Finnish Politics", which appears in SEYMOUR LIPSET and STEIN ROKKAN eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 325. It is useful to repeat the Allardt and Pesonen definition.

"An emphasis on social structure seems to suggest that political cleavages be classified as either structural or non-structural. Maybe this distinction appears to neglect the fact that all cleavages presuppose some groupings. But some political cleavages correspond to ones differentiating social groups within which solidarity and cohesion already exist on other than purely political grounds, while certain other such cleavages lack any such correspondence. Because the latter cleavages can be perceived only in the sphere of politics, they are referred to as non-structural. Of course, they may reflect psychological differences, but they do not reflect any division of the body politic into social groups that are characterized by a personal feeling among their members of belonging together in most walks of life".

Cf. the definition in DOUGLAS W. RAE and MICHAEL TAYLOR, *The Analysis of Political Cleavages* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 23-24.

2 For example, see ERIK ALLARDT and YRJO LITTUNEN, eds., *Cleavages, Ideologies Party Systems* (Helsinki, Finland: The Academic Bookstore, 1964), referred to hereafter as *Cleavages*, RICHARD ROSE and DEREK URWIN, "Social Cohesion, Political Parties and Strains in Regimes", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 1 (April, 1969), pp. 7-67, MATTEI DOGAN and STEIN ROKKAN, eds., *Quantative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969), SEYMOUR LYPSET and STEIN ROKKAN, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), referred to hereafter as *Alignments*, RICHARD L. MERRITT and STEIN ROKKAN, eds., *Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantative Data in Cross National Research* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), ERIK ALLARDT and

on Western Europe and the English speaking democracies,[3] with resulting empirical studies examining propositions set forth by Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan. Lipset initially wrestled with hypotheses he hoped could be expanded into a universal theory of party system generation.[4] Subsequently, however, he collaborated with Rokkan in formulating a model that explained the more a homogeneous experiences of the North Atlantic, Australia and New Zeland.[5]

In contrast to the growing literature that measures relations between socio-economic cleavages and parties in Western Europe, Latin Americanists only recently have begun to heed Russell Fitzgibbon's often cited admonition to concentrate on analyzing and describing political parties.[6] Studies now exist for political parties in Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Perú and Venezuela.[7] They emphasize history,

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STEIN ROKKAN, eds., *Mass Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1970), STEIN ROKKAN, "Nation Building and the Structuring of Mass Politics", SAMUEL N. EISENSTADT, ed., *Political Sociology* (New York: Basic Books, 1971), pp. 393-410, JEAN BLONDEL, "Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies", *Canadian Journal of Political Science* (June, 1968), pp. 180-203 and AREND LIJHART, "Comparative Politics and Comparative Methods", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXV (September, 1971), pp. 682-693.

3 For a useful summary of some results see TABLE 1 in Rose and Urwin, p. 8.

4 SEYMOUR LIPSET, "Political Cleavages in (Developed) and (Emerging) Politicies", *Cleavages*, pp. 21-55. This analysis is reprinted in Allardt and Rokkan, pp. 23-44. This subsequently will be referred to as Lipset — *Emerging* and page numbers will be cited from the version appearing in *Cleavages*.

5 SEYMOUR LIPSET and STEIN ROKKAN, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction" in *Alignments*, pp. 1-64. This subsequently will be referred to as Lipset and Rokkan — *Structures*.

6 RUSSELL H. FITZGIBBON, "The Political Potpourri in Latin American", *Western Political Quarterly*, (March, 1957), pp. 3-22.

7 The major focus of ROBERT SCOTT'S *Mexican Government in Transition* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964) is the *Mexican Partido Revolucionario Institucional*. The P.R.I. also is discussed in detail in Chapter 2 of VINCENT PADGETT'S *The Mexican Political System* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966). Venezuelan political parties are described in JOHN D. MARTZ, *Acción Democrática* (Princeton: University Press, 1965) and ROBERT J. ALEXANDER, *The Communist Party of Venezuela* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1969). HARRY KANTOR'S *The Program and Ideology of the Peruvian Aprista Movement* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953) and GRANT HILLIKER'S *The Politics of Reform in Perú* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971) examine political parties in Perú. Other studies include PETER SNOW, *Argentine Radicalism* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1965) and PAUL H. LEWIS, *The Politics of Exile: Paraguay's Febrista Party* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968). Chilean political parties are analyzed in FEDERICO GIL'S *Genesis and Modernization of Political Parties in Chile* (Gainsville: University of Florida Press, 1962).

Other scholarly works on Latin American political parties have focused on types of political parties, rather than on a single party or parties within one nation. These include ROBERT J. ALEXANDER, *Communism in Latin America* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1957) and ROLLIE E. POPPINO, *International Communism in Latin America* (New York: The Free Press, 1964). Also see EDWARD J. WILLIAMS, *Latin American Christian Democratic Parties* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1967).

structure, the recruitment of leaders, ideology and programs. Latin American political parties also have been classified on continuums from left to right, pragmatic to ideological, democratic to authoritarian and institutionalized to personalized.[8] A recent two dimensional typology categorizes Latin American political parties in terms of "perception" and "mobility".[9] Regarding Latin American party systems, scholarly works make a basic distinction between competitive and non-competitive. Competitive party systems are subdivided into two party systems and multi-party systems.[10] In general, therefore, Latin Americanists following Fitzgibbon's advice have traced party evolution, described party organizations and classified. With few exceptions, relations between structural cleavages, parties and party systems remain unexplored.[11]

Subsequent discussion draws both from Lipset's earlier hypothesizing, which applies to "developing" and "developed" areas, and his latter collaborative effort with Rokkan. Specifically, the focus will be on six cleavages and their impact on party system evolution. Four

8 Cf. CHRISTIAN ANGLADE, "Party Finance models and the Classification of Latin American Political Parties". ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER, ed., *Comparative Political Finance* (Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath Co., 1970), pp. 163-189. A. ANGELL, "Party Systems in Latin America", *"Political Quarterly"*, p. 37 (July 1966), pp. 309-323, JOHN D. MARTZ, "Dilemmas in the Study of Latin American Political Parties", *Journal of Politics*, 26:3 (August, 1964), pp. 509-531, and ROBERT J. ALEXANDER "The Emergence of Modern Political Parties in Latin America" in JOSEPH MAIN and RICHARD W. WEATHERHEAD (eds) *The Politics of Change in Latin America* (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 101-125. In addition various texts on Latin American government and politics discuss and classify political parties. See KARL M. SCHMIDT and DAVID D. BURKS, *Evolution or Chaos* (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 149-174, CHARLES O. PORTER and ROBERT J. ALEXANDER, *The Struggle For Democracy, in Latin America* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1961), pp. 25-37, pp. 49-55., ALEXANDER EDELMAN, *Latin American Government and Politics* (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1969), pp. 350-380 and JACQUES LAMBERT, *Latin America* tr. by Helen Katel (Berkeley & Los Angeles: Univ of California Press, 1969), pp. 167-183, pp. 200-221, GEORGE S. BLANKSTEN, "The Politics of Latin America" in JAMES COLEMAN and GABRIEL ALMOND, *"The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 479-487 and MARTIN NEEDLER, *Latin American Politics in Perspective* (Princeton: Van Nostrand Co., 1968), pp. 88-122.

9 PETER RANIS, "A Two Dimensional Typology of Latin American Political Parites", *Journal of Politics*, 30 (August, 1968), pp. 798-832.

10 See the works noted in footnote 8.

11 Exceptions are PETER SNOW, "The Class Basis of Argentine Political Parties", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LVIII (March, 1964), pp. 163-167 and DOUGLAS *Chalmers*, "Parties and Society in Latin America" (Columbia University: mimeograph, 1970). The impact of differing levels of socio-economic development in Southeast and Northeast Brazil on party evolution is discussed by GLAUCIO ARY DILLON SOARES, "The Politics of Uneven Development: The Case of Brazil" in *Alignment*, pp. 467-497. For a useful discussion of the social basis of Chile's radical left see GLAUCIO ARY DILLON SOARES, "Socio-Economic Variables and Voting for the Radical Left: Chile, 1952", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXI (December, 1967), pp. 1053-1065. Referred to hereafter as *Chile-1952*.

cleavages — between the nation-building center and its periphery, between clericals and anti-clericals, between the countryside and cities and between owners and workers — are portrayed as pivotal to the formation of party systems in Western Europe and the United States.[12] In addition, Lipset also speculates that cleavages between traditionals and moderns and between the poor and others could be important to party system generation in the "developing" areas.[13] Discussion initially explores some consequences of these six cleavages in Western Europe and Latin America, thus providing a cross national perspective with which to compare subsequent analysis of structural cleavages in Venezuela by quantitative methods.

A. CENTER-PERIPHERY CLEAVAGE:

In Europe this involved conflict between the central nation-building culture and an increasing resistance by ethnically, linguistically or religiously distinct subject populations in the provinces or the peripheries is a direct product of what is usually referred to as the national revolution. The national revolution forced ever-widening circles of "peripherals" to choose sides in conflicts over values and cultural identities.[14] Where the subject population's ethnicity, linguistic separateness and religious apartness reinforced each other, and where few crosscutting memberships linked peripherals with the dominant culture, parties of regional defense developed. In contrast, if crosscutting memberships exposed the peripherals to the same political pressures as the more central populations, parties of regional defense failed to develop or received minimal support.[15]

The center-periphery cleavage, a dominant theme in Spanish American politics, emerged differently in the New World than in the Old. Prior to independence Spain and Portugal divided America into viceroyalties centered in Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires and Bogotá.[16] Each viceroyalty answered to the Council of the Indies.[17]

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12 LIPSET and ROKKAN — *Structures*, p. 47. The urban rural cleavage is also described as between land and industry.

13 See especially the subsection entitled "The Parties of the Third World" in Lipset — *Emerging*, Lipset also points out the split between university graduates and the rest of society.

14 LIPSET and ROKKAN — *Structures*, pp. 14-23. Cf. the discussion in PETER H. MERKL, *Comparative Politics* (New York Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1970, chapter 4, "The Center and the Periphery".

15 LIPSET and ROKKAN — *Structures*, pp. 41-46.

16 C. H. HARING, *The Spanish Empire in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963). See especially chapters IV and V on territorial organization.

17 *Ibid.*, chapter VI.

Spanish American independence movements initially gathered strength in the cities, often being centered in the viceregal capitals.[18] In a short time the four Spanish American viceroyalties fragmented into fifteen independent nations. The anarchy, dislocation and destruction accompanying independence prevented swift restoration of order within the fifteen. Regional caudillos ruled as feudal chieftains in large areas of the new nations. Subsequent decades were to be characterized by bloody struggles between the centralizing nation builders, usually residing in capital cities, and the "peripheral" *caudillos.*[19]

In contrast, independence came peacefully to Portuguese America. The new Brazilian nation retained control of all territory formerly administered by the Portuguese crown.[20] Despite a larger territory and population, the Brazilian nation-builders were better able to control centrifugal forces than their Spanish American counterparts. An important difference seems to have been that Brazilian independence was achieved without destruction of the colonial bureaucracy.[21] In contrast, two decades of civil war decimated the Spanish civil service. The former Spanish areas, therefore, had no political infrastructure existing through which national political authority could be exercised in the periphery. Also, the size and diversity of the populations and territories controlled from Rio de Janeiro produced complex regional crosscurrents that did not lend themselves to conceptualization as a center-periphery cleavage. One set of regional tensions involved a dichotomy between the expanding and prosperous Southeast and a stagnant and impoverished Northeast.[22] A second concerned conflicting political ambitions between elites in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul and Minas Gerais.[23]

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18 For an excellent summary of the Spanish American Independence movements see DONALD MARQUAND DOZER, *Latin America: An Interpretative History* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1962), pp. 190-219. Cf. HUBERT H. HERRING, *A History of Latin America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), chapters 13, 14 and 15.

19 The city-countryside struggle became a classic theme of 19th century Latin American writers. Most outstanding are DOMINGO F. SARMIENTO'S *Civilization and Barbarism* (New York: Collier Books, 1961) and RÓMULO GALLEGOS, *Doña Bárbara* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. 1942).

20 Cf. DOZER, pp. 219-225 and HARING, chapter 16.

21 HERRING, chapter 16.

22 Cf. DILLON SOARES, "The Politics of Uneven Development: The Case of Brazil", *Alignments*, pp. 467-496.

23 Cf. JORDAN YOUNG, "Brazil", BEN G. BURNETT and KENNTH F. JOHNSON, eds., *Political Forces in Latin America* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 562-564.

B. CLERICAL-ANTICLERICAL CLEAVAGE:

The church, although periodically in conflict with civic authorities, enjoyed important corporate privileges throughout Western Europe during the Middle Ages.[24] By the early thirteenth century, however, aspirations of the mobilizing nation-states presented new challenges to ecclesiastical privileges. The status of church properties and the financing of religious activities were involved, but the fundamental issue was one of morals, of determining community norms. Control of education, according to Lipset and Rokkan, was the core norm determination issue. Europe's most bitter clash over morals developed when the French Revolution's victorious anticlericals unleashed their violent attack on the Catholic Church.[25]

In Latin America the two sides battled throughout the nineteenth century. Clericals, especially the ecclesiastical hierarchy, lent support to royalists during the struggle for independence.[26] Institutionally, therefore, the church ended up on the losing side. As a strategy for retaining economic and spiritual prerogatives in the new nationalist milieu, Latin American ecclesistical hierarchies allied with the initially dominant Conservative elite. The Liberals, major rivals to the Conservatives, became opponents of Church land holdings and educational dominance.

Within two decades of Spain's expulsion Latin American Conservatives had been ousted from control of government or were being challenged seriously by anticlerical Liberals. Liberals and Conservatives organized elitist political parties and turned their lower class clients against each other in bloody civil wars.[27] When victorious the Liberals nationalized ecclesiastical property, secularized the maintenance of population statistics, and eliminated church control over education. Conservative triumphs, in contrast, restored ecclesiastical privileges. However, by mid-twentieth century militant proclericalism was obsolete.

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24 JOHN R. STRAYER and DANA C. MURO, *The Middle Ages* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1959), chapter 12.

25 LIPSET and ROKKAN — *Structures*, pp. 14-15.

26 For an excellent summary of the church in nineteenth century Latin America see EDELMANN, pp. 119-135.

27 Most standard Latin American history texts discuss the nineteenth century struggle between Liberals and Conservatives in great detail. For a recent treatment that relies on primary sources see J. LEÓN HELGUERA, "The Problem of Liberalism Versus Conservativism in Colombia: 1849-1885", FREDRICK PIKE, ed., *Latin American History: Select Problems* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1969), pp. 224-257.

Issues related to social and economic modernization replaced the clerical-anticlerical cleavage, and other nineteenth century struggles, as major generators of political conflict.

Where Conservative parties remain politically important, as in Chile, Equador and Colombia, they are most concerned with preserving the traditional elite's socio-economic status. Protecting clerical privileges is secondary.[28] Also, no contemporary Conservative party advocates church control of population statistics, abolition of existing public schools or the return of expropriated clerical estates. Nevertheless, Conservatives continue to be more favorably disposed toward the church than their opponents. In parts of Latin America, therefore, party systems continue to reflect the clerical-anticlerical cleavage of the nineteenth century.

C. TRADITIONAL-MODERN CLEAVAGE:

Transition from traditional to modern society involves intellectual, social, economic and political change.[29] Modernization is traumatic. It changes the perceptions of individual human beings, specifically their psychic attitude set. "Psychic attitude set" is used here to indicate what Alex Inkeles defined as "relatively enduring personality characteristics and patterns that are modal among the adult members of a society."[30] According to Max Weber, the modal characteristics and patterns of traditionalism are the "Psychic attitude set for the habitual workday... and the belief in the everyday routine as the inviolable norm of conduct."[31] The psychic attitude set for modernism, in contrast, is described by Huntington as involving "a fundamental shift in attitudes, values and expectations. Traditional man expected continuity in nature and society and did not believe in the capacity of man to control either. Modern man, in contrast, accepts the possibility of change and believes in its desirability."[32]

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28 The conservative parties of Chile, Colombia and Equador are discussed in the relevant chapters of MARTIN NEEDLER, ed., *Political Systems of Latin America* (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1970).

29 See the discussion in C. E. BLACK, *The Dynamics of Modernization* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), pp. 9-26. Pages 175-199 contain a comprehensive bibliography essay on modernization.

30 ALEX INKELES *"National Character and Modern Political Systems"*, FRANCIS L. K. HSU, ed., *Psychological Anthropology* (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1961), p. 173.

31 H. H. GARTH and C. WRIGHT MILLS, tr., *From Max Weber: Essays In Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 296.

32 SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, *Political Order in a Changing Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 32. Cf. MAX WEBER'S discussion of rationalizing every day life in *ibid.*, pp. 270-271.

The shift from traditionalism to modernism has been described by Daniel Lerner as "the infusion of a rationalist and positivist spirit,"[33] and by David Apter as a shift in the claims of society on the polity "from the primordial toward the functional, from the populist to the professional."[34] Western Europe and the United States developed the first predominantly modern societies and nation states. By the middle of the twentieth century, however, modernization had enroached on traditionalism in every nation state. Nevertheless, large populations in the "developing" areas continued within the psychic attitude set of traditionalism. Lipset hypothesizes that the cleavage between "traditionals" and "moderns" will be the single most important generator of parties and party systems among the "developing nations."[35]

In much of Latin America modernization gathered increasing momentum during the latter decades of the nineteenth century. Literacy rates rose, contact with industrial nations in the North Atlantic increased and the "modern" ideologies of Positivism, Marxism and Social Darwinism captured the imagination of an entire generation of intellectuals.[36] Nevertheless, much of Latin America continues to be traditional. Indians, especially in Bolivia, Perú, Equador, Guatemala and México, remain largerly untouched by modernization.[37] In addition, many peasants and substantial numbers of the urban poor retain a traditionalistic mentality.[38] Daniel Lerner argues that percent of lite-

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33 DANIEL LERNER, *The Passing Of Traditional Society* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958), p. 45.

34 DAVID APTER, *Choice and the Politics of Allocation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 117.

35 LIPSET — *Emerging*, pp. 44-47. Lipset here indicates that his definitions of modernizing and traditional are similar to those employed by Weber and Huntington. Lipset refers to this as cultural politics. "...the politics where the cleavages caused by differences in value systems have more effect on the nature of political conflit than the cleavages based on economic and status factors".

36 See LEOPOLDO ZEA, *The Latin American Mind* (Norman, Oklahoma: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), especially Part Two.

37 RUDOLFO STAVENHAGEN, "Classes, Colonialism and Acculturation", IRVING L. HOROWITZ, ed., *Masses In Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 235-288.

38 The urban poor of Latin America have been studied by an increasing number of social scientists, and will be discussed in detail subsequently. From the traditionalism modernism perspective, however, the urban poor, especially the recently arrived migrants, are abandoning the former life style for the latter. The slums, therefore, contain large numbers of moderns and traditionals, as well as many "transitionals". For a more detailed discussion see GINO GERMANI, "The City As An Integrating Mechanism", GLEN H. BEYER, ed., *The Urban Explosion In Latin America* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967), pp. 175-214. The traditionalist mentality of the Latin American countryside is well documented. For an excellent analysis see ERIC WOLF, "Peasantry and the Ideological Order" in *Peasants* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1966), pp. 96-109. Here Wolf discusses the ideology of all peasantry, but his examples favor Latin America, the region of his greatest expertise.

rates is the best available index of transformation from a "traditional culture" to a "modern culture".[39]

Reading skills especially, by opening new possibilities for communication, are seen as fostering the rational-secular attitudes whose emergence are essential in modernization. Latin American literacy ratios, lower than those of the industrial nations but higher than in Africa and Asia, can be taken as an indication of Latin America's middle position on the traditional — modern continuum.[40]

D. URBAN-RURAL CLEAVAGE:

Urban and rural life styles differ in both "developed" and "developing" nations". Cities favor the emergence of a large middle class and serve as industrial centers. Cities are also hubs of commerce and administration, and stimulate growth of a "modern" world view.[41] Although urban environments favor a "modern" psychic attitude set, the urban-rural cleavage should not be equated with that between "traditional" and "modern" culture. Traditionalism pervades many slums and squatter shantytowns in the cities.[42] Also, the countryside is seldom uniformly traditional.[43] A small agricultural middle class

39 LERNER, pp. 62-64.

40 For an intra-regional comparison of literacy in Latin American see *Statistical Abstract of Latin America 1968* (Los Angeles; Latin American Center-UCLA, 1969), pp. 107-108.

41 Cf. BLACK, The Dynamics of Modernization, pp. 21, 52, 69, JOHN FRIEDMANN, "The Role of Cities in National Development", *American Behavioral Scientist* (May/June), pp. 13-21. Freedman's article contains a limited but highly useful bibliography. Also see BERT F. HOSELITZ, "A History of the Long Term Development of the City", BEYER, ed., *The Urban Explosion in Latin America*, pp. 18-32 and HUNTINGTON, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, pp. 47, 54, 74, 83 and 272-273.

42 Cf. ROBERT C. FRIED, "Urbanization and Italian Politics", *Journal of Politics* 29 (August 1967), pp. 505-534 and JOAN M. NELSON, *Migrants, Urban Poverty, and Instability in Developing Nations* (Harvard University Center for International Affairs; Occasional Paper in International Affairs Number 22, 1969). On page 25, in concluding her discussion of migrants, Nelson indicates a traditional modern mix in squatter shantytowns. "...political socialization appears be more important in determining migrants' political behavoir than are the assumed characteristics of anomie and frustration. The Migrants' political behavoir is not primarily a reflection of the trauma of migration. Rather it flows from the political attitudes and patterns of behavior migrants bring with them from the country... and from an active process of political socialization through situations and agents to which they are exposed in the city.

43 Cf. T. LYNN SMITH, "Improvement of the Systems of Agriculture in Colombia" in the author's *Studies of Latin American Societies* (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1970), pp 276-294, GERRIT HUIZER, "Peasant Organization in Agrarian Reform in México" in IRVING L. HOROWITZ, ed., *Masses in Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 445-502 and JOHN DUNCAN POWELL, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics' *American Political Science Review*, LXIV, No. 2 (June, 1970), pp. 411-425.

displays "modern" psychic sets. Modernism often becomes the dominant world view among workers on mechanized plantations producing for the international economy. Even peasants, long primary carriers of traditionalism, sometimes acquire a modern outlook. Rising literacy, the dissemination of transistor radios and political mobilization have accelerated the breakdown of rural traditionalism. Consequently, while the urban-rural cleavage may correspond in some cases to that between "modern" and "traditional culture", it is an empirical question — often open to exploration through the analysis of aggregate data — whether in fact the two are coterminous. In France, for example, aggregate data revealed these cleavages only partially overlapped. Political parties emerged that corresponded to one but crosscut the other.[44]

Modern Latin America's major cities trace their origin either to preconquest settlement patterns or to the experiences of Spanish and Portuguese colonization. Iberians were urban oriented in their homeland and insisted on being city dwellers in the New World.[45] They planted cities on the American countryside rather permitting them to evolve from the course of events. The boundaries of one municipality extended to the boundaries of the next, and each —especially in Spanish America— remained isolated and oriented toward the mother country. The isolation and external orientation of colonial Spanish American cities contributed to the region's fragmentation into numerous city-centered entities during the war for independence. Also, these characteristics of the colonial city help to explain why Spanish America's new nations were plagued by decades of civil war between regional *caudillos*.[46]

Nineteenth century turbulence adversely affected the development of Spanish American cities. Some lost population, others stagnated. Growth required the return of peace. Caracas, capital of Venezuela, for example, only recovered its colonial population of 50,000 during the 1870's.[47] Contrastingly, relative tranquility in Argentina following

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44 Cf. analysis of the emergence of the French MRP in LIPSET and ROKKAN-*Cleavages*, pp. 39-40.

45 RALPH A. GAKENHEIMER, "The Peruvian City of the Sixteenth Century", BEYER, ed., *The Urban Explosion in Latin America*, pp. 33-56.

46 Most texts in Latin American history and politics devote at least one chapter to the nineteenth century civil wars and accompanying *caudillismo*. For a highly useful bibliography see EDELMANN, *Latin American Government and Politics*, pp. 347-349.

47 For a discussion of the growth of Caracas see the "Introduction" to the author's *The Political Process of Urban Development: Caracas Under Acción Democrática* (Los Angeles: unpublished dissertation UCLA, 1969).

defeat of the provincial *caudillos* at the battle of Pavón, in 1861, contributed to the emergence of Buenos Aires as a major urban center of over a million inhabitants during the 1890's. Six other Latin American cities boasted populations of more than 200,000 by 1900.[48] At that time, however, even the region's greatest cities remained apart from the hinterland, urban islands in a great rural sea.

A strikingly different situation existed two thirds of a century later. Ten Latin American cities exceeded the million population mark, and in the countryside peasants were immigrating to small and medium sized market centers.[49] Migrants and more established urbanities partook of a significantly different life style than those remaining in the rural areas. The deepening urban-rural cleavage was reflected in politics, and where free elections were permitted, in the party system. Even a cursory examination reveals significant differences in party preferences between urban and rural voters in Venezuela, Chile, Perú, Argentina, Brazil and Colombia.[50]

E. OWNER-WORKER CLEAVAGE:

In Europe the extension of suffrage to the lower classes changed the character of each national polity, generated new divisions and brought about a restructuring of old alignments. Enfranchisement of the masses, when combined with increased industrialization, guaranteed the emergence of worker movements throughout the continent. Writing in 1969, on the basis of analyzing a decade of research into the social basis of political parties in Western Europe and the Anglo-American democracies, Richard Rose and Dwight Urwin found that class based parties averaged 24 percent of the vote.[51] This was second, by one percent, to the showing of "heterogeneous" parties — ones drawing votes in such a way that their supporters shared no major social cha-

48 For a perceptive analysis of the tension between Buenos Aires and the rest of the nation see JAMES R. SCOBIE, *Argentina: A City and a Nation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964). Other Latin American cities having more than 200,000 in 1900 were Havana, Mexico City, Montevideo, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Santiago de Chile. *Statistical Abstract of Latin America* 1964 (Los Angeles Latin American Center, UCLA, 1965), pp. 24-25.

49 *Statistical Abstract of Latin America* — 1968, pp. 64-65.

50 Cf. the discussion of political parties in these countries in NEEDLER, ed., *Political Systems of Latin America* and in BEN G. BARNETT and KENNETH JOHNSON, ed., *Political Forces in Latin America*, 2 ed. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1970).

51 RICHARD ROSE and DEREK URWIN, "Social Cohesion, Political Parties and Strains in Regimes", p. 29.

racteristics in common.[52] Among class based parties, those depending on industrial workers were the most important, existing in 15 of 17 countries in the Rose and Urwin study. Several, including the Labor Parties of Britain and Australia, averaged more than 40 percent of the vote in recent elections.

European working class parties varied. Generally, worker movements in Protestant countries with the smoothest histories of nation building — England, Denmark, and Sweden — melded into the political system with the least disruption. Catholic countries with difficult or recent histories of nation building — Spain, Italy and France — in contrast, produced deeply divided, alienated working class movements. A third basic grouping, including Austria, Finland, Belgium and Germany, falls into neither category. Lipset and Rokkan hypothesize that within the third grouping worker movements tended to be more divided where the nation builders and the church were openly and latently opposed during the crucial phases of educational development and mass mobilization. On the other hand, they assert that antagonism lessened where the church allied with the nation builders against some outside enemy.[53] Differences in the territorial histories of state formation, nation building and religious evolution, therefore, are seen as affecting the intensity of conflict associated with the owner-worker cleavage. Nevertheless, the cleavage's emergence is also perceived as having brought the affected party systems closer together by increasing the importance of purely economic conflict.[54] A final observation, significant from the perspective of Latin American experience, concerns the alliance making propensity of owners and workers. In no European nation did the two antagonists and their allies find a political home within the same party.

Latin America industrialized later and less completely than Europe. Foreign demands for primary products strengthened the large land holders. The landed elites, beneficiaries of their country's position as a supplier of agricultural products and raw materials, opposed or remained indifferent toward the establishment of domestic heavy industry.[55] In contrast, they welcomed foreign capital that developed light

52 *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17 defines four broad types of parties that were encountered in Western Europe and the Anglo-American democracies. They are: (1) heterogeneous parties, (2) single-claim, religious and anticlerical parties, (3) single-claim, class parties and (4) mutually reinforcing loyalties parties.

53 LIPSET and ROKKAN-*Cleavages* pp. 46-56.

54 STEIN ROKKAN, "Nation Building and the Structuring of Mass Politics", pp. 408-409.

55 EDELMAN, pp. 236-262, analyzes industrialization in Latin America. The final pages of his discussion contain a useful bibliography. For a study of Latin American

industry to process primary products. Light industry expanded as the franchise was becoming universal, and worker movement quickly acquired great political significance. The workers faced as their major protagonists foreign industrialists, the export-oriented middle class and the landed elites.

Labor and industrialists interested in developing domestic heavy industry, both looking for support against the traditional elite and foreign-dominated industry, allied with each other. The pact between labor and domestic industrialists has been labeled the "liberal alliance".[56] After the twentieth century's second decade "liberal alliances" dominated the electoral process. Where the "conservative alliance", foreign industrialists and the landed elite, returned to power it was by persuading the military to negate the "liberals" popular mandate. However, the increasingly professional Latin American military balked at serving as a "conservative" handmaiden. Many officers came to believe that their interests, and those of the nation, could best be served by "liberals".[57] Consequently, the generals reinstated rules for gaining control of government that favored the more popular "liberal alliance". Restored to power, "liberals" found themselves restricted by military perceptions of what was politically acceptable. If "liberal alliance" policy conflicted with these perceptions the military intervened. *Golpes de estado* against Bosch in the Dominican Republic, Goulart in Brazil, Illia in Argentina and Belaunde Terry in Perú were of this ilk.

In conclusion, partial industrialization and enfranchisement of the masses in Latin America stimulated the development of worker movements. Unlike their European counterparts, however, Latin American

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industrialists see FERNANDO H. CARDOSO, "The Industrial Elite", in SEYMOUR M. LIPSET and ALDO SOLARI, *Elites in Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 94-116. THEODORE H. MORAN, "The Development of Australia and Argentina", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 3 No. 1 (October, 1970), pp.71-92 compares Argentina indifference to establishing heavy industry to Australia's policy of promoting its development. For a perceptive study of Latin America's labor elite and HENRY A. LANDSBERGER, "The Labor Elite: Is it Revolutionary?" in LIPSET and SOLARI, pp. 256-500. EDELMANN, pp. 291-315 also discusses Latin American labor and assembles a brief bibliography on the subject. A useful but somewhat dated discussion is FRANK BONILLA'S "The Urban Worker" in JOHN J. JOHNSON, *Continuity and Change in Latin America* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1964, pp. 186-205.

56 This theme is discussed at length by RONALD M. CLASSMAN, "The Limiting Social and Structural Conditions for Latin American Modernization" *Social Research* (Summer, 1969), pp. 182-205.

57 Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 189-195, and ELDON KENWORTHY, "Coalitions in the Political Development of Latin America, in SVEN GROENNINGS, E. W. KELLEY, and MICHAEL LEISERSON, The Study of Coalition Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), pp. 120-133.

workers became political allies of businessmen concerned with developing heavy industry.[58] The new industrialists and the workers, both part of society's "modernized" sectors, made common cause against the landed elite and their allies. Consequently, additional weight is given to the earlier hypothesis that in developing countries the most important cleavage affecting party system development is between traditionalism and modernism.

F. POOR-OTHERS CLEAVAGE:

Lipset hypothesizes that under some conditions division between the poor and all others becomes a cleavage of party generation.[59] However, most studies of the poor, in "traditional" as well as "modern" environments, portray them as politically apathetic.[60] An important exception are recently arrived urban migrants who lack basic services — electricity, running water and housing — and incline toward political activity to obtain them.[61] Also, modernization raises expectations, and in the long run unfulfilled expectations heighten levels of political consciousness. Politically conscious economic marginals are

58 For example, between 1945 and 1955 Argentina's Peronists included workers, the "new industrialists" and elements of the urban poor. Cf., MORAN, "The Development of Argentina and Australia", pp. 89-92 and SCOBIE, pp. 226-227. However, the majority of Argentina industrialists, according to José Luis de Imaz, remain associated with light industry and foreign-owned corporations. *Los Que Mandan*, tr., Carlos Astiz (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1970), pp. 134-172. This may explain Snow's finding that in the aggregate industrialists voted against Peronists. "The Class Basis of Argentine Politics" pp. 164-167. Obviously, additional research is necessary into the relationship between "old" and "new" industrialists throughout Latin America.

59 LIPSET-*Emerging*, p. 49.

60 As an overall generalization GABRIEL ALMOND and SIDNEY VERBA, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), p. 300, conclude that "if an individual has had the opportunity to participate in the family, in the school, or at work, he is more likely than someone who did not have the same opportunities to consider himself competent to influence government". Within each society the relatively well off have more such opportunities than the less affluent. Modernization complements affluence as a positive influence on participation levels. Also, differing political cultures affect participation, *Ibid.*, pp. 299-306. Cf. the discussion of relationships between participation and education in ANGUS CAMPBELL, PHILIP CONVERSE, WARREN E. MILLER and DONALD STOKES, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), pp. 475-482.

61 DANIEL GOLDRICH, RAYMOND B. PRATT, and C. R. SCHULLER, "The Political Integration of Lower Class Urban Settlements in Chile and Peru", IRVING L. HOROWITZ, ed., *Masses in Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 175-212. Cf. TALTON F. RAY, *The Politics of the Barrios of Venezuela* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 33-43. For an excellent summary of literature on migration in Latin America see WAYNE CORNELIUS, "The Political Sociology of Cityward Migration in Latin America: Toward Empirical Theory", FRANCINE RABINOVITZ and FELICITY TRUEBLOOD, eds., *Latin American Urban Research* Vol. I (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1971), pp. 95-150.

likely targets for nationalistic parties promising redistribution. Class consciousness among the poor, however, is often diluted by crosscutting cleavages. Only where other cleavages reinforce divisions between the poor and others, or where consciousness of being on the bottom of the socio-economic pyramid outweighs all else, will parties emerge whose support is differentiated along the poor — non-poor cleavage.[62]

In the "developing" areas examples of the lower strata maneuvering cohesively against all others are the exception. Regional, religious, cultural and ethnic differences, as discussed earlier, usually surpass class consciousness in importance as a primary determinant of parties and party systems. Cleavages between rural and urban areas, as well as between "modern" and "traditional culture", also alter or dissipate the party generating cohesiveness of economic deprivation. The rural poor, for example, frequently have supported candidates controlled by the historic, landed elites. Also, slum dwellers appear highly susceptible to personalistic appeals, whether from the left or the right. Finally, the urban and rural poor often have divided their votes among a variety of elitist parties on the basis of an anticipated patronage.[63] While the poor-others cleavage may be reflected in a polity's competitive parties, therefore, whether or not it will be depends, at a minimum, on the relative intensity and *crosscutting* impact of other structural cleavages.[64]

Latin America's rural masses, a racial potpourri of *mestizos, mulatos,* Indians and blacks, subsisted traditionally as peasants or sharecroppers. What was grown on their own plots the peasants consumed or sold in regional market centers. Produce from large estates was disposed of according to the owner's determination. Recent land reforms, however, permitted an increased number of Latin American peasants to acquire plots capable of providing a moderate standard of living. Nevertheless, the *minifundio* problem remains critical and sharecropping persists as a way of life for many. In relation to those who have benefited from agrarian reform the unaffected constitute a rural subproletariat.[65]

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62 LIPSET-*Emerging,* pp. 49-51.

63 For example, during the 1930's Argentine conservatives captured the votes of many peasants and workers. Snow, "The Class Basis of Argentine Parties", pp. 163-164. Works dealing with the urban poor are noted in footnote 61.

64 ROSE and URWIN deal with this point in detail throughout "Social Cohesion, Political Parties and Strains in Regimes".

65 Among the most useful studies dealing with the rural poor are E. J. HOBSBAWM, Peasants and Rural Migrants in Politics", CLAUDIO VELIZ, ed., *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 43-65. HENRY LANDSBERGER, ed., *Latin American Peasant Movements* (Ithaca, New

Social and economic distances in the cities are as great as in the countryside. Incomes of the upper class, the middle class and of organized labor substantially exceed those of the urban poor. Slum dwellers and recently arrived migrants comprise an increasing percent of Latin America's urban population. Studies by Wayne Cornelius and others indicate that most recently arrived migrants consider themselves better off for having come to the city,[66] and that slum dwellers of a decade and over are not significantly more dissatisfied than the migrants.[67] Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the urban poor will remain apathetic toward any regime that continues in power for a long period during which expectations of upward economic mobility are unrealized. On more than one occasion they had lashed out violently against established regimes in Latin America.[68] The success of such thrusts has varied according to how extensively anti-establishment feelings were shared throughout the polity. By themselves the urban poor have been unable to bring down a government, either through violence or at the polls. An alliance of peasants, slum dwellers, migrants and organized labor, in contrast, appears capable of becoming an electorally dominant coalition of "have-nots" and the least affluent of the "haves". Such a coalition seldom has proved acceptable to Latin America's upper and middle sectors. Either its electoral victories have not been accepted or its freedom to implement redistributive policies has been circumscribed.[69]

York: Cornell University Press, 1969), JOHN D. POWELL, The Political Mobilization of the Venezuelan Peasant (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), and RUDOLFO STAVENHAGEN, ed., *Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements in Latin America* (New York: Fawcett Publishers, 1968).

66 CORNELIUS, "The Political Sociology of Cityward Migration". Cf. KENNETH L. KARST, "Rights in Land and Housing In an Informal Legal System: The Barrios of Caracas", *American Journal of Comparative Law*, Vol. XIX (Summer, 1971), pp. 551-574.

67 WAYNE CORNELIUS "Urbanization as an Agent in Latin American Political Instability", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXIII (September, 1969), pp. 833-857.

68 One of the celebrated examples was the central role played by the urban poor in toppling the regime of Venezuelan dictator Pérez Jiménez. See PHILIP B. TAYLOR, JR., *The Venezuelan Golpe de Estado of 1958: The Fall of Marcos Pérez Jiménez* (Washington, D.C.: ICOPS, 1968), pp. 63-74. Cf. the discussion of "anomic movements" in GEORGE I. BLANKSTEN'S, "The Politics of Latin America", GABRIEL ALMOND and JAMES S. COLEMAN, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 496-501.

69 Brazil's military siezed power in 1964 to prevent formation of a potentially dominant "have not" alliance and the generals removed Argentina's President Arturo Frondizi because he insisted on recognizing electoral successes which would have placed the Peronists, a "have not" party in control of major provincial governments. Venezuelan "haves" agreed to the inauguration of Rómulo Betancourt, the victorious "have not" candidate in 1959, but only because of an underlying understanding which placed limits beyond which his goverment would not trespass in restructuring society.

STRUCTURAL CLEAVAGES AND THE VENEZUELAN PARTY SYSTEM: SOME HYPOTHESES AND TESTS

A brief but violent uprising on October 18, 1945, ended a half century of political dominance by personalistic Andean generals in Venezuela.[70] The victorious young officers placed their civilian ally, Rómulo Betancourt, at the head of a newly formed ruling *junta.* Betancourt, Secretary General of Venezuela's most important mass-based political party, *Acción Democrática,* channeled labor and peasant support to the new regime. *Acción Democrática* called for establishment of a participatory democracy and persuaded the military to permit elections based on universal suffrage for a Constituent Assembly.[71] The Assembly was to draw up a new constitution that would legitimate the revolution. *Acción Democrática* overwhelmingly won the Constituent Assembly elections, and the new constitution reflected the parties democratic socialist ideology.[72] Presidential and congressional elections were held in 1947. *Acción Democrática* gained such a commanding victory that the resulting political system resembled single party dominance in México.[73] However, conservative opponents of *Acción Democrática* gained increasing support in the military. On November 24, 1948, the same officers who placed Rómulo Betancourt at the head of the ruling *junta* in 1945 sent the new *Acción Democrática* president, Rómulo Gallegos, into exile. Major party leaders were either jailed or driven into the underground.[74]

In spite of hardships and persecution *Acción Democrática* remained the most important mass-based political organization in Venezuela between 1948 and 1958, a decade of authoritarian military rule. The revolution of January 23, 1958, opened the way for restoration of competitive democracy, and *Acción Democrática* again emerged as the country's strongest political party. However, in place of the single party dominance of 1946 - 1948, a multi-party system appeared. *Acción Democrática* commanded just under half of the total presidential and

70 For an excellent discussion of events leading up to this revolt, as well as the subsequent three years of *Acción Democrática* rule, see MARTZ, *Acción Democrática,* pp. 49-80.

71 *Ibid.,* pp. 64-70.

72 For a detailed discussion of party ideology during the *trienio,* the designation usually given to the 1945-1948 period, see Rómulo Betancourt, *Política y Petróleo* (Caracas: Editorial Senderos, 1967), pp. 247-544.

73 RONALD H. MCDONALD, *Party Systems and Elections in Latin America* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 37-40.

74 Cf. BETANCOURT, pp. 547-652 and POWELL, *The Political Mobilization of the Venezuelan Peasant,* pp. 87-100.

legislative vote in the 1958 elections.[75] Three rivals, the Democratic Republican Union (U.R.D.), the Social Christians (COPEI),[76] and the Venezuelan Communist Party (P.C.V.) divided the remainder. In the subsequent elections of 1963 *Acción Democrática* retained first place, but five rivals exceeded its presidential and legislative vote by a margin of 3 - 1. Party system fragmentation accelerated, and in the 1968 elections nine important parties divided 96.3 percent of the legislative vote. *Acción Democrática* again, although by the smallest of margins, received the largest legislative vote. However, neither the Communists nor the National Civic Crusade (C.C.N.), a loose amalgam supporting General Marcos Pérez Jiménez, presented presidential candidates. Enough supporters of these parties voted their presidential ballot for the Social Christians to end a decade of *Acción Democrática* control over the national executive.[77] Table 12 profiles the transformation of Venezuela's party system from one of a single party dominance to extreme multi-party competitiveness.

Fragmentation of the Venezuelan party system occurred simultaneously with far reaching social, economic and cultural changes. Venezuela became more "modern", less rural and doubled in population to ten milion between 1946 and 1968. Also, an increasingly efficient road network facilitated rapid travel between all major populated areas. During the early 1960's even the previously isolated Andes became a drive of only seven or eight hours from the capital at Caracas.[78] Scholars and journalists describing the less developed Venezuela of 1946 assert that mass based political parties mirrored the period's social, economic, and political tensions.[79] If they are correct, given subsequent changes in the economy, society and polity, it is likely that contemporary Venezuelan parties are increasingly less related to the structural conflicts of party generation in the 1946 - 1948 period.

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75 McDONALD, pp. 46-51.

76 COPEI is an anacronym for Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente. The full name is seldom used and the party is formally knwon as the Social Christian Party-COPEI.

77 No records are kept of the frequency with which possible combinations of presidential and legislative ballots are cast. This, it can only be inferred that extra Social Christian presidential ballots came from those who voted for the legislative slates of the Communists and the National Civic Crusade. Table 12 also suggests that each of the other presidential candidates received votes from supporters of these political parties.

78 For a useful discussion of social and economic development in Venezuela see *The Economic Development of Venezuela* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1961).

79 Cf. BETANCOURT, pp. 251-253, MARTZ, *Acción Democrática*, pp. 25-33, 316-318, 320-322 and 374-390, McDONALD, pp. 37-40 and ALEXANDER, *The Communist Party of Venezuela*, pp. 5-16.

TABLE 12

PERCENT OF TOTAL PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE VOTE RECEIVED BY IMPORTANT POLITICAL PARTIES IN VENEZUELA SINCE ESTABLISHMENT OF UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE

PARTY	ELECTIONS								
	1946[1]	1947		1958		1963		1968	
		Leg.	pres.	leg.	pres.	leg.	pres.	leg.	pres.
Acción Democrática	78.4	70.8	74.4	49.5	49.2	32.7	32.8	25.7	27.5
Social Christians	13.2	17.0	22.4	15.2	15.2	20.8	20.2	24.2	28.6
Dem. Republican Union	4.3	4.3	—	26.8	30.7	17.4	17.5	9.3	10.9
Communists	3.6	3.7	3.2	6.2	3.2	a.	—	2.8	—
Popular Dem. Force	—	—	—	—	—	9.6	9.4	5.3	6.5
National Dem. Front	—	—	—	—	—	13.3	16.1	2.6	3.3
National Civic Crusade	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	11.1	—
People's Electoral Mvt.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	13.0	17.3
Revolutionary Party of National Integration	—	—	—	—	—	2.3	2.3	2.3	1.8
Total	99.5	95.8	100.0	97.7	98.3	96.1	98.3	96.3	95.9

Source: Calculated from official statistics of the Consejo Supremo Electoral de Venezuela.

a. The Communist Party, because of participation in guerrilla warfare against the Betancourt government, was outlawed in 1962. In 1967, with the guerrilla movement in shambles the Communists were legalized as the Advancement Union (U.P.A.).

1 Election for Constituent Assembly.

In seeking out the social underpinnings of contemporary Venezuelan parties, a logical first strategy is to identify the structural cleavages that played an important part in consolidating party clientele following the extension of universal suffrage. After identification of early cleavage-party relationships, study of their evolution in subsequent elections would reveal the route by which Venezuelan parties came to represent the social and economic groups for which they speak. The tools of political sociology, unfortunately, have been used sparingly to differentiate the bases of mass support for Venezuelan parties.[80] Nevertheless, Venezuelan parties have been described, and while studies are of uneven quality they hold ample generalizations for recasting as hypotheses about the cleavages Lipset postulates to be of primary importance for party systems in developing nations.[81] Subsequent discussion distills such hypotheses from the existing literature on Venezuelan parties.

A. CENTER-PERIPHERY CLEAVAGE:

Venezuelans, particularly the upper class of Caracas, played a central role in liberating northern South America, which became the nation of Gran Colombia.[82] The Caracas elite, however, chafed under domination by a government based in Bogotá and seceded from Gran Colombia. Unfortunately, independence did not guarantee national unity. Between 1830 and 1903 rival regional *caudillos* from Caracas (the "Core"), the "Plains" the "East", the "Andes", and the "West" struggled for political supremacy.[83] In 1899 Andeans gained the upper

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80 An important exception is BORIS BUNIMOV-PARRA, *Introducción a la Sociología Electoral Venezolana* (Caracas: Editorial Arte, 1967). Bunimov-Parra work will be referred to subsequently in greater detail.

81 These studies will be discussed in subsequent analysis of structural cleavages and party system generation in Venezuela.

82 For a comprehensive account see GERHARD MASUR, *Simón Bolívar* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1948).

83 Cf. JOSÉ A. SILVA MICHELENA, *The Illusion of Democracy in Dependent Nations* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), pp. 41-49, GUILLERMO MORÓN, *A History of Venezuela*, tr. John Street (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1964), pp. 148-199, and LAUREANO VALLENILLA LANZ, *Cesarismo Democrático* (Caracas: Tipografía Garrido, 1961), especially pp. 123-147.

In addition, it is useful to define the regions referred to throughout this study as "Andes", "East", "Plains", "West" and Caracas. The "Andes" include the states of Mérida, Táchira and Trujillo. The "West" encompasses the states of Zulia, Falcón, Lara and Yaracuy. In the "Plains" are Apure, Barinas, Cojedes, Guárico and Portuguesa. The "East" is composed of the states of Anzoátegui, Monagas, Nueva Esparta, Sucre, Bolívar and the Federal territories of Delta Amacuro and Amazonas. Caracas presently includes the Federal District and the Sucre District of Miranda state. In the nineteenth century the designation Caracas was sometimes given to all of central Venezuela. For the purposes of this paper the area most often

hand. Four years later, with asistance from Caracas, the Andeans crushed an uprising of regional elites. Subsequently, the defeated *caudillos* were unable to mount a serious military challenge to those controlling the central government.[84]

Andeans held political sway in Venezuela between 1899 and 1945.[85] General Juan Vicente Gómez siezed power in 1907 from the first Andean ruler, Cipriano Castro, when the latter journeyed abroad for medical treatment. Gómez ruled until his death in 1935. During the final Gómez years, and throughout the administration of his successor, General López Contreras, many *Caraqueños* secured high government positions. *Caraqueños*,[86] more educated and experienced in commerce than other regional groups, gained political influence as modernization demanded bureaucrats skilled in economics, law and engineering. By the late 1930's major political decisions were being made by *Caraqueños* as well as Andeans.[87]

Easterners, Plainsmen and Westerners seldom held positions of influence during the Andean decades. Understandably, therefore, youths from the former regions — the "Periphery" — appeared in the forefront of movements opposing the power of Caracas and the Andes. As John Martz and other scholars have noted, Easterners, Plainsmen and Westerners played dominant roles in creating *Acción Democrática*, Venezuela's most important anti-regime political organization by the middle 1940's.[88] When elections based on universal suffrage were first held, *Acción Democrática* received overwhelming support in the

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called "Caracas" will be referred to as the "Core". Included in the "Core" are the states of Miranda, Aragua, Carabobo and the Federal District. From the perspective of Venezuelan nation building the "Andes" — "Core" alliance that ruled from 1899 to 1945 is the "Center".

84 MORÓN, p. 185.

85 The best available analysis is DOMINGO ALBERTO RANGEL, *Los Andinos en el Poder* (Caracas: n.p., 1964). Cf. SILVA MICHELENA, pp. 50-77.

86 The Venezuelan designation for an inhabitant of Caracas.

87 For example, the most important "bright young man" in the administration of López Contreras and Medina Angarita (1935-1940 and 1940-1945) was Arturo Uslar Pietri, a leading Caracas intellectual. Cf. BETANCOURT, pp. 195-197. Arturo Uslar Pietri, "Prólogo", in ISAÍAS MEDINA ANGARITA, *Cuatro Años de Democracia* (Caracas: Pensamiento Vivo, 1963), MARTZ, *Acción Democrática*, pp. 56-62 and EDWIN LIEWEN, *Venezuela*, 2d. ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 61-63. BOTH MARTZ and LIEWEN, in the passages referred to, discuss the rivalry between the *Lopezistas* and the *Medinistas*. To a large degree the former group were "traditional" Andeans and the latter an amalgam of "modern" Andeans and *Caraqueños*.

88 MARTZ, *Acción Democrática*, p. 49. Cf. BETANCOURT, pp. 165-167 and BUNIMOV-PARRA, pp. 164-165.

"East", the "Plains", and the "West".[89] Its major rival, the Social Christian Party, won only in the "Andes" and made a stronger than average showing in Caracas.[90] So discredited was the Andean-Caracas alliance in the "East" that the Social Christians, perceived by many as that alliance's political surrogate, received less than one percent of the vote in several states of the region. Elements in the "East" opposed to *Acción Democrática* clustered around the minuscule Democratic Republican Union. The Democratic Republican Union echoed most of the policies proposed by *Acción Democrática,* but its founders, many of whom were Easterners, rejected the leadership of Rómulo Betancourt.[91]

Analysis of regionalism suggests several hypotheses:

1) *Acción Democrática* emerged as a vehicle whereby the "Periphery" could end forty years of rule by the "Center", the Andean-Caracas elite. *Acción Democrática* therefore will receive a substantially greater share of votes in the "Periphery" than in the "Center".

2) The Social Christian Party, perceived as representing the Andean-Caracas elite, will receive relatively greater support in the "Center" than in the "Periphery".

3) The Democratic Republican Union, rival to *Acción Democrática* where Andeans were least influential, will be strongest throughout the "Periphery", in general, and the "East", in particular.

4) Economic development and modernization between 1946 and 1968, by making the country more homogeneous, will reduce the importance of "Center" — "Periphery" cleavage in Venezuelan party politics.[92]

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89 RANGEL, p. 31, in describing the overthrow of Medina Angarita, begins "...the Andean regime fell of October 18, 1945..." Cf. BUNIMOV-PARRA, pp. 59-63, for a linking of the Social Christians with the more "traditional" Andeans of López Contreras.

90 BUNIMOV-PARRA, *Cuadro Anexo III.*

91 *Ibid.*, p. 267, reveals that in the congressional elections of 1947 the Democratic Republican Union finished in second place in the states of Anzoátegui, Cojedes, Monagas, Nueva Esparta, Sucre and the Federal Territory Amacuro. Discussions of the early history of the Democratic Republican Union regional peculiarities appear in LIEWEN, *Venezuela,* p. 73, and J. M. DOMÍNGUEZ CHACÍN, *Carta Abierta a Jóvito Villalba* (Cacacas: n.p., 1968), p. 9. Cf. the discussion by ROBERT J. ALEXANDER, *The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964, pp. 98-99 and BETANCOURT, p. 252.

92 JOHN D. MARTZ, *"Venezuela"*, BEN G. BURNETT and KENNETH F. JOHNSON, eds., *Political Forces in Latin America,* p. 282, claims that the "average Venezuelan is becoming less conscious of his regionalism".

B. CLERICAL-ANTICLERICAL CLEAVAGE:

During the colonial period, according to the historian, Guillermo Morón, the Venezuelan clergy were "respected but had no power".[93] Nevertheless, as in all Latin America, the church owned property, controlled education and kept vital records. General Antonio Guzmán Blanco, Venezuela's most successful *caudillo* of the 1870's and 1880's, restricted clerical prerogatives by establishing civil marriage, ending church control over education and confiscating ecclesiastical property.[94] In the wake of Guzmán Blanco's attack, the Venezuelan hierarchy's influence was confined to spiritual matters, and even here varied from weak in the "East" to strong in the "Andes". Consequently, almost seventy years before the emergence of mass politics in Venezuela, anticlericals achieved most of their goals.

Clerical influence revived slowly during the long rule of General Juan Vicente Gómez. Allowing the Jesuits to establish San Ignacio High School in Caracas proved an important milestone.[95] Jesuit education for the capital's youth, while confined to the upper class, revived anti-clerical sentiment. The relatively weak position of the church, however, prevented anticlericalism from becoming the intense political issue it remained in countries where ecclesiastical power had never been broken as completely as in Venezuela. Nevertheless, the quickening of political activity following the death of General Gómez brought many spokesmen unsympathetic to the church into the public eye.

Venezuela's oldest political party, the Communists, as expected, preached militant atheism.[96] Fortunately, from the church's standpoint, the Communists remained an isolated fringe. On the other hand, the anticlericalism of the increasingly popular political movement, ORVE, posed a greater threat.[97] ORVE, which nationalistic moderates and leftists hoped to develop into a force for social, economic and political change, served as a rallying point of oppposition to General López Contreras during 1937 and 1938. While ORVE split into rival factions before it could realize its potential, the position of the church remained delicate. Even the relatively traditional government of President Medina Angarita created a political party, the Venezuelan Democratic Party

93 MORÓN, p. 81.
94 *Ibid.*, pp. 178-182; cf. LIEWEN, *Venezuela*, pp. 42-43.
95 SILVA MICHELENA, p. 56.
96 For a detailed discussion of the Communists see ALEXANDER, *The Comunist Party of Venezuela.*
97 MARTZ, *Acción Democrática*, pp. 25-33.

(P.D.N.), that exuded mild anticlericalism.[98] The church, apprehensive over its lack of rapport with the Venezuelan Democratic Party, became alarmed when revolution brought *Acción Democrática* to power. *Acción Democrática* leaders came from what had been the most militantly socialist faction of ORVE.[99]

The ecclesiastical hierarchy feared that anti-clerical politicians would attack resurgent Catholic education. Belief in the imminence of such an offensive was strengthened when the Ministry of Education moved to control the curriculum in Catholic high schools.[100] State subsidies to the church also were perceived in danger. Ecclesiastical leaders saw Rafael Caldera's minuscule Social Christian Party as the only power contender not anticlerical. Consequently, the church supported the Social Christians.[101]

Discussion of the clerical-anticlerical cleavage leads to the following hypotheses:

1) The Social Christian Party became a vehicle through which the church could defend itself against prevailing anticlericalism during the middle 1940's. Social Christian support will be greatest where ecclesiastical influence is strongest.

2) The strength of the anticlerical parties — *Acción Democrática,* the Venezuelan Communist Party and the Democratic Republican Union — will vary inversely with indicies of ecclesiastical influence.

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98 The Venezuelan Democratic Party's leading theorist was Arturo Uslar Pietri. Uslar Pietri, a member of the Caracas elite, came from a family that favored the anticlerical liberals during the nineteenth century. For an informative discussion of the social and economic programs of the Venezuelan Democratic Party see Partido Democrático Venezolano, *La Libertad Económica y La Intervención del Estado* (Caracas: Tipografía La Nación, 1945).

99 MARTZ, *Acción Democrática,* pp. 33-48.

100 Cf. DANIEL H. LEVINE, "Political Development in Venezuela: Conflict, Conciliation, and Exclusion" (mimeograph: Department of Political Science, University of Michigan), pp. 18-19.

The feeling about Ministry of Education designs on the Catholic high schools during 1946-1948 was expressed to the author by several Caracas professionals who attended them at that time.

101 Cf. ALEXANDER, *The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution,* p. 84, LIEWEN, *Venezuela,* p. 72, BUNIMOV-PARRA, p. 308, MARTZ, *Acción Democrática,* p. 321 and PHILIP B. TAYLOR JR., *The Venezuelan Golpe de Estado of 1958: the Fall of Marcos Pérez Jiménez,* p. 24.

C. Traditional culture-Modern culture cleavage:[102]

"Traditional culture's" attitude set predominated throughout Venezuela well into the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the Venezuelan variant of "traditional culture" never evolved into the refined system of roles and attitudes characteristic of civilizations in China, India, the Mediterranean and medieval Europe. Relative to other regions in Latin America Venezuela lacked precious metals and gems, was sparsely populated and attracted only colonists of low status.[103] Nevertheless, cattle raising, the development of cacao as a significant export crop and the emergence of Caracas as a bustling commercial and political center increased Venezuela's visibility during the late eighteenth century. Within the region a native-born oligarchy based on ranching, agriculture and commerce, began challenging the political and social dominance of Spanish-born bureaucrats and merchants, the *Peninsulares.*[104]

Tension between *Peninsulares* and the coalescing Venezuelan oligarchy, called *Mantuanos,* stimulated the independence movement. While a majority of *Mantuanos* rebelled in 1810, an important minority remained loyal to Spain.[105] Not until after two decades of bloody civil war was independence achieved. The fighting decimated the *Mantuanos,* caused extensive property damage and cost one fourth of the national population.[106] In the wake of such carnage Venezuela functioned only sporadically as a unified political entity. Regional *caudillos,* many of whom came to prominence in the struggle against Spain, ruled as feudal lords over large areas. Caracas exercised only nominal control outside of central Venezuela, and on numerous occasions experienced occupation by a successful *caudillo.* Occupation placed *Caraqueños* with predominantly "modern" attitude sets on the defensive. Consequently, the capital seldom transmitted "modernism" to the "periphery" during the nineteenth century.[107]

Given the seemingly interminable violence between 1830 and 1903, few peasants would have been receptive to "modern" attitude sets

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102 The terms "traditional" culture and "modern" culture correspond to the usage in Lerner, p. 57. Each makes up only one element of what Lerner defines as "traditional society" and "modern society". "Traditional" and "modern" culture, as used by Lerner, seem closer to Lipset's concepts of "traditionalism" and "modernism" than more encompassing "traditional society" and "modern society".

103 Silva Michelena, pp. 33-40.

104 Literally, someone born in the peninsula — Spain. Cf. the discussion in Salvador De Madariaga, *The Fall of Spanish American Empire* (New York: Collier Books, 1963), pp. 40-44.

105 Cf. Morón, pp. 59-62, 87, 98, and Silva Michelena, pp. 40-43.

106 Vallenilla Lanz, pp. 11-122.

107 Morón, pp. 153-199. Cf. *Ibid.,* pp. 123-147.

even if they could have been disseminated throughout the countryside. The Caracas elite, no less than its provincial rivals, used terror and demagoguery to recruit peasants into the army. *Caudillos* from both the "Core" and the "Periphery" promised land in return for military service. All broke their word and employed violence against those demanding that the bargain be honored.[108] Consequently, peasants feared interaction with Caracas nation builders no less than with regional chieftains. Rómulo Gallegos captured the sentiment in *Cantaclaro* when a peasant, after spending several hours in a small settlement, explains:

> "...I sold what was mine. Let us go out of this town and away from the townspeople. In this land where I live, the only way to have peace is to remain hidden from the authorities".[109]

This attitude reinforced geographically imposed isolation and inhibited "modern" culture's penetration of the barbaric "traditionalism" that emerged throughout the "periphery" after independence.

In 1903, as discussed earlier, Cipriano Castro defeated the regional *caudillos* in a series of bloody clashes.[110] Victory ended seven decades of near anarchy and brought stability that led to a national climate favoring modernization. Neither Castro nor Juan Vicente Gómez, his successor, however, consciously desired urbanization, mass literacy and popular participation in politics — all components of what Lerner defines as "modern society".[111] On the contrary, Gómez hated cities, grudgingly tolerated elite education and jailed critics of his regime. When the older dictator died, in 1935, literacy rates, often, used to indicate "modern culture",[112] stood where there had been a half century earlier, at 32 percent.[113] Even this figure may have been inflated, for ability to write or recognize one's name often sufficed to demonstrate literacy for the census taker.[114]

Peasant attitudes began to change in the stable milieu of Castro and Gómez. Dread of conscription declined. Reducing this fear em-

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108 POWELL, *The Political Mobilization of the Venezuelan Peasant*, pp. 15-18.
109 Quoted from RÓMULO GALLEGOS, *Cantaclaro* (Buenos Aires: Espasa-Calpe, 1966), p. 31.
110 Of these most important were the battles of La Victoria (October-November, 1901), La Puerta (December, 1901), and El Guapo (April, 1903). MORÓN, pp. 184-185.
111 LERNER, p. 57.
112 Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.
113 República de Venezuela, *Novono Censo General de la República, Resumen*, Parte "A", p. 12.
114 Confirmed in interviews with technicians in Venezuela's *Banco Central* and *Ministerio de Fomento*. The latter has over-all responsibility for the Venezuelan census.

boldened some peasants to voice grievances over the breaking of earlier promises of land. However, no sooner had the peasantry regained a measure of physical security than worsening conditions in the international market posed a new threat. Lower prices for Venezuelan agriculture produce caused landowners to reduce the peasants already abysmal living standard in order to maintain profit levels. Frustrated peasants proved receptive to "modern" organizers.[115]

Inadvertently, Gómez also stimulated the spread of "modern" culture by opening Venezuela to exploitation by the international petroleum corporations. Discovery of massive oil reserves brought unimagined wealth.[116] Cities expanded, contact with "modern societies" increased and resources became available which could raise literacy rates in even the most remote villages. Governments more or less committed to modernization came to power after 1935, and in the following quarter century, Venezuela's literacy rate rose to 66 percent.[117] "Traditional culture" was retreating, and even allowing for inaccuracies in the census, "modern" attitudes dominated for the first time.

Analysis of the "modern culture" — "traditional culture" cleavage in Venezuela suggests the following hypotheses:

1) Because the Social Christians and *Acción Democrática* coalesced when "traditional culture" predominated, and because they then obtained a majority in at least one major region of Venezuela, voting for each should correlate positively with indicies of "traditional culture".[118]

2) Since the Social Christians are widely reported to have many highly educated supporters, the positive correlation of Social Christian voting with "traditional culture" indicies will be lower than the corresponding correlation for *Acción Democrática.*

3) Because the Democratic Republican Union finished second to *Acción Democrática* in 1946 and 1947 throughout the highly "traditional" "East", and because the former inherited the latter's clien-

115 POWELL, *The Political Mobilization of the Venezuelan Peasant,* especially chapters I and II.

116 The best available discussion in English is EDWIN LIEUWIN, *Petroleum in Venezuela: a History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954).

117 *Noveno Censo General de la República,* Resumen Parte "A", p. 12.

118 In 1941 46.1 percent of the inhabitants (15 years and over) of Táchira were classed as "literate". The corresponding percent in Mérida was 32.8 For an informative discussion of social conditions and attitudes in the "Andes" see RANGEL, chapter I.

tele in the electoral fiasco of 1952, [119] the Democratic Republican Union's initial support apparently came from "traditionals". However, since the party received an overwhelming urban vote in 1958, when Admiral Wolfgang Larrazábal ran as its presidential candidate,[120] and because "modern culture" was then dominant in the cities, the Democratic Republican Union of the early 1960's is hypothesized to have encompassed both "traditionals" and "moderns". Its vote, therefore, will not correlate significantly with indicies of the "traditional" — "modern culture" cleavage.

4) The Venezuelan Communist Party's initial support, as discussed earlier, came largely from Caracas and Maracaibo.[121] There is no evidence the Communists made inroads into the "traditional" countryside between 1948 and 1958, when the party, while illegal, was tolerated.[122] Therefore, the clientele of the Communist Party will remain "modern".

5) New parties emerging after 1958 — The National Democratic Front, the Popular Democratic Force, the Revolutionary Party of National Integration, the People's Electoral Movement and the National Civic Crusade — drew support from an increasingly "modern" electorate.[123] It is hypothesized that their emergence was related to pressures from accelerating "modernization" which decreased the likelihood that "modern" and "traditionals" could receive a mutually satisfactory interest aggregation from the same party. Therefore, indicies for "modern culture" are hypothesized to correlate significantly — either negatively or positively — with support for the new parties.

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119 *Acción Democrática* was not allowed to participate in the presidential elections of 1952, and in an attempt to oust the military government of General Pérez Jiménez, threw its support to the Democratic Republican Union. In spite of the Democratic Republican Union's apparent victory its candidate, Jóvito Villalba, was sent into exile. For a more comprehensive discussion see LEO B. LOTT, "The 1952 Venezuelan Elections: A Lesson for 1957", *Western Political Quarterly* (September, 1957), pp. 451-458.

120 Cf. BUNIMOV-PARRA, pp. 279-282, ALEXANDER, *The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution*, pp. 59-60 and BETANCOURT, p. 252.

121 ALEXANDER, *"The Communist Party of Venezuela"*, pp. 23-26.

122 *Ibid.*, pp. 29-47.

123 In 1955 total expenditures by the Ministry of Education were 160.1 million bolívares or 5.3 percent of the total national budget. In 1965 the corresponding figures were 873.4 million bolívares and 11.5 percent of the total national budget. Compiled from the *Anuario Estadístico de Venezuela - 1965*, pp. 290-291 and *Informe al Congreso Nacional - 1966*, pp. 24, 108.

D. URBAN-RURAL CLEAVAGE:

In 1940 two thirds of all Venezuelans lived in settlements of less than 2,500. Caracas boasted a population of slightly over 400,000, while only the cities of Maracaibo, Barquisimeto, and Valencia exceeded 50,000. Between 1940 and 1961, as revealed by Table 13, Venezuelan cities grew explosively.

TABLE 13

GROWTH OF VENEZUELA'S FIVE LARGEST CITIES 1941 - 1961

	POPULATION		
CITY	1941	1950	1961
Caracas	414,808	790,447	1,501,289
Federal District	380,703	709,602	1,257,515
Sucre District	34,703	80,845	243,774
Maracaibo	121,601	235,750	421,827
Barquisimeto	54,176	105,108	199,691
Valencia	54,796	88,701	163,601
Maracay	32,992	64,535	135,353

Source: *Noveno Censo General de la República, Resumen,* Parte "A".

In addition, by 1961 only one third of the population lived in hamlets of under 2,500, while an equal number now resided in urban areas of over 45,000.[124] Metropolitan Caracas exceeded 1.5 million and Maracaibo boasted a larger population than had Caracas two decades earlier. Rural life styles no longer predominated. The history of Venezuelan urbanization suggests the following propositions:

1) Because they dominated Venezuelan electoral politics when the country was predominantly rural, *Acción Democrática* and the Social Christians initially were parties of the countryside.[125] Available evidence indicates that both were weakened disproportionately in the cities by the regime of Pérez Jiménez.[126] Therefore, support for *Acción*

124 Calculated from the *Noveno Censo General de la República.*

125 See Table 12. This, of course, excludes the fraudulent elections of 1952 in which *Acción Democrática* threw its support to the Democratic Republican Union.

126 ALEXANDER, *The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution,* p. 76. Cf. POWELL, *The Political Mobilization of the Venezuelan Peasant,* pp. 190-191, TAYLOR, pp. 60-65 and RAY, pp. 112, 125 and 150.

Democrática and the Social Christians in the 1958 elections is hypothesized to correlate negatively with indicies of urbanism.

2) Given the increasingly urban population, negative correlation between support for Venezuela's two initially dominant parties and indicies of urbanism will weaken when either retains or improves upon the percentage of total vote it received in 1958.

3) Given control of the countryside by *Acción Democrática* and the Social Christians, the parties that dramatically increased their vote in 1958 (The Communist Party of Venezuela and the Democratic Republican Union) will draw disproportionately from urban voters. The same will hold for parties that became important in the elections of 1963 and 1968 (The National Democratic Front, the Popular Democratic Force, the National Civic Crusade and the People's Electoral Movement).[127]

E. OWNER-WORKER CLEAVAGE:

Venezuelan workers first organized in the Federal District between 1910 and 1920.[128] The new unions attempted several strikes which the government of Juan Vicente Gómez quickly crushed. Although he jailed militant labor leaders, Gómez established a Worker's Federation *(Federación Obrera).* The *Federación Obrera,* which claimed a membership of 25,000, became Venezuela's representative in the International Labor Organization. Members of the *Federación Obrera* were largely imaginary, and Gómez attached its headquarters to his Ministry of the Interior.[129] He did not intend that organized labor should have even the slightest opportunity to function as an autonomous group.

In the relaxation following the death of Gómez an autonomous labor movement evolved. Petroleum workers around Lake Maracaibo and employees of mass transit and light industry, largely from the Federal District, were among the first to be organized.[130] By the early

127 Cf. BUNIMOV-PARRA, pp. 280, 298-299, 329, MARTZ, "Venezuela", pp. 286, 288 and JOHN D. MARTZ and PETER B. HARKINS, "Urban Electoral Behavior in Latin America: the Case of Metropolitan Caracas, 1958-1968", paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association convention, Los Angeles, California, September 8, 1970.

128 Cf. VICTOR ALBA, *Politics and the Labor Movement in Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968).

129 U.S. Army, *Area Handbook for Venezuela* (Washington, D.C.: SORO, 1964), p. 413.

130 ALBA, p. 273.

1940's two political parties, *Acción Democrática* and the Communists, competed for control of the fledgling unions. The former gained an upper hand during 1943, and following the revolution of 1945 the latter lost most of its influence.[131] However, the coup of 1948, again gave power to opponents of *Acción Democrática.* The new government dissolved the *Acción Democrática* dominated Venezuelan Confederation of Workers (C.T.V.), jailing or exiling its leaders. Throughout the following decade labor leaders fought in the underground to preserve their unions and restore democracy. Ironically, those who seized power in defense of the *status quo* tacitly encouraged the Communists to recapture influence among the workers. Communist organizers, however, made little headway against the clandestine authority exercised by *Acción Democrática.* With the return of democracy *Acción Democrática* again openly dominated organized labor.[132]

After 1958, although *Acción Democrática* held a majority in most unions within the Venezuelan Confederation of Labor (C.T.V.), minority positions were guaranteed to factions allied with competing parties.[133] The Democratic Republican Union, following the 1958 elections, emerged as organized labor's second political force. U.R.D. labor support weakened, however, when interparty rivalry erupted into an open power struggle.[134] The victors expelled the losers, several of whom were important union leaders. In contrast, the influence of the Social Christian Party within organized labor grew throughout the 1960's. *Acción Democrática,* nevertheless, remained dominant until the split of 1967.

In summation, *Acción Democrática* played a central role in organizing Venezuelan labor and dominated the Venezuela Confederation of Workers during the early 1940's. *Acción Democrática,* however, came to power because of the military coup in 1945, rather than on the strength of the previously discussed "liberal alliance".[135] The "alliance" failed to materialize in Venezuela. This was due to foreign domination of industry and the relatively slow evolution of a national bourgeoisie not allied with historic landed elites. A dynamic and

131 U.S. Army, p. 414.
132 *Ibid.,* pp. 422-426. Cf. ALBA, pp. 276-277.
133 U.S. Army, pp. 425-426, Cf. MARTZ, *Acción Democrática,* pp. 267-270.
134 This was the often discussed struggle between Jóvito Villalba, the founder of the Democratic Republican Union, and Alirio Ugarte Pelayo, the most important of the party's younger leaders. For an excellent summary of the clash see POWELL, *The Political Mobilization of the Venezuelan Peasant,* pp. 190-193. Cf. the more comprehensive account, BHILLA TORRES MOLINA, *Alirio* (Caracas: n.p., 1968).
135 See foot note 56.

confident national bourgeoisie only became a power contender during the middle 1950's, half a decade after the 1948 coup ended Venezuela's first brief experiment in electoral democracy.[136] Also, during the experiment *Acción Democrática's* militant socialism created distrust between itself and the then embryonic national bourgeoisie.

From the perspective of relations between the owner-worker cleavage and political parties, Venezuela in 1946 resembled the Western European model. At that time labor gravitated into one party, *Acción Democrática.* Factory owners supported its major rival, the Social Christians. However, Venezuela's relatively low level of industrial development meant that electoral majorities were impossible if support came only from workers. [137] Labor, therefore, allied inside of *Acción Democrática* with other historically powerless or "have-not" elements — "peripherals", peasants and slum dwellers.

While *Acción Democrática* was never exclusively a party of industrial workers, their presence would be expected to correlate positively with the party's vote in 1946 and 1947. The situation, however, becomes muddied following the decade of military rule. By then, as indicated earlier, the Democratic Republican Union and the Social Christians had developed important minority factions within organized labor. Also, most industrial workers lived in urban areas, and here dictatorship proved relatively successful in rooting out *Acción Democrática* support. Intense efforts were needed to rebuild the party's urban grass roots, but those charged with the responsibility soon accused *Acción Democrática* of betraying its revolutionary heritage.[138] During the 1958 election campaign they already anticipated breaking with the party and were exploring the possibilities of alliance with the Communists. Difficulties also connected with factionalism crippled *Acción Democrática's* urban organizations prior to the 1963 elections.[139] Finally, the subsequent clash between Gonzalo Barrios and Prieto Figueroa shattered the unity of *Acción Democrática*

136 "Power contender" is used in the sense that CHARLES ANDERSON employs the term in his well known *Politics and Economic Change in Latin America* (Princeton: Van Nostrand-Rhinehold Publishing Inc., 1967). See the chapter on "The Latin American Political System".

137 This, of course, excludes peasants belonging to peasant unions. By the time of the fall of Gallegos there were an estimated 300,000 members in the Venezuelan Confederation of Workers. There years earlier there had been no more 50,000. Interview given by P. B. Pérez Salinas to Robert Jackson Alexander. Cited in ALEXANDER'S *Communism in Latin America* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press), p. 263.

138 Cf. RAY, pp. 111-113.

139 MARTZ *Acción Democrática,* pp. 183-196. Cf. RAY, pp. 118-130.

within the Venezuelan Confederation of Labor.[140] This can be assumed to have diluted further any remaining positive correlation between the presence of workers and voting for *Acción Democrática.* Relationships between the owner-worker cleavage and Venezuelan political parties, therefore, are hypothesized to be weak and confused after 1958.

F. POOR-OTHERS CLEAVAGE:

As recently as 1930 the social and economic order of "traditional" Society predominated in Venezuela.[141] A small upper class, dependent on land and arms, held sway at the apex of the income, status and power pyramids. Lawyers, priests, doctors, skilled artisians, university professors and merchants comprised a miniscule middle class that existed to accommodate upper class needs. Other Venezuelans, the overwhelming majority, were "poor".

In rural areas, the more fortunate peasants owned small plots. Most such plots, however, were incapable of feeding a peasant family. Employment on nearby large estates provided the margin between disaster and subsistence. Many peasants, however, lacking even a small plot of their own, survived as squatters or sharecroppers on the large estates. Life was no less harsh for the peasants' counterpart in the cities, slum dwellers. The urban poor performed menial tasks, servicing the upper and middle classes of Caracas and lesser regional centers. Poverty, whether for peasant or slum dweller, was a total life experience. It left an indelible mark. Again, writing in *Cantaclaro,* Rómulo Gallegos captured the feeling in verse:

> He who is born into poverty
> has his soul jigger-bitten.
> While the jigger may be gotten rid of,
> the bite always remains.[142]

Venezuela's poor became less resigned to their fate during the 1930's. As indicated earlier, peasants organized under the tutelege of *Acción Democrática,* and between 1945 and 1948 the party enacted

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140 JOSÉ RIVAS RIVAS, *Las Tres Divisiones de Acción Democrática* (Caracas: Pensamiento Vivo, 1968), pp. 57, 83, 87, 92 and 93.

141 "Traditional society" is used in the previously discussed sense in which Daniel Lerner employs the term. For an excellent discussion of "traditional society" in Venezuela see SILVA MICHELENA, pp. 34-49.

142 Quoted from GALLEGOS, p. 31.

a vigorous land reform program.[143] The program consolidated *Acción Democrática's* hold on the rural poor, but also pushed rural "haves" into the major opposition party, the Social Christians. Peasant loyalty to *Acción Democrática* was reinforced when the military government brought to power by the 1948 coup attempted to restore redistributed lands to former owners.[144]

The ruling generals also invested heavily in the cities. Massive public works projects provided employment and transformed Caracas into one of Latin America's most spectacular and attractive capitals. The lure of a better life in Caracas, Maracaibo and other large cities attracted hundreds of thousands of dissatisfied peasants into an urban milieu. The historic slums of urban Venezuela, never very extensive, could not accommodate the flood of new arrivals.[145] Migrants invaded and squatted on open land. By the early 1950's squatter settlements, called *ranchos,* were common in all major Venezuelan cities. The *rancho* population increased dramatically during 1958 and 1959, in the confusion surrounding the overthrow of Pérez Jiménez. By 1961 one-fourth of Venezuela's metropolitan population lived in *ranchos.*[146]

Rancho inhabitants became the new urban poor.[147] Sometimes without work and often underemployed, their entry into urban life was at the bottom of the social and economic ladder. Nevertheless, most perceived their new life an improvement. *Rancho* people looked to a brighter future with secure employment and in which their children might enter an expanding middle class.[148]

This study proposes that poverty has spurred the poor of Venezuela, urban as well as rural, to common political action. The following hypotheses emerge from the litterature:

1) *Acción Democrática* programs and organizational efforts made the party a spokesman for "have-nots". Contrastingly, most "others" were frightened into the Social Christian Party. While diluted

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143 Cf. discussion in the text related to footnote 115.

144 BETANCOURT, pp. 748-754.

145 RAY, pp. 31-48.

146 Calculated from the *Noveno Censo General de la República.* Metropolitan area is defined as a *municipio* in which there is a city of at least 45,000.

147 No studies of Venezuelan slum dwellers prior to the massive migrations from the contryside are available. Interviews with city planners in Caracas indicate that the preinvasion slums were never very extensive, and were overhelmed by rural migrants. For the purposes of this paper, Venezuela's urban poor will be considered the rural migrants who arrived in the cities after 1940.

148 Cf. RAY, chapters 8 and 9.

by subsequent events, this dichotomy continues. Therefore, the *Acción Democrática* vote will correlate positively with indicators of poverty and that of the Social Christians negatively.[149]

2) While the Democratic Republican Union was founded by individuals with backgrounds similar to *Acción Democrática's* leaders, the former party also attracted "others" who could not support the Social Christians.[150] The Democratic Republican Union, therefore, emerged as an amalgam of "poor" and "others". Democratic Republican Union support will not correlate significantly, either negatively or positively, with indicies of poverty.

3) The Venezuelan Communist Party also is hypothesized to be an alliance of "poor" and "others" — elites in a semisuccessful search for the proletariat.[151] The Communist vote will not correlate significantly with indicies of the poor-others cleavage.

4) Continued poverty in the face of expanding economic development will be taken as a sign by the remaining "poor" that existing party elites are unresponsive. Therefore, political parties emerging after 1958 will draw disproportionate strength from the "poor".

G. The methodology of testing:

Subsequent analysis employs multiple regression to explore relationships between the above mentioned cleavages and Venezuelan political parties. Socio-economic data from the *Noveno Censo General de la República, 1961,* provides potential indicies of cleavages between urban and rural, "traditional" culture and "modern" culture, "poor" and "others" and workers and owners. The potential cleavage indicies serve as independent variables in multiple regression equations. Percent of the vote received by each party is the dependent variable. Separate regressions will be attempted for each important political party in the elections of 1958, 1963, and 1968. Of major interest is which cleavage indices explain variance in party voting for the three elections. Equally important will be the relative strength cleavage indicators for each party.

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149 Liewen, *Venezuela,* pp. 72, 78, 81, 87, Alexander, *The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution,* pp. 76, 77, Bunimov-Parra, pp. 46-47.

150 Many former supporters of President Medina Angarita joined the Democratic Republican Union. On the other hand, followers of General López Contreras gravitated toward the Social Christians. Betancourt, pp. 251-252, Liewen *Petroleum in Venezuela,* pp. 72, 163.

151 Ray, pp. 127-136.

The socio-economic indicies and voting returns reflect data from Venezuela's 642 *municipios.*[152] A *municipio,* the smallest unit of government in Venezuela, resembles a township in the United States. Focusing on the *municipio* has several advantages when using aggregate data from Venezuela. Alternative geographical units, states and districts, often encompass large areas containing a variety of classes, sub-cultures and urban-rural mixtures. A *municipio,* in contrast, is small enough to segregate relatively homogeneous life styles. Also, *municipio* data provides a larger number of cases for purposes of correlation, thus lending this level to an increased reliability and significance. A perplexing problem about the *municipio* focus in Venezuela, however, is that *municipio* records are notoriously incomplete and difficult to obtain.

Proxies for the clerical-anticlerical cleavage are unavailable. They do not appear in the *Noveno Censo of 1961* and are not published by the Venezuelan hierarchy.[153] While regrettable, this may not prove of major consequence. Latin American clericalism often merged with "traditional culture" as a single factor,[154] and subsequent analysis will reveal the emergence of a strong proxy for Venezuela traditionalism. Also, it is asserted widely that the clerical — anticlerical struggle ceased to be of major political importance in Venezuela during the 1870's.[155] Nevertheless, a proxie for Venezuelan clericalism would be desirable. Neither should the distrust of ecclesiastical authority by *Acción Democrática,* the Democratic Republican Union and the Popular Democratic Force be discounted, nor should the pro-church attitude of the Social Christians be minimized.

The indicator for center-periphery cleavage merits special attention. Artificially created and dichotomous, it divides Venezuelan *municipios* into one group, the "Center", and a second group, the "Periphery". "Center" *municipios,* as indicated earlier, include the "Core": and the "Andes".[156] All other regions, the "West", the "Plains", and the "East", comprise the "Periphery".

Economic development after 1945 created greater structural differences between the "Andes" and the "Core" than between regions

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152 For a more detailed discussion of the *municipio* see *Relaciones Nacionales, Estadales y Municipales* (Chicago: Public Administration Service), pp. 32-50.

153 The most desirable proxies would be indicies like percent of *municipio* population attending mass each week or number of priests for number of *municipio* inhabitants.

154 Cf. "Conclusion", J. LLOYD MECHAM, *Church and State in Latin America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966).

155 See the earlier discussion surrounding footnote 94.

156 See footnote 83.

comprising the "Periphery".[157] Such differences likely set the "Center's" subregions on divergent paths of political evolution. If so, a "Core" — others and "Andes" — others dichotomy would prove important in explaining variance in party voting. This possibility will be explored.

Multiple regressions initially were run using eighteen socio-economic *municipio* indicies as cleavage proxies. Table 14 lists the indicies and the cleavage for which each served as a proxy. One indicie, percent of population change between 1951 and 1961, is hypothesized as a potential proxy for anomie.[158] While the indicie proved relatively insignificant, another procedure suggested the presence of anomie. This procedure will be discussed subsequently.

TABLE 14

AVAILABLE MUNICIPIO INDICIES AS POTENTIAL PROXIES FOR PARTY GENERATING CLEAVAGES

AVAILABLE INDICIE	HYPOTHESIZED CLEAVAGE PROXY
Average number of occupants per dwelling	poor-others
% *ranchos* of total dwellings	poor-others
% of total dwellings with thatched roofs	urban-rural
% of population under thatched roofs	urban-rural
% occupants with dirt floors	poor-others
% occupants with running water	poor-others
% occupants with flush toilets	poor-others
% occupants with sixth grade education	"traditional"-"modern"
% change in population 1951-1961	anomie
% living in *municipio* capital	urban-rural
% literate (10 years and over)	"traditional"-"modern"
% population in dwelling with mud and stick walls	urban-rural
% population in less than mud/stick	poor-others
% population in towns of less than 2,500	urban-rural
% population with electric lights	owner-workers
% population with radios	owner-workers
total *municipio* population	urban-rural
Periphery (artificial and dichotomous)	cener-periphery

157 The results of a recent survey in the "Center" show that during the 1960's the region had a net annual population increase of 6 percent annually, almost double the national population growth. See ARTURO SOSA, "Structural Factors in Venezuelan Economic Development", TAYLOR, ed., *Venezuela: 1969*, pp. 107-122.

158 *Chile - 1952*, pp. 1056-1058.

It is conceptually unwieldly to work with eighteen indicies. If a regression using one proxy for each cleavage explained approximately the same percent of variance in party voting as the larger number, matters would be simplified greatly.[159] Consequently, a number of multiple regressions were run using combinations of the eighteen variables in which one or two were inserted as proxies for each of the five cleavages. These runs revealed the following:

1) In no case did either of the hypothesized proxies for the owner-worker cleavage yield a regression coefficient significant to the .05, or whose exclusion appreciably affected the coefficient of determination (R^2). Consequently, either the owner-workers cleavage, as hypothesized, was unimportant in political party generation, or available proxies failed to reflect the cleavage.[160]

2) One combination of four indicies, each an hypothesized proxy for a different cleavage, consistently yielded a coefficient of determination (R^2) close to that obtained when running all eighteen as independent variables. This combination included: a. percent of *ranchos* in total dwellings (poor-others), b. percent of total population living in the *municipio* capital (urban-rural), c. percent literate ("traditional culture"-"modern culture") and d. "Periphery" (center-periphery). For example, when the eighteen variables were regressed against the percent of vote received by *Acción Democrática* in each *municipio* in 1958, the coefficient of determination was .47. When the four mentioned variables were substituted for the eighteen, the resulting coefficient of determination was .45. A loss of .02 in explained variance is a small price to pay for reduction to four variables. Consequently, in most instances results will be based on regressions employing the above four proxies.

3) In the case of COPEI, substituting the "Andes" — others dichotomy for that between the "Periphery" and "Center" yielded a significant increase in the coefficient of determination. Therefore, subsequent analysis also will explore the impact of the "Andes" — others and "Core" — others dichotomies on party voting.

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159 Cf. the procedure used in *ibid.*, 1056-1058.

160 The two indices hypothesized as proxies for the owner-worker cleavage involve the consumption of electricity. Electric consumption is often used to indicate the presence of industrial activity, a necessary condition for the emergence of the working class. Ideally, the proxie would have involved total electric consumption in each *municipio*. Unfortunately, such information was unavailable.

4) In the search for an urban — rural cleavage proxy, a dichotomy was created between metropolitan *municipios* and nonmetropolitan *municipios.* Municipios were placed in one category or the other on the basis of whether or not they contained a city of 45,000 or more.[161] In many "runs", a dichotomy between the two kinds of *municipios* yielded regression coefficients almost as significant as those for percent of population residing in the *municipio* capital. Subsequent "runs", the results of which will be examined in detail, revealed that the hypothesized cleavages of party generation operated differently in metropolitan and non-metropolitan *municipios.*

5) Finally, the matter of anomie remains. Emile Durkheim characterized anomie as a condition of normlessness, and studies in the developing areas indicate this condition most often emerges when modernization places traditional norms in questions.[162] Unfortunately, as indicated earlier, the hypothesized proxy of anomie, percent of population change in a *municipio* between 1951 and 1961, seldom appeared as a significant independent variable in explaining variance in party voting.

If anomie develops as traditional norms are placed into question, we may assume a high level of confusion and frustration among the anomic population. This confusion is likely to be expressed as aggressive alienation from the existing regime, especially if the regime has tenuous legitimacy and is subjected to even moderate stress. Alienation may be expressed as acts of violence to overturn the regime. It also may be expressed by voting for parties, of either the right or the left, which hope to alter existing "rules of the game".[163] To the extent that voting for such "rule altering" parties reflects alienation from the regime it may be considered a non-voluntary response.[164]

Non-voluntary responses are, of course, psychological. The magnitude of a psychological sensation Ψ increases as a power function of physical stimulus, as in Stephens Law $\Psi = c\emptyset n$ or in its logarithmic

161 Calculations from the *Noveno Censo* reveal that in 1961 one-third of all Venezuelans lived in metropolitan *municipios.*

162 Durkheim's discussion of anomie has been edited and is reproduced in ROY C. MACRIDIS and BERNARD BROWN eds., *Comparative Politics,* 3d. ed. (Homewood, Illinois: the Dorsey Press, 1968), pp. 644-650. Durkheim's detailed development of this concept appears in *Suicide: A Study in Sociology,* tr. by GEORGE SIMPSON (New York: The Free Press, 1951).

163 "Rules of the game" is used in the sense popularized by DAVID EASTON, to indicate the "regime".

164 *Chile - 1952,* p. 1057.

equivalent: $\log \Psi + \log c = n \log \emptyset$, where c and n are parameters which vary from one physical stimulus to another.[165]

Perceiving alienated voting as an involuntary response, some studies have employed a multiplicative model in multiple regression to explain variance in party voting.[166] The coefficients of determination (R^2) for the multiplicative model are then compared with those of the more common additive model.[167] If the former are greater, alienation is hypothesized to be politically significant, while if the latter proves greater alienation is deemed unimportant. Subsequent analysis will employ the four cleavage proxies in their additive and multiplicative forms to search for patterns of anomic behavior within the Venezuelan electorate between 1958 and 1968. For this purpose the "Y" variate, the criterion variable to be predicted, will be a party's percent of total *municipio* vote in whichever election is being examined. Indices for the cleavages proxies will be expressed as X_1, X_2, X_3 and X_4. It will then be possible to ascertain which of the following forms is the best predictor of variance in "Y".

1) $Y = b + M_1X_1 + M_2X_2 + M_3X_3 + M_4X_4$

2) $Y = b\ X_1m^1\ X_2m^2\ X_3m^3\ X_4m^4$

STRUCTURAL CLEAVAGES AND THE VENEZUELAN PARTY SYSTEM 1958 — 1963

The generals who siezed power in 1948 were determined to destroy and discredit *Acción Democrática.* This required, in addition to terrorizing party activist, eradication of evidence that the party once spoke for an overwhelming majority. Consequently, *municipio* returns for the elections of 1946, 1947 and 1948, which confirmed *Acción Democrática's* widespread appeal, disappeared. [168] Statistical testing of the impact of cleavage proxies, therefore, is possible only for elections following the overthrow of General Pérez Jiménez.

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165 *Ibid.*

166 Cf. *ibid.*, and D. BURNHAM and JOHN SPRAGUE, "Additive and Multiplicative Models of the Voting Universe", LXIV, 2, American Political Science Review (June, 1970), pp. 471-490.

167 In the multiplicative model, the actual regression to be employed will be Log (Y) = Log (b) + M_1 Log (X_1) + M_2 Log (X_2) + M_3 Log (X_3) + M_4 Log (X_4).

168 Various efforts to uncover the *municipio* election returns for these early elections proved in vain during field research in 1967 and 1968. Detailed results were available only for the parishes of Caracas.

Table 15 compares variance explained by the regression of cleavage proxies (additive form) against percent of the legislative vote received by each important party in the elections of 1958 and 1963.[169] Coefficients of determination (R^2) are of similar magnitude in both elections, but as will be analyzed subsequently, differ from those in the election of 1968.

Table 15 reveals a striking difference in coefficients of determination (R^2) between metropolitan *municipios* and ones without an urban center of 45,000 inhabitants. In the former, if *Acción Democrática Oposición* is excluded, R^2 ranges from .77 to .45. For the latter coefficients of determination are considerably lower, varying between .45 to .17. Only the urbanism proxy, percent of population residing in the *municipio* capital, has consistently higher beta weights in the non-metropolitan *municipios.* This is not surprising, for in the 72 metropolitan *municipios* an average of 93.1 percent of all inhabitants reside in the capital city, which sometimes encompasses an entire *municipio.* Contrastingly, for all other *municipios* 52.8 percent of the population, on an average, lives in the *municipio* capital.[170] The rural non-rural proxy, therefore, appears more useful in non-metropolitan *municipios.* The "Periphery" proxy emerges as equally significant in metropolitan and non-metropolitan *municipios,* and parties retain the same sign for beta weights of the regional measure in both. This is true also, with one exception, for the beta weights of proxies for the "traditional" — "modern culture" and the "poor" "others" cleavages.[171] However, beta weights for proxies of these cleavages proved consistently higher in metropolitan *municipios.* There is no satisfactory explanation for the disparity, which serves to substantiate earlier assertions concerning the importance of urban — rural cleavage in Venezuelan politics.

Meaningful differences appear between the beta weights of cleavage proxies for *Acción Democrática* and the Social Christians.

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169 Legislative returns, rather than presidential, are used in the regressions. In the author's judgment the former better reflect the social basis of Venezuelan party politics. Presidential returns magnify the personalism variable, important but deserving separate treatment. Parties generally received the same percent of legislative and presidential votes in the elections of 1958 and 1963. In the 1968 election, however, ticket splitting enabled the party with the second strongest legislative vote to elect the president. For a more complete discussion of voting in Venezuela see *Venezuela: Election Factbook, December 1, 1968* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1968), pp. 13-17.

170 Calculated from the *Noveno Censo.*

171 The important exception is *Acción Democrática* in regard to percent of population living in *ranchos.* This will be discussed subsequently.

TABLE 15

BETA WEIGHTS, CONSTANT AND COEFFICIENT OF DETERMINATION FOR PERCENT OF PARTY VOTE REGRESSED AGAINST CLEAVAGE VARIABLES (ADDITIVE FORM): ELECTIONS OF 1958 AND 1963

		ACCION DEMOCRATICA		SOCIAL CHRISTIANS		DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN UNION		COMMUNISTS	
		1958	1963	1958	1963	1958	1963	1958	1963
	% Rancho	.19**	.28**	—.36**	—.39**	.11**	—.08**	.08*	
A	% Capital	.03	—.12**	—.29**	—.30**	.26**	.28**	.22**	
L	% Literacy	—.22**	—.03	—.15**	—.28**	.37**	—.01	.45**	
L	Periphery	.48**	.43**	—.48**	—.42**	—.04	.48**	—.03	
	Constant	47.01	22.73	55.03	66.04	—4.24	6.31	—3.56	
N = 642	R^2	.44	.41	.43	.43	.30	.25	.36	
>	% Rancho	—.33**	—.04	—.77**	—.97**	.69**	.50**	.53**	
	% Capital	—.01	—.09	—.19*	—.22**	.14	.30**	.09	
45 K	% Literacy	—.79**	—.39*	—.24*	—.82**	.76**	.07	.86**	
	Periphery	.43**	.55**	—.33**	—.19**	—.29**	.46**	—.06	
N = 72	Constant	143.15	48.90	56.23	96.61	—69.00	59.23	—31.39	
	R^2	.77	.65	.53	.65	.56	.46	.51	
<	% Rancho	.22**	.29**	—.33**	—.34**	.06	—.08*	—.01	
	% Capital	.03	—.09*	—.25**	—.27**	.26**	.27**	.20**	
45 K	% Literacy	—.12**	—.07	—.11**	—.19**	.27**	.05	.24**	
	Periphery	.47**	.42**	—.48**	—.41**	.01	.42**	.07*	
N = 570	Constant	42.34	19.56	55.61	64.79	—2.21	4.25	2.50	
	R^2	.38	.36	.45	.44	.21	.26	.17	

* = beta weight significant to .10
** = beta weight significant to .05

TABLE 15 (con't)

BETA WEIGHTS, CONSTANT AND COEFFICIENT OF DETERMINATION FOR PERCENT OF PARTY VOTE REGRESSED AGAINST CLEAVAGE VARIABLES (ADDITIVE FORM): ELECTIONS OF 1958 AND 1963

		NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT		POPULAR DEMOCRATIC FORCE		ACCION DEMOCRATICA OPOSICION	
		1958	1963	1958	1963	1958	1963
	% Rancho		.12**		.20**		.11**
A	% Capital		.13**		.27**		.24**
L	% Literacy		.48**		.34**		—.06
L	Periphery		—.37**		—.28**		.05
	Constant		—3.58		—4.46		1.29
N = 642	R^2		.48		.34		.04
>	% Rancho		—.08		.70**		.10
	% Capital		—.03		.12		.10
45 K	% Literacy		.52**		.63**		.14
	Periphery		—.47**		—.36**		.14
N = 72	Constant		—11.76		—40.84		—.85
	R^2		.75		.45		.04
<	% Rancho		.08*		.16**		.11**
	% Capital		.08		.26**		.20**
50 K	% Literacy		.30**		.20**		—.07
	Periphery		—.37**		—.28**		.05
N = 570	Constant		.64		—1.80		3.90
	R^2		.24		.20		.03

* = beta weight significant to the .10
** = beta weight significant to the .05

As hypothesized, support for the former relates positively to residence in a "Periphery" *municipio,* to percent of *municipio* inhabitants reaining within "traditional" culture and to percent "poor". Contrary to expectations, in 1958 *Acción Democrática* support is not associated significantly with the proxy of urban-rural cleavage. Social Christian support, in contrast is associated negatively and significantly with percent of the *municipio* population residing in the *municipio* capital. Also, as predicated, Social Christian support appears negatively and significantly associated with residence in the "Periphery' and percent "poor" within the total *municipio* population. Beta weights for the Social Christians further reveal the hypothesized negative relation between party support and percent of "moderns" residing in the *municipio.* However, it was unforeseen that in some cases beta weights for the proxie of "modern culture" would prove more strongly negative for the Social Christians than for *Acción Democrática.*

Proxies for the "Center" — "Periphery" and "poor" — "others" cleavages mark important differences in support for *Acción Democrática* and the Social Christians. The significant and positive beta weights the former exhibits for "Periphery", when coupled with the latter's significant and negative beta weights, adds statistical evidence to impressionistic observations about the political importance of Venezuelan regionalism.

"Periphery" beta weights indicate that as recently as 1958 and 1963 the electorate perceived *Acción Democrática* as speaking on behalf of *Llaneros,* the Venezuelan designation for inhabitants of the "Periphery".[172] Of equal importance was the Social Christian image as a representative of the "Center". However, for neither party was the regionalism beta wieght as important in metropolitan *municipios* as in non-metropolitan ones. The former were changing more rapidly, and their lower "Center" — "Periphery" proxy beta weights suggest that the direction of change lessened the political importance of regionalism.

For Venezuela as a whole and in non-metropolitan *municipios,* as hypothesized, the "poor" — "others" cleavage sharply different-

172 *Llanos* translates literally as plains. Venezuelans commonly use the word *Llanos* in two distinct senses. The first, more restrictive, refers to the region encompassing the states of Apure, Barinas, Cojedes, Guárico and Portuguesa. The second encompasses all of Venezuela except the "Core" and the Andes. This paper uses the more comprehensive definition of *Llanos.*

iated support for *Acción Democrática* and the *Social Christians.* Results confirm popular notions about the former appealing to "have-nots" and the latter to "haves". Negative beta weights for *Acción Democrática* in the metropolitan *municipios,* however, proved a surprise. A majority of metropolitan area slum dwellers migrated from the "Periphery", where as "poor" their presence correlated positively with voting for *Acción Democrática.* This suggests that "poor" voters abandoned their allegiance to *Acción Democrática* after migrating, and raises the question of why.[173] One can hypothesize that an anti-*Acción Democrática* ethos developed in the slums between 1948 and 1958, and that it came to exert an overpowering influence on new arrivals. Some evidence points to this. The authority of the military regime that seized power in 1948 to prevent implementation of *Acción Democrática* programs was stronger in the cities and towns than in the countryside. Persecution, official propaganda and General Pérez Jiménez's courting of the urban poor by providing public works jobs may have producted the desired result — discrediting the former government party. Also, as Ray's study of the urban barrios revealed, Accción Democrática experienced debilitating reserves in the slums immediately prior to the elections of 1958 and 1963.[174] However, research must go beyond the few existing studies of Venezuela's urban poor before definitive generalizations are possible.[175]

A second possibility suggested by *Acción Democrática's* significant and negative beta weight for the "poor" proxy in metropolitan *municipios* is that, contrary to prevailing myths, the party appeals to elements of the urban non-poor. The negative beta weight, however, ceases to be significant in 1963. In that election, as will be discussed, Arturo Uslar Pietri's personalistic appeal won him overwhelm-

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173 Making causal inferences to individual behavior from ecological correlations, of course, commits the ecological fallacy. Therefore, because *Acción Democrática's* vote is positively related to percent "poor" within Venezuelan *municipios* it can not be "causally inferred" that "poor" voters disproportionately support *Acción Democrática.* The ecological correlation, when seen in the light of how the party system evolved, however, appears most logically interpreted as indicating "poor" voters disproportionately support *Acción Democrática.* Reasoning in the latter mode is "causal interpretation" in contrast to "causal inference". For a more detailed discussion of differences between "causal interpretation" and "causal inference" see ERIK ALLARDT, "Aggregate Analysis: The Problem of Its Informative Value", DOGAN and ROKKAN, eds., pp. 41-45.

174 RAY, pp. 98-138.

175 The available studies were discussed in the earlier summation of literature relating to the "poor" — others cleavage.

ing support among the urban middle class.[176] Changing *Acción Democrática* beta weights for the "poor" — "others" cleavage in metropolitan *municipios* may indicate the presence of a discerning urban "others", perhaps the middle class. Urban "others" likely lack the intense loyalty to *Acción Democrática* of its historic clientele — *Llaneros,* peasants and workers. Peasants, and to a lesser degree *Llaneros,* are a declining element in the electorate, which has led many to project a steadily diminishing percent of the vote for *Acción Democrática.*[177] However, if a large group of urban "others" sometimes inclines toward *Acción Democrática,* the party's vote will fluctuate according to the inclination of urban "others", regardless of whether or not more militant supperters become less numerous. This points to an important focus for investigation, differentiating between "others" irretrievably hostile to *Acción Democrática* and those willing to offer conditional support.[178]

The urban-rural cleavage proxy, as hypothesized, yielded a negative and significant beta weight for the Social Christians. However, unexpectedly, *Acción Democrática* support in 1958 was characterized by an insignificant beta weight for both metropolitan and non-metropolitan *municipios.* While, as discussed earlier, the urban-rural cleavage is often meaningless in metropolitan *municipios,* the insignificant beta weight in non-metropolitan *municipios* indicates that *Acción Democratica* clientele was distributed equally between the countryside and small towns.[179] However, five years later *Acción Democrática* exhibits the hypothesized negative beta weight for the urban proxy. This suggests that Betancourt's performance between 1959 and 1963, while satisfying the peasants, weakened *Acción Democrática* appeal in the small towns. One may speculate that agrarian reform and the extension of agricultural credits, cornerstones in Betancourt's agricultural policy, were operationalized in a manner that alienated *Acción Democrática* clientele in the small towns.[180] In any case, gene-

176 Cf. the analysis of the Caracas vote by MARTZ and HARKINS, pp. 13-19.

177 This proposition was repeated by a myriad of candidates and campaign strategists to the author during the 1968 election campaign.

178 The urban middle class in Venezuela is usually characterized as *anti-Adeco* (anti-*Acción Democrática*). See MARTZ, *The Venezuelan Elections of December 1, 1963 — Part I,* pp. 45-46.

179 Calculations from the *Noveno Censo* reveal that in non-metropolitan *municipios* 53 percent of the population live in the capital city.

180 Comprehensive discussions of Betancourt's agricultural programs appear in POWELL, *Political Mobilization of the Venezuelan Peasant,* chapter V, ALEXANDER, *The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution,* chapters XII and XIII and LOUIS E. HEATON, *The Agricultural Development of Venezuela* (New York: Praeger, 1969), chapter IV.

ralizations about *Acción Democrática's* relation to urbanism in non-metropolitan *municipios* must be re-examined.

Finally, *Acción Democrática* and the Social Christians, as expected, emerge from Table 15 as parties negatively associated with literacy, the proxy for "modern culture". To understand the historic rivals' similar negative relation to the "modern culture" proxy, as indicated earlier, one must return to the three democratic elections between 1945 and 1958. In these contests *Acción Democrática* and the Social Christians received approximately 90 percent of the total vote. Also, each obtained a majority in at least one major region of the country. Given the predominance of "traditional culture" at that time, electoral dominance in any major region argues that the victorious party's following would be largely "traditional".[181]

During the brief interregum between the overthrow of General Pérez Jiménez and the 1958 elections, *Acción Democrática* and the Social Christians concentrated on rebuilding support among their historic clienteles, rather on organizing newly important "moderns". In addition, the two parties governed in partnership during the administration of President Rómulo Betancourt. Throughout this partnership legitimation of democratic "rules of the game" consumed major time and energy, thus retarding efforts by either party to organize among the expanding "modern" electorate.

Finally, contrary to expectations, in 1963 the Social Christians evidenced larger negative beta weights for the "modern culture" proxy than *Acción Democrática.* The larger negative beta weights, however, do not necessarily invalidate the widespread impression that Social Christians are a party of the 'highly educated". "Highly educated", in the eyes of most observers, likely signified university educated, and university graduates constitute a small percent of the total population.[182] Contrastingly, the 1961 census revealed 62 percent of all Venezuelans to be literate.

If observations that the Social Christians attract a disproportionate share of university graduates are correct, and if university education,

181 See the earlier discussion surrounding footnotes 118 and 119.

182 For academic 1957-1958 total enrollment in all Venezuelan universities was 10,270. While exact figures are unavailable, a large number of those who enroll in the university never graduate. This situation, however, has changed dramatically since the overthrow of General Pérez Jiménez. See the discussions by GORDON C. ROSCOE, "The Efficacy of Venezuelan Education" and by JOSÉ RAFAEL REVENGA, "The Efficacy of Education in Venezuela", in TAYLOR, ed., 13-54.

at least until 1961, was reserved largely for children of the upper class, the Social Christian Party appears as a hybrid of Venezuela's most "traditional" masses joined to present day successors of the *mantuanos*. This characterization raises the question of whether an increasingly "modern" mass base will tolerate what must be a paternalistic relationship with the "highly educated" elite. In the long run, unless Catholic socialism proves more compelling than *Acción Democrática's* democratic socialism, pressures associated with the advance of "modern culture" will strain Social Christian unity, possibly to the breaking point.

Venezuela's other parties, the Democratic Republican Union, the Communists, the National Democratic Front and the Popular Democratic Force emerge from Table 15 with significant and positive beta weights for the "modern culture" and urban proxies. The first two parties, while predating the military coup of 1948, received jointly less than 10 percent of the total vote in elections between 1946 and 1948.[183] The latter two coalesced in anticipation of the 1963 elections, formed by politicians, businessmen and professionals who became disillusioned with established parties. In 1958 the Communists and the Democratic Republican Union polled 34 percent of the total legislative vote. The former, however, joined with *Fidelists* guerrillas in 1962, thus forfeiting legal status. This left three parties positively associated with "modern culture" and urbanism in the 1963 election. Together the three captured 41 percent of the total legislative vote.[184]

The Democratic Republican Union, the most important of the above four, was the only one to present candidates in the elections of both 1958 and 1963. Its cleavage proxy beta weights also underwent greater changes than those of either *Acción Democrática* or the Social Christians. Most striking, in metropolitan *municipios* the proxy for "Periphery" shifted from a significant — .29 to a significant .46. Only slightly less dramatic is the "Periphery" beta weight's change in non-metropolitan *municipios* from an insignificant .01 to a significant .42. Earlier hypotheses asserted that the Democratic Republican Union was strongest in the "East", a subregion of the "Periphery". The party, therefore, would be expected to have at least a

183 See Table 1.
184 *Ibid.*

midly positive beta weight for "Periphery". Instead, Table 15 reveals a dramatically fluctuating beta weight.

An explanation for this fluctuation lies in the brokerage performed by the Democratic Republican Union before and after the regime of General Pérez Jiménez. Initially, the party served as a focus for elements in the "Periphery" opposed to *Acción Democrática.*[185] In the 1958 election, however, anti-*Acción Democrática* "Peripherals" were joined by "Center" businessmen and professionals who opposed both *Acción Democrática's* socialism and the Social Christians' alleged Andean cliquishness and clericalism. The presidential candidacy of Admiral Wolfgang Larrazábal, military hero in the uprising Pérez Jiménez and initiator of the against "Emergency Plan", public works attracted slum dwellers, most of whom lived in the "Center". New support from the "Center" in 1958 evidently overwhelmed the Democratic Republican Unions older "Periphery" clientele. In 1963, however, Larrazábal ran as the presidential nominee of the Popular Democratic Force. Also, Arturo Uslar Pietri, a Caracas intellectual, became a major presidential contender. Larrazábal's switch and the emergence of Uslar Pietri drained off "Center" slum dwellers and the urban middle class. Consequently, as revealed by the beta weight pattern for 1963, the party again became a "catch-all" for anti-*Acción Democrática* elements in the "Periphery".

The Democratic Republican Union also appears in Table 15 with positive and significant beta weights for the urban and the "modern culture" proxies. This lends weight to hypotheses concerning the urban and "modern" electorate that coalesced during the 1950's. Its suppport for the Democratic Republican Union confirms the inability of *Acción Democrática* and the Social Christians to maintain urban organizations following the coup of 1948. Most likely as claimed earlier, Pérez Jiménez socialized the "urban" and "modern" population to distrust the country's two historically dominant political parties.

The Democratic Republican Union, while losing its significant beta weight for the indicator of "modern culture" in 1963, retains a significant and positive beta weight for the urban proxie. In non-metropolitan *municipios* the Democratic Republican Union continues as a party of the "Periphery's" small towns. One can speculate that

185 See BUNIMOV-PARRA, map III.

voters in the "Periphery's" small towns, earlier revealed as having abandoned *Acción Democrática,* gravitated toward the Democratic Republican Union. Apparently they retained an anti-Social Christian bias and were searching for a vehicle to express displeasure with President Betancourt.

For metropolitan *municipios,* in 1958 and 1963, the Democratic Republican Union has significant and positive beta weights for the "poor" proxie. In the earlier election this reflects Admiral Larrazábal's popularity in the slums. Five years later, however, the Democratic Republican Union loses most of its urban following throughout the "Center". In the heavily urban Federal District, for example, support fell from 60 percent to 12 percent of the total legislative vote. The Democratic Republican Union's significant and positive beta weights in 1963, for the "poor" of metropolitan *municipios,* therefore, are likely a residue of earlier support stemming from Larrazábal's popularity.

Arturo Uslar Pietri replaced Larrazábal as the metropolitan voter's favorite in 1963.[186] His supporters polled an impressive 13.6 percent of the total legislative vote. Table 15 reveals support for their party, the National Democratic Front,[187] was positively and significantly correlated with proxies of urbanism and "modern culture". This confirms hypotheses that parties emerging after 1958 will reflect the tensions of increasing modernization and urbanization. Interestingly, beta weights for the "poor" proxie in both metropolitan and non-metropolitan *municipios* proved relatively insignificant in explaining variance in National Democratic Front support. In 1963, therefore, inter-class antagonism appeared insufficient to prevent a cross-class alliance between non-rural and "modern" voters residing in the "Center".

Finally, Table 15 reveals a strong similarity in the beta weight pattern of cleavage proxies for the Democratic Republican Union and Communists in 1958, and the Popular Democratic Force in 1963. Since Admiral Larrazábal ran as each of the above parties presidential candidate, and given his strong personalistic appeal, this finding

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186 For example, in 1963 Uslar Pietri received 40 percent of the total presidential vote in the Federal District. Larrazábal, in contrast received only 21 percent.

187 Uslar Pietri's followers ran in the 1963 elections using the designation of National Front of Independents and Professionals (IPFN). Following the election the name was changed to National Democratic Front.

TABLE 16

BETA WEIGHTS, CONSTANT AND COEFFICIENT OF DETERMINATION FOR PERCENT OF PARTY VOTE REGRESSED AGAINST CLEAVAGE VARIABLES WITH ALTERNATIVE REGIONAL INDICATORS (ADDITIVE FORM): ELECTIONS OF 1958 AND 1963

		SOCIAL CHRISTIANS		DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN UNION		POPULAR DEMOCRATIC FORCE		COMMUNISTS	
		1958	1965	1958	1963	1958	1963	1958	1963
	% Rancho	—.17**	—.19**	.06	.12**		.05	.05	
A	% Capital	—.17**	—.19**	.21**	.35**		.18**	.19**	
L	% Literacy	.05	—.10**	.24**	.04		.19**	.38**	
L	Andes	.69**	.64**						
	Core			.39**	—.22**		.52**	.20**	
N = 642	Constant	17.73	34.08	—.03	7.61		—3.00	—3.05	
	R^2	.60	.59	.43	.11		.50	.39	
	% Rancho	—.27**	—.60**	.36**	.71**		.42**	.42**	
>	% Capital	—.16*	—.18**	.15*	.37**		.12	.10	
	% Literacy	—.33**	—.42**	.29**	.16		.27**	.66**	
50 K	Andes	.69**	.51**						
	Core			.67**	—.33**		.56**	.25**	
N = 72	Constant	1.90	4.69	—26.79	—21.69		—20.92	—24.89	
	R^2	.73	.77	.76	.35		.57	.54	
	% Rancho	—.15**	—.17**	.05	.10**		.02	.01	
<	% Capital	—.13**	—.15**	.21**	.34**		.15**	.19**	
	% Literacy	.01	—.07*	.21**	.11*		.10**	.23**	
50 K	Andes	.70**	.65**						
	Core			.34**	—.20**		.52**	.11**	
N = 570	Constant	18.63	32.85	.16	4.72		—.94	—.89	
	R^2	.61	.59	.32	.15		.38	.17	

* = beta weight significant to the .10
** = beta weight significant to the .05

is hardly surprising. The vote reflecting Larrazábal's charisma, especially in metropolitan *municipios,* suggests that while "modern culture" and "Center" voters sometimes united across class lines — as with the National Democratic Front — the "poor" "others" cleavage could also become a source of political party differentiation. Regardless of class, however, non-rural and "modern" voters rejected Venezuela's best organized and historically dominant parties in 1958 and 1963. This led John D. Martz, a perceptive observer of Venezuelan politics, to label non-rural and urban support as the "non-party" vote.[188]

Table 16 supplements Table 15 by throwing additional light on the politics of Venezuelan regionalism. Here the substitution of a "Core" non-"Core" dichotomy for that between "Periphery" and "Center" significantly increases the coefficient of determination (R^2) for the Democratic Republican Union and Communists in 1958 and for the Popular Democratic Force in 1963. Since R^2 is explained variance, the higher a regression equation's R^2 the better it reflects reality. The above parties, therefore, are better described as drawing support from the "Core" than from the "Center" — a combination of "Core" and "Andes". In fact, other regressions revealed that support from the Democratic Republican Union, the Communists and the Popular Democratic Force correlated negatively with residence in Andean *municipios.*[189]

The Social Christians, by contrast, emerge from Table 16 as an "Andean" party. Substitution of the "Andes" — "others" dichotomy for that between "Periphery" and "Center" increases the coefficient of determination (R^2) for all *municipios* an impressive .20 in 1958 and .12 in 1963. Generally, therefore, parties with negative and significant beta weights for "Periphery" — thus emerging as "Center" — had variance in their electoral support better explained by the "Core" or "Andes" regional variable than the "Periphery" — "Center" di-

188 MARTZ, *The Venezuelan Elections of December 1, 1963 — Part III,* pp. 24-26.

189 TABLE A: *Partial Correlation Coefficients for Andes (All municipios) in Additive Cleavage Proxie Regressions: Elections of 1958 and 1963.*

	1958	1963
Democratic Republican Union	—.37**	—.35**
Communist Party	—.18**	—
Popular Democratic Force	—	—.17**

** = significant to .05

chotomy. The only exception proved to be the National Democratic Front.[190]

Findings detailed in Table 16 foreshadow the shattering of Venezuela's "Core" — "Andean" alliance, the politically dominant "Center" between 1899 and 1945. When dependent exclusively on cooperation between each region's elite the alliance functioned cohesively. However, after its viability could be decided by mass preferences, as expressed through universal suffrage, the alliance floundered. The Andean milieu was relatively "traditional", rural and poverty stricken.[191] In contrast, the "Core" — long the country's most "modern" region — was increasingly wealthy, industrialized and urban. In 1958 and 1963 Andean and "Core" voters apparently believed their interests to be sufficiently divergent that they would not trust the same political party to represent both.

Had most "Core" and Andean voters united behind a single party in 1958, *Acción Democrática,* spokesman for the "Periphery", would have come within a whisker of defeat.[192] Five years later *Acción Democrática* was even more vulnerable, but again a "Core" Andean split enabled the "Periphery" to continue in power. Tables 15 and 16 pointed to a relationship between this split and the growth of "modern culture". In 1958 and 1963 the Social Christians (Andeans) had significant and negative beta weights for the indicie of "modern culture." "Core" parties, the Communists, the Popular Democratic Force and the Democratic Republican Union in 1958 — on the other hand, benefited from additional support as *municipio* literacy rates rose. This leads to speculation that divisiveness associated with the "modern culture" — "traditional culture" cleavage was dissolving the historic bonds of Venezuela's "Core" Andean alliance.

Tables 15 and 16 also suggest conflict crystalization within the "Periphery". The Democratic Republican Union, weakened by heavy losses in the "Core" between 1958 and 1963, held its own throughout

190 The coefficient of determination was .48 for a regression of the cleavage proxies (all *municipios*) with the "Core" — others dichotomy as the indicator of regionalism. As Table 15 reveals, the same coefficient of determination was obtained with the "Periphery" — "Center" dichotomy as the regionalism proxy. The National Democratic Front, therefore, was as much a party of the "Center" as of the "Core".

191 Cf. RANGEL, chapter XV.

192 Table 12 reveals that the "Core" and Andean political parties received 49.1 percent of the total presidential vote in 1958. In contrast, *Acción Democrática* received 49.2 percent.

the "Periphery",[193] except in the Western states of Zulia and Lara. Here were located the country's second and third cities, Maracaibo and Barquisimeto.[194] These cities supported Larrazábal in 1958, but proved inhospitable to Villalba's candidacy in 1963.

Acción Democrática's vote fell an average of 21 percent throughout the "Periphery between 1958 and 1963.[195] The party's altered support profile reveals a newly significant negative beta weight for the indicie of urbanism. While *Acción Democrática* contracted into a force of the "Periphery's" rural areas, Tables 15 and 16 indicates that the Democratic Republican Union became a representative of the region's small towns. This suggests a relationship between party system fragmentation within the "Periphery" and the urban-rural cleavage. In the "Center", contrastingly, fragmentation appeared most related to "Core" — Andean divergence and the cleavage between "modern" and "traditional culture".

193 This is illustrated by comparing the regional breakdown of Admiral Larrazábal's vote in 1958 with that of Jóvito Villalba in 1963. Larrazábal also received support from the Communist party, and the following table integrates the 3.2 percent of the 1958 vote garnered by the Communists with the Democratic Republican Union's share, 31.4 percent. In 1963 Villalba received only the support of the Democratic Republican Union.

TABLE B: *Comparison of Regional Support for the Presidential Candidates of the Democratic Republican Union in 1958 and 1963.*

REGION	PERCENT OF TOTAL PRESIDENTIAL VOTE	
	1958	1963
CORE	61.2	14.5
ANDES	8.4	8.9
WEST	27.2	18.9
EAST	27.3	31.5
PLAINS	18.5	21.8

Source: Calculated from statistics of the *Consejo Supremo Electoral de Venezuela.*

194 See TABLE 13.

195 The following table reveals the magnitude of *Acción Democrática* losses between 1958 and 1963. It compares the percent of the vote received by *Rómulo Betancourt* with that obtained by Raúl Leoni.

TABLE C: *Comparison of Regional Support for the Presidential Candidates of Acción Democrática: Elections of 1958 and 1963.*

REGION	PERCENT OF TOTAL PRESIDENTIAL VOTE	
	1958	1963
ANDES	45.9	27.6
WEST	60.9	37.2
PLAINS	68.7	42.6
CORE	23.1	18.1
EAST	67.6	50.8
All Venezuela	49.2	32.8

Source: Calculated from statistics of the *Consejo Supremo Electoral de Venezuela.*

Explaining differences in significant beta weights indicating party system fragmentation within Venezuela's two major political regions, while likely to throw new light on political party evolution, would involve "running" and analyzing cleavage proxy regressions for each subregion of the "Periphery" and the "Center". Consequently, it lies beyond the scope of this discussion. Statistical confirmation of intraregional divisiveness in 1963 alone, given the importance of beta weights for the regionalism proxy in Tables 15 and 16, points to a potential for far reaching changes in relationships between structural cleavages and party support.

Table 17, which relates to the elections of 1958 and 1963, reveals that with several exceptions the additive model proved superior in explaining variance in party voting.

Only in non-metropolitan *municipios,* for the Democratic Republican Union, does the multiplicative form yield a higher coefficient of determination in 1958. Again, for the 1963 election, a multiplicative form raises the coefficient of determination for the Democratic Republican Union in non-metropolitan *municipios.* This might be interpreted as evidence the Democratic Republican Union attracted voters alienated from *Acción Democrática,* the "Periphery's" dominant party. However, such modest increases in coefficients of determination as the multiplicative model produced for U.R.D. are of doubtful importance.[196] Success for the multiplicative model in raising coefficients of determination with *Acción Democrática Oposición,* however, demands closer attention.

Acción Democrática Oposición splintered from *Acción Democrática* in 1962, following a bitterly unsuccessful struggle to control the parent organization. Those who lost, leaders as well as followers, likely felt alienated from the victors and their recently established regime.[197] Hence, the multiplicative model's doubling of the coefficient of determination for *Acción Democrática Oposición* could be interpreted as confirmation of the hypothesis that higher coefficients of determination for the multiplicative model reveal alienation, and

196 See footnote 180.

197 Especially in the "Periphery" *Acción Democrática* was associated with the multiparty regime established in 1959. It was referred to as the democratic regime or "Democracy". During the Betancourt and Leoni administrations government public works projects inevitably included a sign with the slogan, "This is the way Democracy Works".

TABLE 17

COMPARISON OF COEFFICIENTS OF DETERMINATION FOR ADDITIVE AND MULTIPLICATIVE FORMS OF PARTY VOTE AS PREDICTED BY CLEAVAGE PROXIES: ELECTIONS OF 1958 AND 1963

	ACCION DEMOCRATICA				SOCIAL CHRISTIANS				DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN UNION				COMMUNISTS			
	1958		1963		1958		1963		1958		1963		1958		1963	
	A	M	A	M	A	M	A	M	A	M	A	M	A	M	A	M
ALL	.44	.37	.41	.36	.43	.33	.43	.24	.30	.30	.25	.30	.36	.26		
> 45 K	.77	.67	.65	.62	.53	.50	.65	.44	.56	.46	.46	.38	.51	.38		
< 45 K	.38	.32	.36	.32	.45	.33	.44	.26	.21	.24	.26	.29	.17	.14		

	NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT				POPULAR DEMOCRATIC FORCE				ACCION DEMOCRATICA OPOSICION				SOCIAL CHRISTIANS (ANDES)			
	1958		1963		1958		1963		1958		1963		1958		1963	
	A	M	A	M	A	M	A	M	A	M	A	M	A	M	A	M
ALL			.48	.26			.34	.22			.04	.10	.60	.42	.59	.34
> 45 K			.75	.67			.45	.37			.04	.04	.73	.64	.77	.60
< 45 K			.24	.15			.20	.13			.03	.10	.61	.42	.59	.33

	COMMUNISTS (CORE)				POPULAR DEMOCRATIC FORCE (CORE)				DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN UNION (CORE)			
	1958		1963		1958		1963		1958		1963	
	A	M	A	M	A	M	A	M	A	M	A	M
ALL	.40	.28					.50	.36	.43	.36	.11	.13
45 K	.54	.46					.57	.54	.76	.68	.35	.30
45 K	.17	.17					.38	.27	.32	.28	.15	.13

A = Additive Form
M = Multiplicative Form

TABLE 17

COMPARISON OF COEFFICIENTS OF DETERMINATION FOR ADDITIVE AND MULTIPLICATIVE FORMS OF PARTY VOTE AS PREDICTED BY CLEAVAGE PROXIES: ELECTIONS OF 1958 AND 1963

through it anomie.[198] Nevertheless, the multiplicative model yields only a coefficient of determination of .10 in all municipios. At this level any statement concerning the two model's relative merits has little value.

The Election of 1968

Table 18 compares the additive and multiplicative models of the structural cleavage equation using "Center" — "Periphery" as the regional proxy. Table 19 compares the additive and multiplicative models of the structural cleavage equation using alternative regional indicies for the 1968 elections. Tables 18 and 19, in light of Tables 15, 16 and 17, reveal that the structural bases of party support changed more between 1963 and 1968 than during the previous five years. While the signs of beta weights associated with parties in 1963 and 1958 remained the same in 1968, the beta weights themselves generally became smaller and less significant. This proved especially true of ones for the regionalism proxy, the diminished importance of which reduced coefficients of determination for all political parties in both metropolitan and non-metropolitan *municipios.* In the former, however, an additive form of the structural cleavage equation remained a relatively good predictor of support variance for the Social Christians, the Communists and the Popular Democratic Force. The additive equation proved even better in predicting variance for the newly formed National Civic Crusade.

The additive equation's ability to predict variance in voting for factions of what had been *Acción Democrática* declined dramatically in 1968. Barrios supporters, retaining the *Acción Democrática* label, experienced a drop in the coefficient of determination for metropolitan *municipios* from .65 to .29. Contrastingly, in metropolitan *municipios* the additive equation for the Prieto group, the People's Electoral Movement, yielded a significant beta weight for only "Periphery". In non-metropolitan *municipios Acción Democrática* retained the same significant beta weights as in 1963, although the coef-

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198 See subpoint 6 at the end of Section II.

TABLA 19

COMPARISON OF ADDITIVE AND MULTIPLICATIVE FORMS OF STRUCTURAL CLEAVAGE PROXIE REGRESSION: ELECTION OF 1968 WITH ALTERNATIVE REGIONALISM INDICIES

		SOCIAL CHRISTIANS		POPULAR DEMOCRATIC FORCE		COMMUNISTS	
		A	M	A	M	A	M
	% Rancho	—.19**	—.03	.13**	.26**	—.03	—.03
A	% Capital	—.16**	—.08*	.25**	.14**	.25**	.11**
L	% Literate	—.16**	—.06	.03	.19**	.35**	.21**
L	Andes	.56**	.50**				
	Core			.34**	.31**	.20**	.20**
	Constant	40.21	3.64	.44	— 3.07	—.91	—7.65
N = 642	R^2	.50	.29	.23	.23	.47	.18
	% Rancho	—.77**	—.53**	.64**	.50**	.32**	.19
>	% Capital	—.06	.06	.23**	.04	.22*	.08
	% Literate	—.78**	—.57**	.20**	.26*	.55**	.14*
45 K	Andes	.19**	.32**				
	Core			.37**	.42**	.02	.27*
	Constant	78.96	9.50	— 7.29	— 5.62		— 9.54
N = 72	R^2	.64	.52	.45	.41	.45	.13
	% Rancho	—.17**	.03	.11**	.25**	—.09**	—.04
<	% Capital	—.14**	—.08**	.21**	.12**	.20**	.10*
	% Literate	—.12**	—.04	.02	.12**	.19**	.14**
45 K	Andes	.59**	.51**				
	Core			.32**	.28	.19**	.18**
	Constant	38.94		.74	—2.44	—03	—6.19
N = 570	R^2	.50	.29	.17	.18	.24	.11

* = beta weight significant to the .10

** = beta weight significant to the .05

A = Additive Form

M = Multiplicative Form

ficient of determination fell by .12 The People's Electoral Movement also emerged with a positive and significant beta weight for "Periphery" in non-metropolitan *municipios,* but differed from *Acción Democrática* in relating to the "modern culture" and non-metropolitan urbanism proxies. From the perspective of associated social and economic indicators, therefore, the M.E.P. emerged as quite distinct from *Acción Democrática.*

Different beta weight patterns for the M.E.P. and *Acción Democrática* were not unexpected. Personalistic rivalry between Prieto Figueroa and Barrios coincided with ideological and generational clash. While the older and historically moderate leaders supported the latter, the former's partisans averaged half a generation younger and advocated militant socialism.[199] Together the two factions polled 39 percent of the total legislative vote in 1968, which compared favorably to the 33 percent received by *Acción Democrática* five years earlier. Regressing the combined vote of *Acción Democrática* and the People's Electoral Movement on the cleavage proxies, as indicated by Table 20, almost restores the varience support pattern of 1963.[200] Table 20 also reveals how the schism of 1967 divided *Acción Democrática's* historic clientele. Supporters in urbanized "modern culture" sided with Prieto while those in rural "traditional culture" favored Barrios. This suggests that clash between the two milieus may be so all-encompassing in Venezuela that aggregating the interests of both within a single party is impossible without abandoning pluralistic democracy.[201]

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199 While Prieto Figueroa was several years older than Barrios, both belonged to *Acción Democrática's* "Old Guard". Jesús Angel Paz Galarraga, the candidate of *Acción Democrática's* younger leaders, realized his chances at the nomination were slight after the "Old Guard" replaced him with Barrios as the party's Secretary General. Subsequently, Paz Galarraga proposed an alliance to help Prieto take the party's presidential nomination away from Barrios, the heir apparent. Prieto Figueroa accepted, and with assistance from Paz Galarraga defeated Barrios in the primary election of August, 1967.

200 The increasing obsolescence of 1961 census data should not be overlooked as a possible cause for the universal lowering in 1968 of coefficients of determination for the additive form of the structural cleavage equation. While the census was taken an equidistance between the elections of 1958 and 1963, it was seven years out of date by the 1968 election. Nevertheless, obsolescent census data alone seems unable to account for *Acción Democrática's* dramatically lower coefficients of determination in 1968. It might, however, account for the drop in coefficients of determination between *Acción Democrática* in 1963 and regression of the combined vote of *Acción Democrática* and the People's Electoral Movement in 1968.

201 Cf. the discussion in ALLARDT and ROKKAN, eds., pp. 40-41.

TABLE 20

BETA WEIGHTS AND COEFFICIENTS OF DETERMINATION FOR PERCENT OF PARTY VOTE AND COMBINED PARTY VOTE REGRESSED AGAINST CLEAVAGE VARIABLES (ADDITIVE FORM)

		Acción Democrática 1963	*Acción Democrática* 1968	Peoples Electoral Movement 1968	*Acción Democrática* plus People's Electoral Movement 1968
	% Rancho	—.04	—.18	.15	—.03
>	% Capital	—.09	—.21	.01	—.16*
45 K	% Literacy	—.39**	—.49**	.12	—.31**
	Periphery	.55**	.01	.65**	.53**
N = 72	R^2	.65	.29	.43	.60
	% Rancho	.29**	.28**	—.05	.23**
<	% Capital	—.09*	—.09*	.10*	—.03
45 K	% Literacy	—.07	—.08	.22**	.04
	Periphery	.42**	.26**	.36**	.43**
N = 570	R^2	.36	.26	.20	.30

* = significant to .10
** = significant to .05

Parties of the Victory Front also developed support patterns in 1968 which cleavage proxies proved less able to explain than in 1963. This occurred most dramatically in the case of the National Democratic Front. Recipient of 13.3 percent of the vote in 1963, and with highly significant beta weights, the party attracted less than 3 percent of the vote five years later. Also, socio-economic indicies became strikingly powerless to explain variance in National Democratic Front support in both metropolitan and non-metropolitan *municipios.* Most likely the movement was reduced to a diverse residue of ambitious political cadres and "hangers on".

Other Victory Front participants, the Democratic Republican Union and the Popular Democratic Force, retained support from more than 5 percent of the electorate. While the coefficients of determination for each fell in metropolitan and non-metropolitan *muni-*

cipios, the drop proved substantially greater in the latter, where coefficients of determination already were lower. In metropolitan *municipios* both continued drawing more votes where poverty was greater and where a higher proportion of *municipio* inhabitants resided in the *municipio* capital. The Popular Democratic Force remained a party of the "Core"; with a significantly positive beta weight for the "modern culture" proxy. The Democratic Republican Union, in contrast, was not significantly related to the "modern culture" proxy and boasted disproportionate support in the "Periphery". While losing votes between 1963 and 1968, therefore, both political parties retained their original socio-economic profiles in metropolitan *municipios*. Apparently the personalistic appeals of their leaders, while weaker, remained. Indeed, the lower coefficients of determination for the Popular Democratic Force and the Democratic Republican Union in metropolitan *municipios* seemed largely due to the declining importance of regionalism.

More profound shifts appeared in the social and economic underpinnings of the Democratic Republican Union and the Popular Democratic Force in non-metropolitan *municipios*. As in the big cities, lower coefficients of determination were accompanied by lower beta weights for regionalism. The Popular Democratic Force became more positively associated with the presence of the rural poor and the percent of the population living in *municipio* capitals not part of major metropolitan areas. The party's vote also became less strongly associated with "modern culture". Discussion with Popular Democratic Force leaders suggested that two factors contributed to these changes.[202] First, Admiral Larrazábal, his prestige dimmed by defeats in 1958 and 1963, was not running as the party's presidential candidate. Whatever charisma the Admiral retained he seemed unable to transfer to Burelli Rivas. During the campaign, therefore, his non-metropolitan supporters, more numerous where literacy rates were highest, appeared inclining toward Pérez Jiménez's National Civic Crusade and Prieto Figueroa's People's Electoral Movement. Second, Jorge Dáger, Secretary General of the Popular Democratic Force, heavily committed resources in an intensive effort to organize "poor" and "traditional" slum dwellers in the "Periphery" who recently had migrated from the countryside to small market towns. Unfortunately for the Popular

202 Informal conversations during November and December, 1967, with Jorge Dáger, Douglas Dáger and Angel Zambrano.

Democratic Force, more was lost in big cities than was gained in the small towns.

The Democratic Republican Union, in non-metropolitan *municipios,* became less a party of the towns, of the "poor" and of the "Periphery". These changes occurred in the wake of dissatisfaction with Villalba's personalistic domination and with the decision to support Burelli Rivas. In protest, several important U.R.D. leaders left the party.[203] Declining coefficients of determination for the Democratic Republican Union, as well as for the Popular Democratic Force, suggest that both disaffection with party leaders and a shrinkage in total vote weaken relations between party voting and social and economic cleavages.

Lower "Andes" and "Periphery" beta weights for the Social Christians add further evidence concerning the declining importance of regionalism. This decline appears responsible for slightly lower Social Christian coefficients of determination in both metropolitan and non-metropolitan *municipios.* Despite having attracted new support the party's beta weight profile resembled that of 1958 and 1963. The most important result of the intensive recruitment drives between 1963 and 1968, consequently, seems to have been an expansion of Social Christian appeal nationally among the social and economic groups from which support was drawn in the Andes.

The National Civic Crusade, with a significantly negative beta weight for "Periphery", is an exception to generalizations about regionalism's declining importance. The party of Pérez Jiménez also displays positive beta weights for percent living in *ranchos,* percent literate and percent residing in the *municipio* capital.[204] This is the general pattern since 1958 for personalistic parties in their initial electoral experience. It suggests a sizable floating vote in "Center" metropolitan *municipios,* and argues that the "poor", urban and "modern" electorate is only weakly attached to existing political parties. Should political brokers sever these attachments and unite "poor', urban and "modern" voters in a single party, it would be a new electoral majority.

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203 See the arguments in CHACÍN, *Carta Abierta...,* which propose an alliance with *Acción Democrática* or the People's Electoral Movement.

204 The coefficient of determination for the National Civic Crusade in metropolitan *municipios,* .77, was equaled only twice in Tables 15, 16 and 17 — for *Acción Democrática* in 1958 and for the Social Christians in 1963. This suggests that the chosen proxies retained most of their ability to measure cleavages in 1968.

In the elections of 1963 and 1958, as indicated by Table 17, coefficients of determination almost always proved higher for the additive than for the multiplicative model. Contrastingly, in 1968 the multiplicative form emerged as a better predicter of electoral support variance in a significant number of instances, especially in non-metropolitan *municipios*. The Social Christians, the National Civic Crusade, the Communists and to a lesser degree *Acción Democrática* continued with higher coefficients of determination for the additive model in both metropolitan and non-metropolitan *municipios*. Support variance for the People's Electoral Movement, the Popular Democratic Force and the Democratic Republican Union was explained better by the additive equation in metropolitan *municipios* and by the multiplicative in non-metropolitan *municipios*. Finally, the multiplicative form better explained variance in voting for the Revolutionary Party of National Integration in both metropolitan and non-metropolitan *municipios*.[205]

Given recent research into the meaning of differences in coefficients of determination between multiplicative and additive treatments of aggregate voting data, Tables 18 and 19 suggest growing voter alienation. The Revolutionary Party of National Integration, the party for which replacing the additive model of the cleavage equation with the multiplicative resulted in the greatest increases in coefficients of determination, represented a merger of *Acción Democrática Oposición* with leftists who waged unsuccessful guerrilla warfare to disrupt elections in 1963.[206] Revolutionary Party of National Integration leaders called for the immediate nationalization of banks and large corporations, for a rapid redistribution of income and for tight control over foreign investment. No Venezuelan party represented more total opposition to the existing political, economic and social order.

Political parties for which the multiplicative model better explained support variance in non-metropolitan but not metropolitan *municipios* included the Democratic Republican Union, the Popular Democratic Force and the People's Electoral Movement. Highly

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205 This also was true for the National Democratic Front. Extremely low coefficients of determination resulting from regressing National Democratic Front vote in 1968 on structural cleavage proxies casts doubt on any model based inferences.

206 For a comprehensive discussion of this period's guerrilla movements see RICHARD GOTT, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America* (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1971), pp. 121-222.

personalist, they resembled the Revolutionary Party of National Integration in evidencing positive beta weights for percent of population living in the non-metropolitan *municipio* capital. Earlier discussion of the 1963 election speculated that higher beta weights for the U.R.D. multiplicative cleavage equation in non-metropolitan *municipios* reflected intense dissatisfaction with *Acción Democrática's* rural development policies in the "Periphery's" small towns.[207] Also, violence associated with the anti-guerrilla campaign likely increased dissatisfaction. Dissatisfaction and violence, when coupled with findings that parties supported by one third of the electorate evidenced higher coefficients of determination for a multiplicative form of the cleavage equation, suggest increasing alienation. In addition, the multiplicative and additive models explained approximately the same amount of support variance for *Acción Democrática* in the non-metropolitan *municipios.* If higher coefficients of determination for the additive model indicate the absence of alienation and anomie, therefore, outside of the large cities only clienteles of the National Civic Crusade, the Social Christians and the Communists clearly were not anomic in 1968.

Given the rapidly changing metropolitan *municipios,* additional political parties besides the Revolutionary Party for National Integration might have been expected to have evidenced higher coefficients of determination for the multiplicative model. Had the additive equation also better explained support variance for the P.R.I.N., it would have raised a serious question about whether differences in the multiplicative and additive equation's coefficients of determination could reveal alienation in an urban milieu. That this protest party's coefficient of determination (R^2) increased from .28 to .40 upon substitution of the multiplicative for the additive form, however, sustained the marking of anomic voting by differences in coefficients of determination for the two models as a plausible proposition.

The additive model explained a greater proportion of variance in metropolitan *municipios* for the National Civic Crusade, the Popular Democratic Force, the Democratic Republican Union and the Communists-all of which evidenced significantly positive beta weights

207 See the discussion surrounding footnote 180.

for the proxies of "poverty" and "modern culture". This reinforces findings by Karst, Cornelius and Goldrich that a "modern" life style in the urban slums poses no immediate threat to political stability.[208] Asserting the absence of an immediate threat to political stability, however, is not to claim the urban poor are supportive of the existing regime. The National Civic Crusade leader, General Pérez Jiménez, remains the arch villain of Venezuelan democracy, and Communists portray the regime as a front for the corrupt domestic bourgeoisie and foreign imperialism.[209] The additive model also yielded higher coefficients of determination for parties intuitively considered most supportive of the existing regime — the Social Christians and *Acción Democrática.* This suggests that while comparison of additive and multiplicative regression models may reveal the presence of intensely felt alienation, it tells nothing of the critically important balance between limited dissatisfaction, indifference and support for the regime.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Analysis of the 1958 election revealed structural cleavages, particularly in metropolitan *municipios,* to be good predicters of variance in party voting. Venezuela's two major parties, *Acción Democrática* and the Social Christians, emerged on opposite sides of two cleavages — between "Periphery" and "Center" and "poor" and "others". Voting for the former was heaviest when a *municipio* was located in the "Periphery" and its population relatively "poor". In contrast, the latter's greatest appeal lay in "Center" *municipios* with a high proportion of "others". Because in 1946 *Acción Democrática* and the Social Christians received more than 90 percent of the total vote, and since that year's election was the first in Venezuela based on universal suffrage, it is tempting to hypothesize that cleavage related differences between the two in 1958 reflected the basic conflicts that earlier set in motion the modern party system.

Given Venezuela's more rural and traditional character in the 1940's, it is also significant that voting for both *Acción Democrática*

208 See GOLDRICH, PRATT and SCHULLER, "The Political Integration...", KARST, "Rights in Land..." and CORNELIUS, "The Political Sociology...".
209 Cf. GOTT, pp. 174-176.

and the Social Christians correlated negatively with indices of "modern culture" and urbanism. Unfortunately, *municipio* voting returns for the elections of 1946, 1947 and 1948 were destroyed. Without these returns, discussion of pre-1958 relations between structural cleavages and party support remains highly speculative

Between 1948 and 1958 "modern culture" became more pervasive and urbanization continued. When the democratic party system re-emerged during the latter year, support for the Democratic Republican Union and Communists correlated positively with proxies for "modern culture" and urbanism. In addition, the Communists and the Democratic Republican Union were predominantly parties of an altered version of the "Center" — the "Core". Returns from the 1958 election, therefore, indicated that voters in "modern" and urban environments disproportionately rejected the political parties dominating prior to the military coup of 1948, and that the "Center" of the 1946-1948 period was fragmenting into an Andean and "Core" region. These findings confirmed the hypotheses of Section II.

As the party system evolved between 1958 and 1963, relationships between structural cleavages and individual political parties became more complex. Clustered around urbanism, "modern culture" and poverty, many voters drew apart under the banner of the Popular Democratic Force, whose supporters resided disproportionately in the "Core". The "modern culture" — urban mixture bridging the "poor" — others cleavage shifted political allegiance from Admiral Larrazábal in 1958 to the National Democratic Front of Arturo Uslar Pietri in 1963. Also, the "Periphery" became less unanimous in its support for *Acción Democrática.* "Periphery" voters in relatively "modern" and urban *municipios* looked more favorably on the Democratic Republican Union. Cleavage proxies in 1963, however, explained overall variance in party voting almost as well as in 1958.

In 1958 and 1963 the cleavage proxies proved far better predicters of variance in party voting for metropolitan *municipios* than for non-metropolitan *municipios.* This disparity suggests possibilities meriting consideration for future research. First, the proxies chosen to represent the structural cleavages may be inappropriate outside of metropolitan areas. The comparatively low beta weights for percent literate in non-metropolitan *municipios* casts doubt on its ability to indicate the "modern culture" — "traditional culture" cleavage throughout the countryside. The same, although to a lesser degree,

may be true of the relationship between percent living in *ranchos* and the "poor" — others cleavage. The indices selected as proxies for structural cleavages in non-metropolitan *municipios,* therefore, should be re-examined as data from the 1971 census becomes available.

Another possibility is that in non-metropolitan *municipios* different structural cleavages will better explain variance in party voting. For example, Venezuela's Social Christian Party received overwhelming support in the "Andes", where the church historically enjoyed its greatest influence. While empirical data is unavailable, some politicians stated privately that the greatest Social Christian gains in 1963 and 1968 came in areas where the church was most active. The clerical-anticlerical cleavage, therefore, may prove more important in affecting voting than *a priori* assumptions suggested. Also, the owner-worker cleavage eventually may be shown to have a major impact on party voting. More will be known along this line as the Industrial Census becomes more detailed.[210]

Cleavage variables predicted less variance in party support for the 1968 election.[211] This raises the possibility, discussed earlier, that employed proxies became less representative of the hypothesized cleavages. Also, throughout rural areas the four structural cleavages themselves possibly ceased being good predicters of variance. The high coefficient of determination for the National Civic Crusade (additive form) in metropolitan *municipios*, .77, however, argues that proxies retained the capability of measuring hypothesized cleavages, at least in the cities.

Non-structural variables may have been increasingly significant in 1968. Party identification, campaign appeals and the relative vigor of grass roots party organizations fall in this category. Dissension within parties receiving almost eighty percent of the vote in 1963 also likely affected voting.[212] While additive regressions proved unsuccessful in locating an autonomous proxy for dissension or frustration,[213] structural cleavage regressions for the elections of 1958, 1963 and 1968 revealed that in some instances higher coefficients of determination were associated with an additive model and in others with a

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210 The recent Venezuelan Industrial Census does not include *municipio* level data.

211 See footnote 200.

212 The other twenty percent of the electorate, of course, supported the Social Christians in 1963.

213 See TABLE 14 and the subsequent discussion of percent of population change between 1951 and 1961 as an indice of anomie.

multiplicative. A significant breaking point appeared between elections in 1963 and 1968. With two exceptions, regardless of ideology, the additive model yielded higher coefficients of determination prior to 1968. In the latter year, contrastingly, higher coefficients of determination were associated with the multiplicative model in a number of cases.

The basic difference in the additive and multiplicative models concerns interaction.[214] Interaction is absent in the former and present in the latter. This begs the question as to what it means to say that under some conditions the interaction of several socio-economic variables better explains variance in party support and under others variance is better explained when the impact of each remains independent. It was hypothesized that interaction marks involuntarily expressed alienation and noted that events leading to the 1968 election *a priori* appeared to alienate elements in the non-metropolitan electorate. The emergence in non-metropolitan *municipios* of higher coefficients of determination for the interactive or multiplicative model, reversing the pattern of earlier elections, was cited as qualified confirmation of this interpretation.

Regressions for the elections of 1958, 1963 and 1968 in Venezuela build on findings from Pennsylvania and Chile. Chilean research undertaken by Soares and Hamblin analyzes radical left voting in 1952. While revealing that the multiplicative model better explained radical left voting, it makes no attempt to compare the predictive power of the additive and multiplicative equations for major participants in the Chilean party system. In contrast, Burnham and Sprague focus on the overall party system for Pennsylvania elections in 1960, 1964 and 1968. Their findings reveal that only the 1968 vote for George Wallace was better explained by the multiplicative model. They interpret this as confirming Soares and Hamblin's contention that higher coefficients of determination for the multiplicative model indicate social and economic conditions involuntarily have radicalized and alienated voters. Burnham and Sprague, however, argued that alienation in 1968 was insufficient to realign the party system in Pennsylvania. They concluded:

> That 1968 was not a year marked by profound nationwide realignment of the mass base is fairly obvious-our Pennsylvania

214 Equations for the alternative forms were set forth in subpoint 6, at the end of section II.

> major party data indicate as much. But it was an election year which would rank close to the top of any imaginable scale which might measure the intensity of intergroup tensions, discontent and aggressive hostility directed by significant elements in the public against existing institutions and leaders. Electoral politics had to compete directly through the year with the politics of direct action and confrontation up to the well-barricaded gates of the Democratic National Convention.[215]

Intergroup tensions, discontent and hostility directed against the government also marked Venezuelan election campaigning in 1968.[216] However, open manifestations of hostility and alienation were less intense than in the United States. Comparison of the relative ability of the additive and multiplicative models to predict variance in the two environments, surprisingly, reveals the latter better described reality for one third of the total Venezuelan electorate in 1968 and for only 14 percent of its Pennsylvania counterpart.

In terms of future research, the Venezuelan elections of 1958, 1963 and 1968 argue that differences between multiplicative and additive models of voting behavior may be an important key to understanding party system evolution. If higher coefficients of determination for the multiplicative model can occur not only on the right and left extremes, but also in the center, party voting better explained by the interactive equation may indicate with whom the government has lost legitimacy. Given these assumptions, one third of Venezuelans voting in 1968 balloted in a pattern suggesting alienation from the existing regime. Consequently, the 1969 to 1974 constitutional period may prove decisive for the institutionalization of democracy. Another division within *Acción Democrática,* or the splitting off of a major faction from the Social Christians, would so fragment the party system as to create immobilism comparable to that in the fourth French Republic. This would encourage authoritarian challenges on both the left and right. Either electoral success by an authoritarian elite or long term immobilism would tempt Venezuela's military to follow the lead of its Brazilian or Argentine counterparts and assume direct control.

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215 Quoted from BURNHAM and SPRAGUE, p. 486.

216 The division between supporters of Barrios and Prieto created extreme bitterness. In Maracaibo, a stronghold of Prieto support, there were sporadic attacks on organizers for Barrios. Also Prieto's spokesmen accused the government of instructing Ministry of Public Works employees to remove campaign materials belonging to the People's Electoral Movement. Nothing in the pre-election maneuvering, however approached the violence in Chicago which surrounded the Democratic National Convention of 1968.

On the other hand, a united *Acción Democrática* could recover much of its historic clientele and possibly make inroads among as yet unorganized urban voters. The Social Christians, barring intra-party warfare, can anticipate continuation of the past decade's steady growth. This is not to argue that if *Acción Democrática* and the Social Christians remain united Venezuela will become a two party system. Each remains relatively unattractive to voters in the "modern" milieu — historically the clientele of parties on the extreme left, extreme right, and to a lesser extent the People's Electoral Movement and the Democratic Republican Union.[217] The possibility of a single "modern culture" alliance encompassing such diverse groups as the National Civic Crusade and the Revolutionary Party of National Integration, however, appears remote. Also, structural cleavages of importance were bridged and crosscut, perhaps permanently, by events leading to the election of 1968. Whether the 1968 election brought a genuine reordering of mass politics in Venezuela, or only a temporary blurring of historic cleavages, however will not be known until voters go to the polls in 1973.

217 In 1968 both the People's Electoral Movement and the Democratic Republican Union were part of what is best labeled the "far left". Ideologically, they stood between *Acción Democrática* and parties of the radical left. Personalism rather than ideology, however, seemed the most important force holding together the Democratic Republican Union and the People's Electoral Movement. As discussed earlier, Jóvito Villalba dominated the former and Luis Beltrán Prieto Figueroa the latter.

APPENDIX A

POLITICAL BIOGRAPHIES

GONZALO BARRIOS

In 1968 Gonzalo Barrios almost became President of the Republic, losing to Rafael Caldera by less than one percent of the popular vote. His career up to that point placed him in the front ranks of *Acción Democrática* leaders. Barrios belonged to the "Generation of "28", youth who raised the standard of rebelion against General Juan Vicente Gómez in 1928. Opposition to the government brought imprisonment and exile to Barrios on numerous occasions. One such period was spent in Spain, during the Civil War, with Rómulo Gallegos. Subsequently, because of President Medina's decision to tolerate political opposition, Barrios was able to return to Venezuela. In 1945 he became a member of the revolutionary *junta* and governor of the Federal District. When Gallegos was elected president he chose Barrios for the influential post of Presidential Secretary.

The military coup against Gallegos again brought imprisonment and exile. Returning after the revolution that overthrew Pérez Jiménez, Barrios became the *Acción Democrática* leader in congress. President Leoni subsequently appointed Barrios to be Minister of the Interior, in 1964. Two years later Barrios was elected Secretary General of *Acción Democrática.*

Born in 1903, son of a wealthy businessman in Acarigua, Portuguesa, Barrios has remained single. He is Catholic and has degrees in law and political science.

ROMULO BETANCOURT

Rómulo Betancourt was born in 1908 in the village of Guatire, near Caracas. He began working at the age of twelve as a part time

bill collector for a tobacco company. Following graduation from the Liceo Caracas, and while a student at the Central University of Venezuela law school, Betancourt organized student protests against the Gómez regime. Hunted by the dictator's secret police, Betancourt fled to Costa Rica where he joined the Communist Party.

Betancourt returned to Venezuela in 1936 after the death of Gómez. Disillusioned with communism, he organized the highly nationalistic *Acción Democrática* party between 1936 and 1942. Betancourt also established two newspapers, *Orve* and *El País,* and ran successfully for the Federal District Municipal Council. In 1945, while collaborating with the Army, Betancourt became president of the ruling Revolutionary *Junta.*

After turning over the presidency to Rómulo Gallegos, Venezuela's first popularly elected chief executive, Betancourt again found himself in exile when the military ousted President Gallegos, in 1948. For ten years Betancourt lived in Costa Rica, Puerto Rico and New York, directing *Acción Democrática's* underground activities.

When able to return, in 1958, Betancourt became his party's candidate for president. Victorious, his administration was one of steady though unrevolutionary reform. In 1964 Rómulo Betancourt passed the presidential sash to Raúl Leoni, his popularly elected successor. This was a milestone in the consolidation of Venezuelan democracy.

Over the Years, Betancourt has authored a number of books. Best known are *Two Months in the Jails of Gómez, Problemas Venezolanos* and *Venezuela: Política y Petróleo.*

GERMAN BORREGALES

Germán Borregales was born on May 28, 1909, into the provincial elite of Coro in the state of Falcón. He attended journalism schools in Geneva, Switzerland, and in New Yor City at Columbia University. A member of the National Organization of Democratic Newspapermen and of the Association of Venezuelan Writers, his published works include *Venezuelan Chronicle, The USSR and the OIT,* and numerous articles in Venezuela's most prestigeous newspapers.

While in college, Borregales and Rafael Caldera were Catholic leaders of the National Student's Union (UNE). Borregales subsequently founded a newspaper dedicated to combating communism and

held several minor posts in the government of Pérez Jiménez. During this time his relationship with Caldera cooled when he attacked the Social Christian leader as "sympathetic" toward the radical left. Abandoning the Social Christians in 1961, Borregales formed a party called the National Action Movement (MAN). In both the 1963 and 1968 presidential elections the National Action Movement received only .3 percent of the national vote. Nevertheless, after the 1968 election Borregales became a member of the Chamber of Deputies by virtue of the National Electoral Quotient.

MIGUEL ANGEL BURELLI RIVAS

An orphan at the age of four, Burelli Rivas grew up in the rural market town of La Puerta, in the state of Trujillo. He was born on July 8, 1922, the tenth of twelve children. At an early age he went to work in his family's modest flour mill, subsequently attending school in the neighboring Andean state of Mérida. To support himself while studying Burelli Rivas worked as a night school teacher, as director of a local radio station, and as chief editor of the newspaper *El Vigilante.* His law studies at the University of the Andes led to political activism. Burelli Rivas enrolled in President Medina's *Partido Democrático Venezolano* and rose quickly to become its Secretary General in Mérida.

Involvement with President Medina forced Burelli Rivas to flee to Quito, Ecuador, following the military coup of October, 1945. Three years later, however, he returned to Venezuela and entered the diplomatic service. He was appointed First Secretary to the Venezuelan embassy in Bogotá and subsequently became Secretary of the Venezuelan Delegation to the United Nations. Exiled during the Pérez Jiménez regime, Burelli Rivas traveled to Italy where he received a post graduate fellowship from the government. He returned to Venezuela following the overthrow of Pérez Jiménez and accepted a position in Admiral Larrazábal's provisional government. Alternating between foreign and domestic government service, Burelli Rivas subsequently served on the Supreme Electoral Council, as Minister of Justice under President Leoni and as Venezuelan ambassador to Colombia and Great Britain.

While ambassador in England Burelli Rivas was offered the Victory Front's presidential nomination. A Catholic, Burelli Rivas is the father of five by his second wife, María Briceño de Burelli.

RAFAEL CALDERA

Born on January 24, 1916 in San Felipe, capital of the state of Yaracuy, Rafael Caldera was bereft of his mother while still a child, and raised by an uncle. His early education was under the Jesuits in the Colegio San Ignacio de Loyola. At seventeen he became a leader of Catholic Action Youth, which enabled him to travel as a delegate to the organization's international convention in Rome. Subsequently, Caldera received a degree in political science from the Central University in Caracas, where he remained as a professor.

In addition to running in four elections as the Social Christian presidential nominee, Caldera served as Secretary General of the National Action Party between 1941 and 1945; Deputy to the National Congress from Yaracuy between 1941 and 1944; policy advisor to COPEI between 1946 and 1948; representative from the Federal District to the National Constituent Assembly in 1946 and 1947; Secretary General of COPEI beginning in 1948; member of the Special Commission for Revision of the Electoral Law in 1949 and 1950; Deputy to the Constituent Assembly of 1952; President of the Chamber of Deputies, 1959 to 1961; and a member of the World Committee of Christian Democracy.

An ardent Catholic, Caldera is married to Alicia Pietri Montemayor de Caldera and is the father of six children. Besides a diploma in political science, he boasts degrees in law and sociology. In private life, Caldera practices law. His favorite leisure time diversions include reading and playing dominoes.

ALEJANDRO HERNANDEZ

A candidate for president in the 1968 election, industrialist Hernández captured less than 1 percent or 26,806 votes. Hernández's Venezuelan Socialist Party appealed to blue collar workers by calling for higher salaries, more jobs and a redistribution of income.

A highly successful businessman, Hernández was born on Margarita Island in 1907. Until the 1968 campaign his interest was primarily commercial, founding such companies as *Frigorífico Pescador* and *Bodegas Hispanoamericanas, C.A.* He was also the first president of the National Economic Council, a director of the Banco Industrial and the Venezuelan Development Corporation, head of the powerful

business association *Fedecámaras* and the moving force behind the Pro-Venezuelan Association. Married, Hernández has one daughter.

WOLFGANG LARRAZABAL

Admiral Larrazábal supported the Victory Front in 1968. Five years earlier he placed fifth in the presidential balloting with 10 percent of the popular vote. In 1958, as the presidential candidate of the Democratic Republican Union and the Communist Party (P.C.V.), the former Navy officer received 35 percent of the presidential vote — ahead of Caldera but far behind Betancourt's 49 percent. At that time the Admiral's popularity was at its peak. He had just resigned as President of the provisional *junta* that took office after the downfall of Pérez Jiménez. During his short tenure of office he developed an "Emergency Plan" that provided work for the urban masses and made him their champion.

Born in 1911, Larrazábal twice attended the United States Naval School in Miami. He became his country's highest ranking naval officer in 1957 and served as ambassador to Chile during 1959 and 1960.

RAUL LEONI

Born at Upata de Carreros, in the state of Bolívar in 1905, Raúl Leoni served as President of Venezuela between 1964 and 1969. An examination of Leoni's activities prior to his nomination as *Acción Democrática's* presidential candidate, in 1963, reveals a distinguished career of loyal service to country and party.

1928 — Member of the "Generation of '28".

1936 — Deputy from Bolívar.

1937 — Exiled to Colombia where he studied law and political science.

1945 — Member of the revolutionary *junta.*

1945—1948 — Minister of Labor.

1946—1947 — Member of Constituent Assembly from the Federal District.

1955—1957 — While in exile from the Pérez Jiménez government, worked in the International Labor Organization in La Paz, Bolivia.

1958 — First Vice President of *Acción Democrática.*

1959—1963 — Senator from Bolívar (elected President of the Senate three times).

1959—1962 — President of *Acción Democrática.*

When asked about plans after his presidential term Leoni replied, "I have devoted a number of years to politics, and I wish to leave the field open to others. I will take a trip abroad, I will dedicate myself to my profession and I will work at what there is in Puedpa". Puedpa is the Leoni family ranch in Bolívar.

He died in 1972 and his death was deeply felt by the nation.

GUSTAVO MACHADO

Released from Jail, where he had been detained for his role in urban guerrilla warfare during 1963, Gustavo Machado entered the 1968 election campaign as a leader of the Union for Advancement (U.P.A.), the official designation for the Venezuelan Communist Party. Gustavo Machado was born in 1898 and became involved in politics after General Gómez closed the Central University in 1912. His protests against Gómez led to arrest and imprisonment for thirteen months. Following his release Machado returned to the University, but in 1918 fled to France. While studying in Paris he embraced communism. Machado subsequently traveled to Moscow and in 1928 returned to Venezuela, participating in an ineffective attempt to overthrow Gómez.

After founding, with the help of his brother, Eduardo, the Communist Party of Venezuela, Gustavo held the organization together through several turbulent decades. In 1947 Gustavo Machado ran as the Communist Party's presidential nominee, but received only 3 percent of the total vote.

In an interview on his seventieth birthday the aging Communist leader declared that many young people today are rooted ideologically in the past century and that he is as "progressive" ideologically as today's young law student. In the 1968 election Gustavo Machado was elected to the Chamber of Deputies from the Federal District.

JESUS ANGEL PAZ GALARRAGA

Born in Puertos de Altagracia, a village near Maracaibo, Zulia, in 1919, Paz Galarraga became one of *Acción Democrática's* foremost "middle generation" leaders. In 1967 Paz masterminded Prieto Figueroa's successful primary election campaign and, along with the latter, was expelled from *Acción Democrática.* Paz became the second most important leader in the People's Electoral Movement.

After completing high school in Maracaibo, Paz entered medical school at the Central University of Caracas. He was a member of the secret PDN Party and in 1941 signed the Incorporation Act of *Acción Democrática.* Before graduating as a medical doctor in 1943, he became a national leader of the Federation of Venezuelan students. In Caracas he married Ana Victoria Rangel, by whom he has three children.

Paz returned to his native state, and while establishing a private clinic retained an interest in politics. After the 1945 revolution, he was named Secretary General of *Acción Democrática* in Zulia. In 1946 he became a Zulian Deputy to the National Constituent Assembly, and in 1947 he was elected to the National Chamber of Deputies. During the Pérez Jiménez decade, despite jail and exile, Paz Galarraga organized the Zulian resistance.

Following the dictator's downfall, in 1959, Paz became Secretary General of *Acción Democrática.* In 1968 he served as First Vice President of the People's Electoral Movement and was returned to congress as Senator from Zulia.

MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ

Born in the village of Michelena, Táchira in 1914, the son of a seventy year old farmer, Marcos Pérez Jiménez's military career began with attendance at the *National Escuela Militar* in Caracas. After additional military schooling in Colombia and Perú, he became a Venezuelan Army lieutenant in 1934, eventually returning to the Escuela Militar as an instructor in ballistics and weapons. In 1944 he joined the General Staff as section chief. In this position the plump, bespectacled officer became involved in plotting against the government of President Medina Angarita.

In 1945, Captain Pérez Jiménez played a significant role in the bloody revolution. Three years later, when the military ousted Presi-

dent Gallegos, he again figured prominantly. Although only thirty-eight years of age, he was named Minister of Defense and a member of the three-man ruling military *junta* that replaced Gallegos.

In 1952, Pérez Jiménez proclaimed himself Provisional President, reversing the popular balloting in which the Democratic Republican Union's Jóvito Villalba won the election. His administration became increasingly heavy-handed. Imprisonments, exiles, torturings and murders were occupational hazards for opposing politicians. Relying on armed might and the advice of other military officers from the Andes, Pérez Jiménez governed in the tradition of his predecessor from Táchira, Juan Vicente Gómez. Pérez Jiménez justified a police state by claiming the goal of his regime, "social and economic democracy", was impossible given the chaos and instability that would result from "Western style" democracy.

When forced to flee the country in 1958, Pérez Jiménez settled in Miami, Florida. He was extradited in 1963 from the United States and returned to Caracas, where he was found guilty of embezzling during his decade in power. Jailed, he remained in his television-equipped cell-suite until 1968, when he was freed on the condition that he leave the country. He traveled promptly to Spain.

From Madrid Pérez Jiménez announced that he was not inclined to seek the presidency in 1968, but was willing to run as senator. Polling an unexpectedly large vote, the ex-dictator both won a seat in the National Senate, and the right by virtue of congressional immunity to return to Venezuela.

LUIS BELTRAN PRIETO FIGUEROA

Born in 1902 on Margarita Island, in a town called Copey, Prieto Figueroa began school in La Asunción, Nueva Esparta, but completed his secondary education at the *Liceo Caracas* in the Federal District. In 1934, he graduated from the Central University of Caracas with a degree in political and social sciences.

"El Maestro", as Prieto's followers sometimes call him, first pursued an active career in education. His positions included: Professor of Spanish at the Liceo Andrés Bello and at the Colegio Católico Venezolano; Professor of Sociology at various institutions; founder of the Pedagogic Institute of Venezuela; Professor of the Department of

Philosophy and Education of the Central University of Venezuela; Professor of Adult Education and Literacy at the University of Havana (1950 to 1951); Professor of Education in both Costa Rica and Honduras, where he also was chief of UNESCO's technical assistance mission; a founding member and first president of the Venezuelan Federation of Teachers.

Prieto's accomplishments in politics have been even more noteworthy: a founder and leader of *Acción Democrática,* becoming it's president in 1964; Secretary General of the Revolutionary *Junta* of government in 1945; Minister of National Education from 1947 to 1948; National Senator on three different occasions; President of the Senate, 1962 to 1966. Prieto is married to Cecilia Oliveira de Prieto, a Venezuelan of Portuguese heritage and a former pupil of the "maestro". The couple has seven children. A reader of wide interests, Prieto Figueroa has published twenty-five books. Reflecting on his political thinking he once stated, "I have always moved within a circle of people with open minds, what the Americans would call liberal thinkers, but what we call thinkers of the left".

RAUL RAMOS GIMENEZ

In 1962 Raúl Ramos Giménez, leader of the *Acción Democrática* splinter group, ARS, became the presidential candidate of the *Acción Democrática Oposición* party. Winning only 2.3 percent of the vote, the party's sixth place showing proved unexpectedly low.

Born in 1917, the lawyer-politicians was too young to be a member of "Generation of '28". Nevertheless, in 1945 he was elected to the directorship of *Acción Democrática* and after the 1945 revolution he was appointed governor of Yaracuy. In 1947 he was selected as chairman of the national Congress. After returning from exile, in 1958, he became a member of the Acción Democrática policy committee and later the political secretary of its National Executive Committee. Ramos Giménez also was elected senator from the Federal District in 1958.

ARTURO USLAR PIETRI

In a country where almost every politician labels himself Socialist, Arturo Uslar Pietri is relatively conservative. He champions minimal

governmental "interference" in private enterprise. In 1963, Uslar tried for the presidency, running fourth with sixteen percent of the national vote.

A writer-scholar-politician born in 1906, Uslar has a distinguished record:

1939—1941 — Minister of Education.
1940 — Honorary Doctorate from the University of Puerto Rico.
1941—1943 — Presidential Secretary of the Government.
1943 — Minister of Finance
1945 — Minister of Interior
1957 — Honorary Doctorate from the Central University in Caracas.
1958 — Senator from the Federal District.

Uslar Prietri also has served as Professor of Political Economy and Venezuelan Literature at the Central University of Caracas and as Professor of Spanish American Literature at Columbia University New York.

JOVITO VILLALBA

A member of the "Generation of '28" who did not follow his peers into *Acción Democrática,* Jóvito Villalba founded the third most powerful party in recent Venezuelan history, the Democratic Republican Union (U.R.D.). As the presidential candidate of U.R.D. in 1952, Villalba was the apparent winner until Pérez Jimnénez reversed the results. Again in 1963, the U.R.D. leader tried unsuccessfully for the presidency, receiving 19 percent to the vote, close to Caldera's 20 percent, but considerably behind Leoni's 33 percent. In the election Villalba's greatest strength came from tiny Margarita Island (the state of Nueva Esparta), where 51 percent of the voters supported their "native son".

In 1968, Villalba briefly became the U.R.D. candidate for president, but only until the party aligned behind a coalition candidate. A professor of law who was born in 1908, the *margariteño* has been both imprisoned and exiled for his political activities. Having served as a national deputy and senator since 1959, Villalba retained his Senate seat in the 1968 election.

EDITORIAL
SUCRE
CARACAS